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Sketching the `Söteria Tou Biou' 
Plato and the Art of Measurement 
Introduction and Executive Summary 
In this thesis, I aim to demonstrate that measurement is an important and dynamic 
theme though which Plato explores the nature of arete in a range of dialogues 
covering the early, middle and later periods of his work. 
In chapters 1-3, I will explore the origin of this theme in the Protagoras' metretike 
techne' - an art which involves the maximisation of pleasure in our lives through 
measurement. I suggest that Socrates presents the metretike techne as a sketch of 
the type of wisdom which would be sufficient for arete and which, as such, has the 
potential to be 'the salvation of our lives'. 2 He shows how the metretike techne can 
bring determinacy and accuracy to the decisions we have to make about how we 
should live, because it is founded upon an objective and quantifiable standard for a 
good life. In addition, through its foundation on hedonism, it offers an account of our 
motivation to act consistently upon our knowledge of what is right to do. 
I will argue that, long after the Protagoras, Plato remains committed to the metretike 
techne. While often regarded as an ad hominem device or as tongue-in-cheek, the 
idea of a metretike techne is, in fact, hugely important in shaping Plato's account of 
arete. In chapters 4-6I will trace the refinement of this sketch of arete through the 
Gorgias and Republic. Driving the process of refinement for Plato is the challenge of 
combining the practical strengths which he remains convinced that a metretike 
techne offers with his emerging account of a good and truly pleasant life as 
dependent upon order kosmos in the individual soul and in the state. 
From this process of refinement, as I will discuss in the final chapter, the basilikb 
techne, 3 the statesman's art, emerges in the Statesman as the basis of arete in the 
state. The basilike technd entails measurement of order in the state against the 
standard of 'due measure' to metrion . This art retains the key strengths of the 
original metretike techne, whilst responding to its weaknesses. So, in completing the 
portrait of the statesman, Socrates also completes a sketch of arete as measurement 
which he began in the Protagoras. 
1 Which Socrates introduces at Protagoras 357a. 
2 Protagoras 357a6 - 7. 3 Statesman 311 c5. 
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Chapter 1- Planning the Sketch 
(Protagoras 309a - 351 b) 
1.1 A sketch of wisdom 
In the Protagoras, at 357a6 - 7, Socrates introduces a model of knowledge as the art 
of measurement metretike techn8l and praises it extravagantly as 'the salvation of 
our lives' he söteria tou biou . In this chapter and the next, I will argue that 
Socrates 
makes this claim because he regards the metretike techne as a preliminary sketch of 
what knowledge must be like if it is to provide the basis for living a good life. As with 
any sketch, it will require revision and the adding of further detail, ' but Socrates is 
suggesting that it does capture the essential features of a model of knowledge which 
would be sufficient for arete. The metretike techne sets out the defining 
characteristics of a form of wisdom which, if we were to achieve it in practice, would 
save our lives. It would do this by ensuring that our lives are truly good, thus 
protecting our souls from the dangers of a bad life founded upon a false conception 
of wisdom. 
In putting forward this argument, I hope to challenge those who regard the metretike 
techne as no more than an ad hominem device. 2 I will argue that it represents a real 
and valid answer, albeit one which may require modification, to the central question 
Socrates raises in the Protagoras - what type of knowledge would be sufficient for us 
to live a good life? 
In order to demonstrate that Plato/Socrates does see the metretike techne as serving 
this purpose and that this explains the bold claim Socrates makes for it, I will 
examine the structure of the Protagoras as a whole -a dialogue which takes place in 
the home of Callias where a number of sophists, most notably Protagoras, and their 
' In the next chapter I will discuss the evidence that Socrates fully recognises the preliminary nature of his sketch of 
wisdom. 
2 This view is adopted by, for example, Sullivan (1961), Dyson (1976), Zeyl (1980) and Stokes (1986, pp. 358 - 49). 
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followers have gathered. In this chapter I will look at the first part of the dialogue, up 
to 351 b, and will attempt to show that this part of the dialogue plans and prepares for 
a sketch of the type of knowledge which is sufficient for a good life3 -a sketch which 
will be undertaken later in the dialogue. In particular, it identifies the features which 
must be in the sketch. Just as an artist, in preparation for a portrait, would consider 
which features are essential to achieving a good resemblance, so in the same way 
Socrates prepares for a sketch of human wisdom. I will suggest that, as a result of 
his discussion with Protagoras and the other sophists up to 351 b, he identifies two 
essential features. Firstly, the sketch must show (in other words, answer the question 
of) whether human wisdom is essentially technical or non-technical in nature. 
Secondly, it must show what type of life we must achieve through wisdom in order to 
preserve the safety of the soul. 4 
Is wisdom a techne? 
Firstly, I will discuss how Socrates himself introduces and systematically pursues the 
question of whether wisdom is a techne. I will suggest that, throughout his 
conversation with Protagoras up to 351 b, he explores and challenges the assumption 
that arete is itself a techne, or is like a techne in any significant respect. In doing so, 
his approach is in contrast with many other Socratic dialogues where he draws an 
analogy between the two. Socrates' exploration of the relationship between wisdom 
and techne counts against those who argue that the model of wisdom as the 
metretike techne, when it is introduced later in the dialogue, is no more than an ad 
hominem device which emerges in response to the arguments of the many. Instead it 
represents an answer to a question which Socrates himself has raised about the 
nature of knowledge -a question which is important to him and which has been there 
throughout the dialogue. 
What type of life must wisdom achieve? 
Secondly, I will suggest that the discussion up to 351 b establishes that any practical5 
sketch of the type of wisdom which is sufficient for a good life must take account of 
The type of knowledge which Socrates describes as wisdom - sophla. 
4 In the second introductory frame, 310a8 - 314c2, Socrates warns Hippocrates that the wrong sort of knowledge can 
endanger and damage the human soul. 
5 Practical in the sense of enabling us not only to understand what a good life entails but also to achieve this in 
practice. 
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and reflect what a good life entails. It is, in fact, Protagoras who first makes this point. 
He complains on several occasions that they are discussing arete in vague and 
ambiguous terms, without reference to any clearly defined standard for a good life. 6 
As a result, their discussion results in a series of 'dead ends' which, taken together, 
represent a positive statement of the need to identify and agree a standard for a 
good life upon which a practical sketch of wisdom can be founded. This statement is 
reinforced in a long digression from the central discussion (334d - 338e) which is 
prompted by Socrates' objecting to the length of Protagoras' answers. Socrates and 
Protagoras cannot agree about how long their answers should be7 and it looks as 
though their discussion is going to grind to a halt. However, the assembled company 
helps them to resolve their differences and they eventually agree upon a way 
forward. They agree (or, at least, reluctantly accept) that the appropriate standard for 
their answers will be to metrion mekos (338b1). While this digression is apparently 
concerned with dialectical procedure - with the way Socrates and Protagoras conduct 
their conversation -I will suggest that it does have direct relevance to the actual 
subject of their conversation. It prompts the reader to recognise that, although 
Socrates and Protagoras have now established a clear dialectical standard, they still 
lack a clear standard for a good life upon which to base their sketch of wisdom. Thus 
the digression reinforces the criticism that Protagoras has been making throughout 
their discussion of arete - that they are talking in vague and ambiguous terms, rather 
than referring specifically to what a good life entails. 
In section six of this chapter I will suggest that when, at 351 b, Socrates asks 
Protagoras what a good life Feu zen entails, he begins the process of defining the 
standard they need and thus embarks upon his sketch of wisdom. A question which 
is often seen as a rather abrupt change of tack is, in fact, the point when Socrates 
puts pen to paper in a sketch he has been planning from the very beginning of the 
dialogue. 
1.2 Establishing an enquiry into wisdom 
The main dialogue of the Protagoras is preceded by three introductory frames. Taken 
together, these frames serve to: 
61 will argue that this should be our interpretation of Protagoras' objections at 331d1 - e4 and at 334a3-c6. 
Protagoras' standard is makroioaia, whereas Socrates' standard is brachulooia. 
3 
(i) establish knowledge as a priority within the dialogue; 
(ii) establish a concern, on Socrates' part, with identifying the type of knowledge 
which will enable us to live a good kalon life and which, in doing so, will 
preserve the safety of our souls; 
(iii) introduce a distinction between the knowledge required to perform a particular 
activity or profession and the knowledge (wisdom) which underpins a good 
life. 
In the first frame (309a1 - 310a7), Socrates talks to an unnamed companion and 
updates him on what has been happening. The companion assumes that Socrates 
has been busy pursuing the handsome kalos, 309a3] Alcibiades, but Socrates says 
that he has actually spent the day with Protagoras who caused him to virtually forget 
about Alcibiades. He claims that Protagoras is a finer man tini kallioni, 309c2] than 
Alcibiades, because he is reputed to be the wisest man alive (309d l- 2). This 
introductory conversation emphasises the overriding importance of wisdom to 
Socrates (outweighing any other concerns or preoccupations for him - even 
Alcibiades at his `most delightful age', 309b1) and thus predicts its importance and 
central role within the subsequent dialogue. 
The first frame also establishes to kalon as a standard of value within the dialogue for 
what is good and, therefore, desirable in living our lives. Socrates and his companion 
compare Alcibiades and Protagoras on this basis and Socrates argues that 
Protagoras is kalliön on account of his wisdom. Taylor (1991, pp. 64 - 65) points out 
that this is resonant of Diotima's account in the Symposium of 'erotic education', 
where the lover proceeds from loving physical beauty to loving moral and intellectual 
beauty and, from there, to higher forms of beauty, culminating in beauty itself. 
However, the prominence of this standard of value in the introductory frame also 
predicts its importance within the arguments of the Protagoras itself where, in the 
search to find the type of wisdom which enables us to live a good life, to kalon is the 
principal criterion by which a good life is judged. Protagoras makes clear that he will 
not accept an account of arete that does not fulfil this criterion8 and Socrates takes 
care to establish that the account he proposes will also result in a life which is kalon. 9 
° For example, at 351c1- 2. 
9 For example, at 358b3 - 6. 
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In the second frame (310a8 - 314c2) Socrates makes clear that his concern with 
wisdom does not manifest itself in an unquestioning admiration of all those who claim 
to possess it, but instead in a desire to examine such claims. He describes how 
Hippocrates, a young friend of his, woke him up before day-break because he had 
heard that Protagoras was in town. Hippocrates is very excited to hear of Protagoras' 
arrival, and keen to become his pupil. Since it is far too early to call upon Callias, with 
whom Protagoras is staying, Socrates uses the time to question Hippocrates about 
what he hopes to learn by becoming Protagoras' pupil. He asks Hippocrates to 
consider what type of knowledge Protagoras actually teaches and what effect this will 
have on Hippocrates' soul. Socrates warns that immeasurable damage can be done 
to one's soul by gaining the wrong sort of wisdom, just as we can damage our 
physical health by eating the wrong sort of food. In the case of the soul, Socrates 
suggests, the danger is greater because we cannot carry our learning away in a 
separate container and inspect it before we consume it. We must take extra care, in 
our pursuit of wisdom, to avoid the potential dangers to the soul. These dangers are 
stressed in this frame1° and Socrates makes clear that the preservation and safety of 
our soul depend upon us pursuing only the right sort of wisdom. He thus establishes 
from the outset a concern with identifying the type of wisdom which will keep our 
souls safe. The introductory frame lays the foundation for a search for this type of 
wisdom -a search which will culminate in the discovery of the metretike techne - 
which, Socrates will claim, is the only source of safety for our lives ( söteria tou 
biou, 357a6 - 7]. 
In the second frame, Socrates also introduces an important distinction between the 
type of wisdom which we need to carry out a particular activity or profession and the 
type which we need in order to give a good life. Hippocrates is embarrassed to admit 
that he wants to become a professional sophist. Socrates suggests that, perhaps, he 
does not seek the skills of professional sophistry from Protagoras but, rather, a 
general education for his life as a free citizen: 
'But then perhaps that isn't the sort of study you expect to have with Protagoras, but 
rather the sort you had with the reading master and the music teacher and the 
trainer. You didn't learn any of these in a technical way [g 2i technei , with a view to 
70 The potential danger [kindunosl is emphasised at 313a2&3,314a1&2 and the need to ensure that what 
Hippocrates learns from Protagoras is safe a hal at 313e4. The potentially damaging fDon6ron effects of 
wisdom are made clear at 313a4 - 8,313d2,313e4. 
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becoming a professional yourself, but simply for their educational value ei aideiai , 
as an amateur and a gentleman should. ' (312a7 - b4, Taylor, 1991) 
I will suggest in the next section of this chapter that Socrates' subsequent discussion 
with Protagoras will explore and challenge the relationship between the technical 
knowledge we need to carry out a specific activity or job (knowledge of a techne) and 
the knowledge we need to live our lives. The introductory frame introduces this 
distinction and thus lays the foundation of the subsequent discussion. 
The third frame (314c3 - 317e2) describes the eventual arrival of Socrates and 
Hippocrates at Callias' house and gives a detailed description of the scene inside the 
house where the rest of the dialogue will take place. The house is full of people who 
claim to be wise and to teach wisdom, and of their followers who have an 
unquestioning admiration for their wisdom. Hippocrates (and the reader) is now 
aware, however, of the potential danger to the souls of both teachers and pupils. The 
stroppy doorkeeper, who represents a physical barrier to Hippocrates' entry into the 
world of the sophists (314c - e), reminds us that Socrates has also created a barrier 
in Hippocrates' mind. This barrier has curbed his eagerness to meet Protagoras to 
the point where he is happy to stand outside his house and finish a conversation 
before entering, when only a few hours ago he was waking Socrates up before dawn 
because he was so excited about meeting Protagoras. 11 It will prevent Hippocrates 
from becoming a devoted admirer of Protagoras until he is satisfied that it is safe (for 
his soul) to do so. The resistance Socrates has created in Hippocrates' mind 
contrasts with the openness of Protagoras' followers to his teaching - an openness 
which is illustrated, physically, by their care never to stand in his way. 12 
Taken together, the three introductory frames not only prepare the ground for an 
enquiry into the nature of wisdom, but also establish the values which will drive this 
enquiry. We know that the dialogue will seek to find the type of wisdom which 
underpins a life which is good kalon and thus protects the safety of our souls. In 
" The gradual arrival of dawn during the introductory frames illustrates Hippocrates' gradual awareness of the 
potential dangers of becoming Protagoras' pupil. Socrates draws attention to the gradual process of enlightenment: 
'He blushed - day was already beginning to break, so that I could see him - and replied, "If its like what we said 
before, obviously I should be hoping to become a sophist"' (312a2 - 4, Taylor, 1991) 
12 Socrates describes how'I was absolutely delighted by this procession [of Protagoras' followers], to see how careful 
they were that nobody ever got In Protagoras' way, but whenever he and his companions turned round, those 
followers of his turned smartly outwards In formation to left and right, wheeled round and so every time formed up In 
perfect order behind him. ' (315b2 - 8, Taylor, 1991) 
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particular, it will explore whether or not this knowledge is a techne. The metretike 
techne will ultimately emerge as the type of wisdom which can fulfil these criteria. 
1.3 Techne as a 'lens' for the enquiry 
Socrates begins his enquiry by asking Protagoras (318a ff. ) how Hippocrates will 
benefit from becoming Protagoras' pupil. Protagoras' first answers are vague but, 
eventually, he offers a clear description of his profession: 
'What I teach is the proper management of one's own affairs, how best to run one's 
household, and the management of public affairs, how to make the most effective 
contribution to the affairs of the city both by word and action. ' (318e5 - 319a2, 
Taylor, 1991) 
It thus becomes clear that Protagoras is offering to teach what Hippocrates wants to 
learn, and that there is a basis for further discussion between them. Protagoras is 
concerned with teaching the wisdom that will help Hippocrates to live well, both in his 
private life and in his public life as a citizen. This seems entirely in line with what, as 
Socrates has helped him to clarify (312a7 - b6), Hippocrates wants to learn from 
Protagoras. So, it is worth their while to stay and talk further with Protagoras. 
Having established what type of wisdom Protagoras claims to teach, Socrates raises 
the question of whether such wisdom is actually teachable. 
'Have I understood you correctly, then, I said. You seem to me to be professing the 
art of being a citizen ten Dolitik6n technen, 319a4], and to be promising to make men 
into good citizens. 
[Protagoras] That, Socrates, he said, is precisely what I undertake to do. 
[Socrates] It's a splendid technique technema to have acquired kektesai ,I said, if 
you have in fact acquired it (for I shall not say, particularly to you, anything other than 
what I really think). I didn't think that that was something that could be taught, but 
since you say that you teach it I don't see how I can doubt you. ' (319a3 - b1, Taylor, 
1991 amended)13 
" Cf. Taylor's original translation: 'Have I understood you correctly, then, I said. You seem to me to be talking about 
the art of running a city [tom litik@ hnen , and to be promising to make men Into good citizens. 
[Protagoras] That. Socrates, he said, Is precisely what I undertake to do. 
7 
In this passage, Socrates carefully re-frames the description which Protagoras gave 
of his profession at 318e5 - 319a2 as the bold claim that the wisdom that underpins 
a good life as a citizen is just another techne. He suggests, specifically, that 
Protagoras is claiming that: 
(a) there is a techne of being a good citizen (319a3 - 4) 
(b) he has mastery of this techne (319a8 - 9), and 
(c) he can teach this techne to others, thus making them good citizens (319a4 - 5). 
Taylor's translation of leggin at 319a4 as 'talking about' does not bring Socrates' 
point out clearly. His point is not that Protagoras is simply'talking about' a techne of 
good citizenship - but that he is making the bold and controversial claim that such a 
techne exists. I would, therefore, suggest translating le ein as 'profess', in order to 
emphasise Protagoras' confirmed belief in the existence of such a techne. Taylor 
translates kektesai (319a8 - 9) as 'discovered'. This does not, however, convey 
Socrates' suggestion that Protagoras is claiming to have mastered this techne. I 
have, therefore, translated it as 'acquired'. 
If Protagoras' claims are true, Socrates suggests, then he has acquired a fine 
technique technema . Taylor's translation of technema as 'thing' does not convey 
adequately that Socrates is representing Protagoras' statement of his profession as a 
statement about the technical nature of wisdom. I have adopted instead Lombardo 
and Bell's translation (1992) of technema as technique. The word technema, 
however, has implications not only of technique and craftsmanship but also of deceit 
and trickery. Socrates' use of this word leads us to view Protagoras' claims critically. 
Protagoras is treating the wisdom required to live a good life as a techne which we 
can learn in much the same way as we learn, for example, the flute. But in doing so 
is he really offering us a practical means of living a good life or is he just tricking us? 
I will attempt to demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter (and in chapter 2) how 
the question of whether wisdom can be a techne underpins Socrates' enquiry into 
wisdom. At this stage, however, I would just like to draw attention to the important 
role of 319a3 - b1 in establishing this question. Socrates carefully reframes 
[Socrates] It's a splendid thing rtechn6ma to have discovered ek ai ,I said, if you have in fact discovered it 
(for I 
shall not say, particularly to you, anything other than what I really think). I didn't think that that was something that 
could be taught, but since you say that you teach it I don't see how I can doubt you: 
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Protagoras' description of his profession and suggests that Protagoras is making the 
bold claim that living a good life as a citizen is a techne which can be taught and 
learnt like any other. At the same time, Socrates carefully chooses language which 
simultaneously casts doubt on this claim. Roochnik (1996) argues that in the 
Protagoras (and throughout the 'early' Socratic dialogues) Socrates' use of the 
techne analogy is not intended to present techne as a model or blueprint for arete14 
but rather as a 'lens' (p. 14) through which to explore the respects in which arete 
differs from a techne and thus to understand what arete really entails. 15 This certainly 
seems to be the case at this stage of the dialogue; Socrates' discussion of 
Protagoras' profession at 318e5 - 319a2 serves to put techne in place as a 'lens' 
through which we can explore and challenge whether the wisdom that is sufficient for 
arete is like a techne in the sense that it can be systematically taught and learnt. 16 
Socrates' Opening Speech: 319a8 - 320c1 
Our first view through this lens is provided by Socrates who, from 319b to 320c, 
offers a perspective on the question of whether wisdom is a techne. He explains that 
he had thought that the wisdom which underpins a good life is not a teachable techne 
which can be learnt, but a natural ability which is shared by everyone to some extent. 
To justify this opinion he describes how the Athenian assembly always calls upon 
experts for advice on matters which it regards as technical en technei, 319c7 - 8] but 
when it comes to the management of the city ej tön op leös tes dioikeseös, 319c8 - 
dl] it will accept advice from anyone, because it believes all are equally qualified. He 
goes on to describe how, in their private lives, good citizens have been unable to 
teach their ability to live well to their children, because this ability cannot be taught 
(Pericles' education of his own children is cited). So, Socrates suggests strongly that 
14 Roochnik (1996, p. 6) refers to this as the Standard Account of Techn6 (SAT) in the early Socratic Dialogues, an 
account which he challenges. He suggests that, according to this account, 'the e hn6 analogy In the early 
dialogues provides a serious, positive theoretical model for the moral knowledge Socrates seeks. ' 
15 Roochnik (1996, p. 13) compares Plato's use of techn to the use made by other fifth- and fourth-century authors 
who often began by asking the stock question of their subject, 'Is it really a technd? '. Roochnik suggests that: 'When 
an author asks of his own work, Is it a echne ? he engages in a self-reflection that forces him to raise epistemological 
questions about both the nature of his subject matter and his cognitive access to it. As a result, these writings broach, 
with various degrees of explicitness, many of the same issues that surface when the X becomes moral knowledge as 
it does in the early Platonic dialogues. ' 
1° While I support Roochnik's view that in the Protagoras Socrates uses techn6 as a lens through which to 
view/understand what rt entails, rather than just as a straightforward analogy for it, I will argue in the next chapter 
against his conclusion that the view through this lens shows a model of rt which is essentially non-technical. 
Instead I will suggest that the technd lens ultimately shows that wisdom, if It is to be practical (in the sense of 
enabling us to achieve a good life in practice), must share some of the key characteristics of e hn . 
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living a good life, either in the public arena of managing the state or as a private 
citizen, is not a technical ability which can be learnt or taught. 
Socrates' language in his opening speech also carefully emphasises a distinction 
between the ability to perform a specific task/profession well and the ability to live a 
good life. The former is described as techne, the latter as arete, and Socrates takes 
care not to blur this distinction. All the things which can be taught and learnt are 
summarised as being 'en technei', 319c7 -8- matters of techne; building and 
shipbuilding are cited as examples. They are the province of a craftsman 
fdemiouraon, 319c2 - 3]. Socrates does not describe them as arete at any point in his 
opening speech. Similarly, when he is talking about living a good life (either in 
managing the city well, or in one's personal life), he describes it only as arete (not 
techne). " Socrates takes great care to keep the language he uses to describe 
professional expertise entirely separate from the language he uses to describe living 
well. Only at one point does he blur this distinction when, just before his long speech, 
at 319a4, he summarises Protagoras' description of his profession as Mn olitiken 
technen'. Here, the ability to live well as a citizen is described as a techne. At this 
point, however, Socrates is speaking on Protagoras' behalf, not his own. He is 
summarising Protagoras' description of his own profession and, therefore, reflects 
Protagoras' failure (as Socrates sees it) to distinguish between arete and techne in 
describing what he teaches. 
Socrates' clear distinction between techne and arete appears to be in sharp contrast 
with the way he uses techne in many other dialogues, as an analogy for arete. 
However, the Protagoras does eventually result in the positive conclusion that arete 
is a techne - the metretike techne. I would suggest that it is for this reason that 
Socrates wants to demonstrate in this particular dialogue that he is not assuming any 
similarity between techne and arete. Since the outcome of the dialogue is that arete 
is a techne, he wants to make it clear that this conclusion is the result of sound 
dialectic and not of any unjustified assumptions about the relationship between arete 
and techne. In order to do this, he begins by making a clear distinction between the 
two -a distinction which is noticeable by the absence of such a distinction in many 
other dialogues. Socrates' care in ensuring that he does not assume any similarity 
between techne and arete is, I would suggest, evidence that he intends us to take it 
seriously when he does, eventually, identify the two. 
17 319e2,320a3,320b5,320c1. 
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Protagoras' Speech: 320c2 - 328d2 
Socrates has challenged Protagoras on three specific points about the relationship 
between arete and techne. He has challenged whether: 
(a) there is a techne of being a good citizen; 
(b) this techne can be taught to others, thus making them good citizens; 
(c) Protagoras himself has mastery of this techne and is able to teach it to others. 18 
Protagoras responds to the first challenge - the challenge of proving that there is a 
techne of being a good citizen - by telling a muthos (320c2 - 322d5) about the 
creation of mortals by the gods. He describes how Prometheus and Epimetheus, on 
behalf of all the gods, distributed the attributes required for the preservation of mortal 
life. Epimetheus failed to provide for the human race at all and used up all their 
resources on ensuring the survival of animals. So, Prometheus stole technical 
wisdom ten entechnon sophian, 321 d1], together with fire, from Athena and 
Hephaestus, and gave this to the human race. This specialist expertise19 was not 
sufficient, however, to keep the human race safe. It enabled it to provide food for 
itself, but not to sustain the communities on which its long-term survival depended. 
Living in a community also required politikC- techne, which Prometheus could not 
obtain for them as it was controlled by Zeus. So, the human race remained in danger 
of destruction until Zeus intervened and instructed Hermes to distribute justice (dike) 
and conscience (aidös) to all humans. 
Aidös and dike are not identified directly as politikd techne within the muthos. 
Instead, Protagoras describes them, more poetically, as 'the principles of 
organization of cities and the bonds of friendship' (322c3, Taylor, 1991). 1 would 
suggest, however, that we are justified in taking them to represent olitike techne in 
the muthos and that it is important to Protagoras' argument that we do take them in 
this way. There are three main justifications for doing so. Firstly, we are told 
specifically that Zeus intervened because the human race lacked olp itike techne and 
78 I suggested above that these three claims are attributed to Protagoras by Socrates at 319a3 - b1 and that 
Socrates' first speech (319b1 ff. ) challenges these claims. 
19 DCmiouraike to hn , 322b3. In this particular context, this Is used by Protagoras to describe a skill which is held 
only by a limited group of specialist craftsmen. It becomes an important term within Protagoras' argument, when he 
contrasts d@miouraikd e hn with litik e hn which, he argues, is a non-specialist form of technö. 
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that he was concerned about the consequences of this lack. It seems reasonable, 
therefore, that he would intervene by providing olitike techne - not by providing 
something else. Secondly, the way aidös and dike are described in the muthos is 
entirely in line with the way olitike techne is described. We are told that olitike 
techne was required for humans to be able to gather together [hathroidzesthai, 
322b6] in cities and communities, rather than living in scattered settlements 
s oraden, 322b1]. Similarly, we are told that aidös and dike are the'ordering 
principles' kosmoi, 322c3] of cities and the 'uniting bonds' fdesmoi... sunagögoi, 
322c3] of friendship. The essential features of aidös and dike - the ability to bring 
people together in harmonious communities - are the same as those of the olp itike 
techne. Finally, Zeus suggests that Hermes should not distribute aidös and dike in 
the same way as the other technal were distributed h6s er allön technön, 322d3 - 
4], possibly implying that they are themselves technai. The failure to describe aidös 
and dike specifically as olitike techne, may just represent a choice on Protagoras' 
behalf, to adopt a more 'poetic' description when describing something which is 
bestowed by Zeus. 
If we do accept the identity of aidös and dike with olp itike techne, then Protagoras' 
muthos responds directly to Socrates' first challenge. It suggests that excellence as a 
citizen is, indeed, a techne. In fact, it is the most important techne of all, upon which 
the survival of the human race ultimately depends. 20 At the same time the muthos 
demonstrates that Socrates' reason for doubting its being a techne is unfounded. 
Socrates has presented the city's failure to recognise specialist21 technical expertise 
on how the city should be managed as firm evidence that they do not acknowledge 
the existence of any technical expertise at all on this subject. Protagoras, through his 
muthos, suggests that Socrates is failing to distinguish between specialist and non- 
specialist technical expertise. Specialist technai are possessed only by a few, and 
this is sufficient to meet the needs of the whole community. Politike techne, in 
contrast, is a non-specialist form of techne which must be held by everyone if the city 
is to flourish. This distinction between specialist and political techne is made very 
clear when Hermes asks how he must distribute olitike techne: 
'Now Hermes asked Zeus about the manner in which he was to give conscience 
faid6sl and justice dike to men: "Shall I distribute these in the same way as the 
20 Its importance is emphasised by the fact that it is described as' ar ILI Qi' (controlled by Zeus, 321d5) and we are 
told that none of the other gods could have access to it. 
21 Specialist in the sense of being mastered by only a limited number of practitioners. 
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arts? These are distributed thus: one doctor is sufficient for many laymen, and so 
with the other experts fdemiourgoil. Shall I give justice and conscience to men in that 
way too, or distribute them to all? " 
"To all", said Zeus, "and let all share in them; for cities could not come into being, if 
only a few shared in them as in the other arts. And lay down on my authority a law 
that he who cannot share in conscience and justice is to be killed as a plague on the 
city". ' (322c3 - d5, Taylor, 1991) 
Protagoras goes on to spell out specifically how the muthos has responded to 
Socrates' argument. It has demonstrated why the Athenians will accept advice from 
all citizens as to how the city should be governed. This is not because they don't 
believe it is a techne, but because they recognise it is not a techne which is 
possessed only by a few specialist craftsmen, but one which is universal. Socrates, 
Protagoras implies, is just muddled about the nature of techne; he has wrongly 
assumed that each techne is the province of a specific expert fdemiourgosl. In fact, 
some technai are held by everyone to some extent because human life itself 
depends upon it: 
'So that, Socrates, is why when there is a question about how to do well in carpentry 
or any other expertise alles tinos demiouraikesl, everyone including the Athenians 
thinks it right that only a few should give advice, and won't put up with advice from 
anyone else, as you say - and quite right too, in my view - but when it comes to 
consideration of how to do well in running the city, which must proceed entirely 
through justice and soundness of mind, they are right to accept advice from anyone, 
since it is incumbent on everyone to share in that sort of excellence, or else there can 
be no city at all. ' (322d5 - 323a3, Taylor, 1991) 
The preservation söteria of life from destruction is a continuous theme throughout 
the muthos. Epimetheus ensures that animals are saved from destruction by the 
physical attributes he gives them, 22 and Prometheus tries to do the same for humans 
by providing them with techne23 This does not prove to be enough for the 
preservation of human life, however, and Zeus, who is himself concerned about the 
22 We are told that he devised for each animal a power I'dunaml n to ensure their safety ei sbterian, 320e31 from 
other animals. He kept some safe Fes6lzen, 321a1], for example, by their size, and took care to protect all animals 
from mutual destruction fallOloothorian, 321a3]. He also ensured the safety Is6t6rian, 321b6] of those species which 
were a food-source for others, by making them prolific. 
23 Prometheus was at a loss as to how to secure the s6tOria of the human race [321 c8] when all their resources had 
been used up on animals, and so stole chn from Athena and Hephaestus. 
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destruction of the human race, intervenes by providing olitike techne. Thus the 
survival of the human race is ensured. By emphasising this theme within the muthos, 
Protagoras refers to a concern which Socrates emphasised in the opening frame of 
the dialogue, namely that they should identify the type of wisdom which will keep 
their lives safe. He emphasises that the söteria which Socrates is seeking rests in the 
possession of a techne - ultimately, Socrates will agree with him (so the final 
conclusion of the dialogue is foreshadowed even at this early stage). 
Protagoras has yet to respond to Socrates' second challenge, however, namely to 
show that politil<8 techne can be taught. If he is to uphold the claim which he has 
made in his muthos - that there is a olitike techne - he must demonstrate that this 
techne is teachable. Otherwise, its right to be regarded as a techne is in doubt. 24 To 
respond to this challenge, Protagoras moves away from using muthos and employs 
logos instead. 25 He refers first (323c - 324d) to the Athenians' punishment of those 
who are not good citizens. Their use of punishment, he claims, is evidence of their 
belief that good citizenship can be taught. Furthermore, he argues (323c - 326e) 
that, contrary to what Socrates has claimed, excellent citizens do indeed teach their 
children politik6 techne; it is an integral part of every aspect of their upbringing and 
education, until they are adults. At this stage, the state assumes the role of educator, 
by subjecting them to its laws. The only reason (326e - 328b) why some of the 
children of excellent citizens do not appear to learn olitike arete is that some have a 
much greater aptitude than others. 
Having argued that excellence as a citizen is teachable, Protagoras replies to 
Socrates' third challenge - that is, to demonstrate that Protagoras himself has 
mastery of this techne. Protagoras explains that his mastery of this techne is evident 
from the way he charges his pupils (328b - c). He is sufficiently confident that his 
pupils will be satisfied that they have learnt political excellence from him, that he 
gives them the choice as to whether they pay him. 
The language Protagoras uses throughout his argument makes clear that not only 
does he regard political excellence as a techne, but that, in fact, he believes arete 
24 Roochnik (1996, p. 26) argues that from a very early stage in the use of the word (from Homeric times), echn Is 
taken to require 'mastery of rational principles that can be explained and, therefore, taught. 
25 The precise stage at which he makes this transition is, however, hard to identify. From 322d to 323a, where he 
explains the relevance of the muthos to Socrates' argument, it can be claimed that he is still dealing with muthos. 
From 323a4 he appears to have moved away from any reference to the muthos and to be using reasoned argument, 
but it is not until 324d that Protagoras himself acknowledges that he is beginning to use logos. 
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and techne are interchangeable as appropriate terms to describe either succeeding 
in a specific craft or in life as a whole. For Protagoras the professions which Socrates 
has described as technai are themselves examples of arete. So, for example, at 
322d7 he speaks of arete tektonike (excellence in carpentry) whereas Socrates has 
described such practical expertise only as techne (319c7 - 8). 26 At 323a7 - 8, 
Protagoras refers to practical skill in flute playing and in other activities as 'en tais 
allais aretais'. Similarly, the ability to live well as a citizen - an ability which Socrates 
described only as arete - is, for Protagoras, itself a techne. At 327b, he suggests that 
no one is reluctant to share their knowledge of justice or the laws, in the same way 
that they are reluctant with 'tön allön technematön' (327b1) - justice is treated as a 
techne, albeit one which is shared by everyone. At 327c6 - 7, he refers to even the 
wickedest citizen being a 'craftsman' in the art of justice dikaion auton kai 
demiourcion toutou tou pragmatosl. 27 Protagoras' use of techne and arete as 
interchangeable terms contrasts with Socrates' careful distinction between the two in 
his first argument. It serves to emphasise how different his position is from Socrates' 
own at this stage, and at the same time, to look ahead to the time when Socrates, 
too, will be forced to abandon the distinction. 
Testin4 Protagoras' claim to techne 
Socrates doesn't appear to reply directly to Protagoras' argument. Instead he asks a 
question about the relationship between the different parts of arete: 
'You said that Zeus bestowed justice and conscience on mankind, and then many 
times in your discourse you spoke of justice and soundness of mind and holiness and 
all the rest as all summed up as the one thing, excellence. Will you then explain 
26 Adkins (1973, p. 6) points out that Protagoras' use of aret , rather than e 
hn6, to refer to excellence in a practical 
activity such as carpentry Is unusual. Techn6 denotes competence and expertise and this would be, Adkins argues, 
the more usual way of referring to expertise in a practical skill. He explains (p. 11) Protagoras' use of aret to describe 
the skill of the carpenter as an attempt to appeal to artisans in his audience (who, he suggests, would see in the 
application of the term art to a craft the suggestion that they too have the excellence which was 'traditionally the 
prerogative of the wealthier members of society'). Adkins believes Protagoras is speaking 'with the suspicions of a 
mass audience in mind' (p. 10). This interpretation would seem plausible were it not (as Stokes points out, 1986, 
p. 211) that Protagoras isn't speaking to a mass audience. The initial scene in Callias' house has made it clear that it 
is a select and educated private audience. Instead, It seems more likely that Plato highlights Protagoras' broad 
interpretation of rt in order to create a contrast with the restricted sense in which Socrates has used the term. 
27 By comparison with those who have been not been brought up In a civilised society. Here, through his use of the 
word 'demiouraikos', Protagoras makes the point that all citizens possess 'expertise' in aretO; it Is not the province of 
a limited few. 
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precisely whether excellence is one thing, and justice and soundness of mind and 
holiness parts of it, or whether all of these that I've just mentioned are different 
names of one and the same thing. This is what I still want to know. ' (329c2 - d2, 
Taylor, 1991) 
Protagoras replies (329d3 - 4) that arete is a single thing and that the other qualities 
are parts of it. Socrates goes on to question the nature of the relationship between 
the parts and the whole. He asks whether it is like the relationship between the face 
and its features, or like the relationship between a piece of gold and its 
homogeneous parts; Protagoras replies (329d8 - e2) that it is more like the former. 
Socrates then enquires whether one part of virtue can be present without the others 
and Protagoras confirms his belief (329e - 330b) that it can, because each of the 
individual parts of arete is different from the other, both in itself and in its capacity 
fdunamis This line of questioning would seem, at first, to bear very little relationship 
to the previous argument about whether excellence as citizen is a techne which can 
be taught. In fact, there is a direct relationship between the two. For Socrates, one of 
the distinguishing features of a craftsman is his ability to understand how the relevant 
parts of his `product' relate to one another and combine to create an ordered whole. 
Similarly, a distinguishing feature of the product of a techne is that it is an ordered, 
structured whole within which the component parts are arranged so as to achieve the 
effectiveness of the whole. Socrates makes this clear, for example, in the Gorgias 
when he says to Callicles: 
'Look for instance if you like at painters, builders, shipwrights, all other craftsmen 
[demiourgousl - whichever one you like; see how each of them arranges in a 
structure whatever he arranges, and compels one thing to be fitting and suitable to 
another, until he composes the whole thing arranged in a structure and order. All 
craftsmen [demiourgoil, including those we were talking of just now, gymnastic- 
trainers, and doctors, form the body into order and structure, don't they. Do we agree 
that this is so, or not? ' (Gorgias 503e4 - 504a3, Irwin, 1979) 
Socrates sees an essential mark of the true craftsman as the ability to understand 
the structure and order of the product of his techne, in terms of the relationship of its 
parts to the whole and to each other. An essential mark of the product of a real 
techne is that it is characterised by this order. Protagoras is claiming that the ability to 
live well is a techne of which he has mastery. Socrates challenges him to 
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demonstrate that this is the case by asking him to demonstrate his understanding of 
the structure of a good life (the 'product' of living well). 
In the arguments which follow, Socrates puts this understanding to the test, by 
challenging the replies which Protagoras has given regarding the 'order' and 
'structure' of a good life. He does so through a series of arguments which examine 
the relationship between the individual parts of arete. It is important to remember that 
the question underpinning all of these arguments continues to be whether arete is a 
techne which can be learned and taught. Socrates is testing whether Protagoras can 
demonstrate that arete does have a determinate and ordered structure - the hallmark 
of any techne. Techne continues to be the 'lens' through which Socrates examines 
the type of wisdom required to live a good life. 
1.4 An obscured view? 
The validity of each of the arguments through which Socrates challenges Protagoras' 
understanding of the structure of arete has been the subject of much discussion. In 
this section, I will explore why Protagoras is so unhappy with each argument. As a 
result of his objections, each argument is either abandoned before a conclusion is 
reached, or the conclusion is effectively forced upon him when he is clearly unhappy 
with it. In every case, I will suggest, Socrates' and Protagoras' failure to reach 
agreement on the relationship between the different parts of arete is due to a failure 
to define the principal terms which are used within the argument - that is, to define 
what the terms mean in the context of a good life. Socrates and Protagoras are 
exploring what kind of ability is needed to achieve a good life (or, more specifically, 
whether or not this ability is a techne), without referring specifically to the nature of a 
good life. Their view of the nature of arete is obscured by the vague and non-specific 
language with which they are attempting to depict it. I will attempt to demonstrate this 
by considering each of the arguments in turn: 
Justice and Holiness: 330c1 - 332a1 
In the first argument, Socrates focuses upon whether justice (dikaiosune) and 
holiness (hosiotes) are alike, and argues that they are homoiotaton [331 b5]. 
Protagoras does not accept this, however. He points out that some aspect of 
resemblance can be found between almost any two things, and claims that this is not 
sufficient to describe them as alike. 
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`Very well then, he said. Justice resembles holiness in a way; since in fact anything 
resembles anything else in some way or other. There is a respect in which white 
resembles black, and hard soft, and all the other things that seem completely 
opposite to each other. We said before that the parts of the face have different 
powers and are not like one another. Well, in a way each one does resemble and is 
like the others. So by this line of argument you could prove, if you wanted to, that 
these too are all similar to one another. But it isn't right to call things similar homoia 
just because they have some point of similarity homofon ti , 
however small, nor 
dissimilar if they have some dissimilarity. ' (331d1 - e4, Taylor, 1991) 
Protagoras does not explain the circumstance in which he believes we are justified in 
saying that two things are alike. However, we can look to our own use of the term to 
help us understand what he may be suggesting. When we do call two things alike, 
we mean that the similarities which we have identified between them are important or 
relevant within the context of our discussion. So, for example, I say to a friend that 
my two cousins are very alike. In fact, they are dissimilar in many respects - they 
look very different and are different ages. However, my friend and I are talking about 
the personalities of my family members. My cousins have many similarities in their 
personality (both, for example, have bad tempers) and so I feel justified in saying that 
they are alike. 
I would suggest that Protagoras is making the point that he and Socrates have not 
identified or agreed what the relevant/important resemblance or similarity is in the 
context of arete. As a result, they have no justification for describing the different 
parts of arete as alike. They are relying upon an adjective [homoiosl which, as 
Protagoras points out, can be used in an almost unlimited number of contexts 
(anything is like anything else in some respects). Our use of the word only becomes 
meaningful and justified when we have agreed which likenesses are relevant in the 
context of our discussion. 
So, Socrates' argument fails, to the extent that Protagoras remains reluctant to agree 
that justice and holiness are alike: 
[Socrates] `I was astonished. Do you really think, I said, that the just and the holy 
have nothing more than some slight similarity to one another? 
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Not exactly, he [Protagoras] said, but then again it isn't as you seem to suppose. ' 
(331 e5 - 332a 1, Taylor, 1991) 
In objecting to Socrates' use of homoios within his argument, Protagoras introduces 
a difficulty, which he does not state explicitly at this stage, but which will become 
explicit later in the dialogue. If their use of the word `alike' is to be meaningful, they 
must agree what the word means in the context of their discussion. In other words, 
they must agree which similarities between justice and holiness are relevant to living 
a good life. To achieve this, however, they must begin with a shared understanding 
of what a good life entails and it becomes clear that they do not have this. 
Wisdom and Soundness of Mind: 332a2 - 333b6 
Socrates goes on to explore whether wisdom (sophia) is the same as soundness of 
mind (söphrosune). This time the basis of his argument is that both of these parts of 
arete have the same opposite (aphrosune) and that they are, therefore, one and the 
same thing. In the previous argument, Protagoras made the point that the principal 
adjective (homoios) which they were using to explore the relationship between two 
parts of arete, could be used in many different contexts. Since they had not agreed 
how 'homoios' was to be defined in the context of arete, Protagoras regarded this line 
of argument as pointless. I would suggest that Protagoras believes the same difficulty 
applies to the use of the adjective 'opposite' enantion within Socrates' argument 
from 332a2 - 333b6. The word 'opposite' is usually used to refer to two things which 
are opposed to each other either in their physical location or in their characteristics. It 
describes the position of two things at different ends of a scale from one another, 
whether this scale is one of physical location or of character. For our use of the word 
to be meaningful, however, it is necessary to have identified what the relevant scale 
is. If, for example, we are talking about (if our scale is) intensity/shade of colour, then 
white is the opposite of black. But in other respects, white and black are not opposite; 
they do have similarities; for example, both are colours and both appear on a chess 
board and on a zebra. 
So, if the term `opposite' is to be used meaningfully in the context of living a good life, 
we must first identify what it means within this context. What scale are we using to 
judge the extent to which two abilities differ from one another in respect of achieving 
a good life? If Socrates is claiming that two parts of arete have the same opposite - 
aphrosune - then we must be clear on what scale we are judging their opposition. 
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Protagoras does not state explicitly that the basis of his objection to Socrates' 
argument is that Socrates is, once again, using an adjective without having defined 
its meaning in the context of their discussion. We are told only that he agreed 'very 
reluctantly' fmal'akontös, 333b4] to the conclusion of the argument that wisdom and 
soundness of mind have the same opposite; the reason for his reluctance is not 
stated. However, when Socrates makes the point that they have now established the 
unity of two pairs of virtues, we are reminded that Protagoras' objection to the basis 
of the first conclusion (about the unity of justice and holiness) would apply equally 
well in this case: 
'So good sense and wisdom would seem to be one and the same, would they not? 
And previously, you recall, we saw that justice and holiness were virtually the same. ' 
(333b4 - 6, Taylor, 1991). 
Socrates' statement appears, at face value, to be a reminder of their progress so far 
(as he sees it). However, it also serves to remind us that Protagoras was unhappy 
with the first conclusion they reached, just as he is now unhappy with the second. In 
doing so, it leads us to recall why Protagoras objected to the first conclusion and to 
recognise that the very same objection applies here. Both of Socrates' arguments 
have relied upon terms which have not been adequately defined in the context of 
living a good life. This implied difficulty becomes explicit in the next argument. 
Justice and Soundness of Mind: 333b7 - 333e1 
From 333b7, Socrates begins to question Protagoras about the relationship between 
justice (dikaiosune) and good sense (söphrosune). His strategy is to make 
Protagoras consider whether to act unjustly can ever, at the same time, be to act with 
good sense. In doing so, Socrates puts Protagoras in a rather uncomfortable position 
by forcing him, effectively, to choose between: 
(i) accepting that an unjust act can, nevertheless, be an example of good sense 
because it enables the perpetrator to succeed eu prattein, 333d7]. By accepting this, 
Protagoras would support Socrates' argument that each part of arete is different, but 
would undermine his moral reputation as a teacher of young citizens. Protagoras 
clearly feels that in his position, he must be seen to hold and profess strong moral 
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values. He is ashamed to agree to any conclusions which might suggest that, as a 
teacher, he would advocate that his pupils should sometimes act unjustly. 28 
(ii) denying that an unjust act can ever be an example of good sense. Protagoras is 
aware that, in doing so, he would undermine his claim that he teaches people how to 
succeed in their public and private lives. He knows that many people believe that 
individual success is often the result of injustice rather than of justice, and would be 
sceptical that an education, founded on the principle of acting justly in all situations, 
will give them (or their children) the best chance of success in life. 
So, Protagoras is faced with a dilemma. He reluctantly accepts that on occasion 
people do act with good sense in acting unjustly, and that they succeed eu 
prattousin, 333d7 - 8] as a result of their injustice. 
The good and the beneficial (333d9 - 334c6) 
At 333d, Socrates introduces the question of what is good for men: 
`Now, I said, are those things good which are beneficial ö helima to men? ' (333d9 - 
e1, Taylor, 1991) 
In raising this question, Socrates is not moving away from the current line of 
discussion, as might appear to be the case, but clarifying how they define the 
success eu rattein which he and Protagoras have just'agreed' can be the result of 
injustice. If we describe our lives as successful, this suggests a belief that we have 
achieved something which is good for ourselves, or for others (or both). So Socrates 
raises the question of how we measure our success and suggests that by achieving 
something good, we mean achieving something beneficial. 
By asking whether what is good for men is what benefits them, Socrates makes 
Protagoras' dilemma worse. Protagoras has admitted that on occasion men succeed 
as a result of injustice. If he now accepts the resulting benefit to the individual as the 
criterion by which an action is judged to be good or bad, he must then admit either: 
28 [Socrates] 'Do you think that a man who acts unjustly is sensible in so acting? 
[Protagoras] I should be ashamed to assent to that, Socrates, he said, though many people say so. ' (333b8 - c3, 
Taylor, 1991) 
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(i) that in teaching men to be just he teaches them something which is often of no 
benefit to them, or; 
(ii) that, in order to benefit his pupils, he teaches them injustice. 
At the heart of Protagoras' difficulty with each of Socrates' arguments to establish the 
unity of arete is Protagoras' personal conviction that each part of arete has its own 
distinguishing characteristics29 and that wisdom on its own cannot be sufficient for a 
good life. This conviction30 becomes clear in the course of the dialogue up to 334 
and is reflected dramatically in Protagoras' becoming increasingly resistant to and 
annoyed with Socrates' attempts to establish the unity of arete: 
`I could see that Protagoras was annoyed ftetrachunthail by this time, and that he 
was ready for a verbal battle a 6nian and keen to get to grips; so when I saw that, I 
took care to put my questions in a mild manner. ' (333e1 - 5, Taylor, 1991). 
Protagoras does not entirely reject Socrates' definition of what is good, however, but 
instead he points out that that 'beneficial' also refers to things which are not good for 
men, but are good for other things: 
'My goodness, yes, he said, and there are things I call good even though they aren't 
beneficial to men. ' (333e1 - 2, Taylor, 1991) 
Protagoras then makes the point (at length) that 'beneficial' is an adjective which can 
be used in many different contexts. It can refer to what is good for plants and 
animals, as well as to what is good for men. Similarly it can refer to what is good for a 
particular breed of animal, for a particular part of a plant or for a particular part of the 
human body. As a result, a huge variety of things can be described as beneficial and 
the same thing may be beneficial in one context, and harmful in another: 
'Not at all. I know of many things which are harmful to men, food and drink and drugs 
and a thousand other things, and of some which are beneficial. Some things have 
29 As Protagoras first states at 329d8 - e2. 
30 The strength of this conviction is also demonstrated by the fact that Protagoras cannot bring himself to abandon it 
even though it would clearly be in his interest to do so. If living well as a good citizen entails far more than the 
technical knowledge ( litik e hne) which he claims to teach (31 9a3 - 7), then his pupils are probably wasting their 
money. 
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neither effect on men, but have an effect on horses; some have no effect except on 
cattle, or on dogs. Some have no effect on any animal, but do affect trees. And some 
things are good for the roots of the tree, but bad for the growing parts, for instance 
manure is good if applied to the roots of all plants, but if you put it on the shoots and 
young twigs it destroys everything. Oil, too, is very bad for all plants and most 
destructive of the hair of animals other than man, but in the case of man it is 
beneficial to the hair and to the rest of the body. So varied and many-sided a thing is 
goodness, that even here the very same thing is good for the outside of the human 
body, and very bad for the inside. That is the reason why doctors all forbid sick 
people to use oil in their food except in the smallest quantities, just enough to cover 
up any unpleasant smell from the dishes and garnishes. ' (334a3 - c6, Taylor, 1991) 
Protagoras' statement about what is beneficial is often interpreted as a statement of 
the doctrine that "man is the measure" which is attributed to him in the Theaetetus. 3, 
A. E. Taylor (1926, p. 251) suggests that Protagoras' argument is that'nothing can be 
pronounced good absolutely and unconditionally. ' He claims that this is 'a direct and 
simple application of Protagoras' own principle of "man the measure" to ethics'. 
Vlastos (1956, p. xvi, n. 32) suggests that this 'looks like a piece of genuine 
Protagorean theorizing'. Yet, as C. C. W. Taylor (1991, p. 133) points out, there is 
nothing in this passage of the Protagoras which suggests that what is beneficial 
depends on what any individual believes to be beneficial. As Taylor puts it: 'The 
observation that manure is good for roots but bad for leaves neither entails nor 
follows from the thesis that whatever anyone believes to be good is good (for the 
person who believes it)'. There is no suggestion in Protagoras' statement at 334a -c 
of the doctrine that "man is the measure". Nor does Protagoras deny that a single 
account/definition of goodness exists, which applies to all individual instances of 
goodness. 32 C. C. W. Taylor (1991, p. 133) makes this point when he says: 'all the 
different things which he [Protagoras] cites as good for some kinds of things and not 
good for others might be good or not in virtue of possessing or lacking one and the 
31 'Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they 
are not...... as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you - you and I each 
being a man? ' (Theaetetus 152a2 - 8, Levett [revised Burnyeat] 1990) 
1 Moser & Kostas (1996) deny that the passage is a statement of Protagorean relativism and argue that Protagoras 
accepts the beneficial as'a standard that can be applied in reaching moral agreement' (p. 114). In fact, Protagoras 
does not argue for or against the existence of a single standard for goodness; Instead he points out that 'beneficial' 
can only be used meaningfully as a criterion for goodness when it Is used within a specific, clearly defined context. 
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same set of highly general characteristics or one and the same relationship to 
something... '. 
In fact, Protagoras is now stating explicitly the objection to which he has hinted 
during each of Socrates' previous arguments for the unity of arete. Both of these 
relied upon terms which had not been adequately defined in the context of living a 
good life and Protagoras makes clear that this is also the case here. Just as in 
previous arguments Socrates failed to identify how we judge what is alike, 33 and what 
is opposite34 in the specific context of arete, here he has failed to identify what 
'beneficial to men' means in this context. 
Protagoras explains that 'beneficial' expresses what is good in a particular context; it 
expresses what is good for X. It is a word which is varied (pantodaron - 334b7) and 
many-sided (oip kilon - 334b6) because of the wide range of contexts within which we 
use it. The range of examples Protagoras gives serves to emphasise the diversity of 
its application. As a result, we cannot use it meaningfully without reference to a 
specific, clearly defined context. In other words, we must be precise about to whose 
benefit we are referring. Even when we have identified whether we are talking about 
humans, animals or plants we still need to be more specific. With plants for example 
we must clarify whether we are talking about their roots or their growing parts. 
Similarly, it is not meaningful to talk without qualification (as Socrates is trying to do) 
about what is beneficial for men. Instead, we must specify precisely to which aspect 
of human existence we are referring. Oil, for example, is good for maintaining the 
condition of human hair and skin, but bad if it forms part of the human diet. We would 
be mistaken if we simply said that oil was beneficial for men, without clarifying in 
what respect. Socrates has made this very same mistake in his argument for the 
unity of justice and good sense. He has referred very generally to what is beneficial 
'to men', without distinguishing whether he means: 
(i) beneficial in enabling men to live a better life, or 
(ii) beneficial in another aspect of their lives by, for example, making them wealthy or 
powerful. 
3' In discussing the relationship between justice and holiness: 330c1 - 332a1. 
34 In discussing the relationship between wisdom and soundness of mind: 332a2 - 333b6. 
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As a result, Protagoras implies, Socrates' argument is built on a false foundation. He 
is attempting to make Protagoras concede that injustice can sometimes benefit men, 
without clarifying whether it can benefit them in respect of achieving a good life. 
A number of commentators have suggested that Protagoras' statement simply 
represents an irrelevant digression, which he uses to sidestep a difficult question. 
Stokes (1986, p. 309) adopts this view and Vlastos (1956, p. xvi, n. 32) agrees that 
Protagoras' reply serves 'only to help the sophist out of a fix in the argument'. In fact, 
Protagoras' apparent digression is a clear statement of a difficulty which is 
undermining the foundation of their discussion and of the need to address this if they 
are to make further progress. In their discussion about the unity of arete Socrates 
and Protagoras are failing to refer specifically to what a good life entails. As a result, 
they are failing to achieve any real progress. 
1.5 Establishing the need for a standard 
So, Protagoras' apparent digression is, in fact, a direct reply (although admittedly a 
rather long one) to Socrates' question about the relationship between what is good 
and what is beneficial. He does not sidestep the question and it is actually Socrates 
who moves away from the subject of discussion by complaining about the length of 
Protagoras' replies: 
'Protagoras, I happen to be a forgetful sort of person, and if someone speaks to me 
at length, I forget what he is talking about. It's just as if I were a trifle deaf; in that 
case you would think it right to speak louder than usual, if you were going to talk to 
me. So now, since you are dealing with someone with a bad memory, cut your 
answers short and make them briefer, if I am to follow you. ' (334c8 - d5, Taylor, 
1991) 
Socrates' feigned difficulty in understanding Protagoras' reply reflects a real difficulty 
in dealing with the criticism that he has raised. Protagoras has made Socrates aware 
that, throughout their discussion, they have been failing to refer specifically to what 
living a good life actually entails. They have been talking about the relationship of the 
different parts of arete within a good life, without specific reference to what they 
actually mean by a good life. 
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Socrates' complaint results in a discussion (334d - 338e) about dialectical 
procedure. The assembled company try to help Socrates and Protagoras reach 
agreement about how they will conduct their enquiry and to prevent them from 
abandoning it. I will suggest that, through this apparent digression from their 
discussion, Plato actually explores how Socrates can address Protagoras' criticism 
that he is not referring to what a good life entails and thus offers a way forward for 
their enquiry into wisdom. 
It proves difficult to reach agreement on what length of answer is appropriate, since 
Protagoras is an advocate of makroloaia and wants to be allowed to continue to 
make long speeches. Socrates, in contrast, advocates brachulocia and believes that 
they can only make progress if Protagoras' replies are brief and to the point. The first 
attempts to help them resolve their differences are ineffective. Callias defends 
Protagoras' right to answer in the way he wants (335c - 336b). Alcibiades, in turn, 
claims that Socrates' objections to this are justified. At the point where the 
conversation is about to descend into a quarrel, Critias intervenes (336d - e) and 
suggests that, rather than taking sides, they should unite in persuading Socrates and 
Protagoras to continue. At this point (337a) Prodicus enters the conversation and 
suggests some linguistic distinctions which he feels are relevant to their debate. He 
distinguishes between: 
" Listening impartially koinoi and listening without discrimination isoi ; 
" Debating famphisbeteinl and wrangling eridzein ; 
" Giving esteem feudokimeinl and giving praise e ainein ; 
" Gaining enjoyment feuphrainesthail and gaining pleasure hedesthai . 
Allen (1996, p. 114) in his commentary on this passage, suggests that Prodicus' 
contribution is 'openly satiric'. He describes how 'Prodicus undertakes to settle a 
serious disagreement over the form of the discussion with a series of trivial 
distinctions between largely irrelevant words; he is a pedant and it is idle to plead on 
his behalf that one man's pedantry is another man's scholarship. ' For Allen the 
purpose of the digression is, essentially, 'to break the tension of the dialogue' and 
this parody of Prodicus helps to achieve this. Allen fails to acknowledge, however, 
that Prodicus' contribution is, in fact, the foundation upon which a resolution to the 
problem is built. Prodicus clarifies the standard which the conversation must achieve. 
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His semantic distinctions are underpinned by the question: 'what would the best 
conversation kalliste sunousia be like? '. 35 He concludes that it would be one where: 
(i) the audience listen impartially (koinoi) but with discrimination (me isoi), 337a2 - 6; 
(ii) the speakers argue (amr hisbetein) but do not quarrel (eridzein), 337a6 - b3; 
(iii) the speakers earn esteem (eudokimein) but not praise (epaineisthai), 337b4 - 7; 
(iv) the audience gain enjoyment (euphrainesthai) but not pleasure (hedesthai), 
337c1 - 4. 
Prodicus establishes a clear standard for a kalliste sunousia based on a clearly 
defined set of criteria. 36 In doing so, he puts the sophists in a better position to 
determine what length of answer is appropriate, because they have now a clearly 
defined standard to refer to in reaching a decision. This becomes apparent when 
Hippias suggests a solution, based directly upon the standard Prodicus has 
proposed. He proposes that Socrates and Protagoras should both pursue a middle 
course meson ti, 338a6 - 7] and should aim to achieve a moderate length to 
metrion mekos, 338b1] in their answers. For Socrates this will entail avoiding 
excessive brevity, and for Protagoras, avoiding excessive verbosity. Hippias 
suggests that pursuing a middle course will enable the assembled company to 
achieve a constructive discussion which: 
" does not descend into a quarrel; 37 
" is not unworthy of their reputation; 38 
" has dignity and elegance. 39 
In justifying this model of dialectic, Hippias takes careful account of Prodicus' criteria 
for a kalliste sunousia, and the model is clearly founded upon the standard which 
Prodicus has proposed. This counts against Allen's claim that Prodicus' contribution 
35 He refers to this standard at 337b3. 
36 However tenuous the semantic distinctions he makes they are, nevertheless, detailed and precise, thus forming the 
basis for a precise set of criteria. 
37 Hippias is concerned that they should not wrangle rdiaoheresthail amongst themselves 'like the most worthless of 
men' (337e1 - 2, Taylor, 1991). In doing so he takes account of Prodicus' second criterion - that the participants 
should debate but not quarrel. 
38 Prodicus' third criterion for the discussion was that both speakers should be held in esteem by their listeners. 
Hippias acknowledges this criterion when he expresses the fear that, by wrangling amongst themselves, they will 
appear unworthy of their good reputation fm&den ut u IQ axi mat axion apoohOnasthai, 337d7 - e1]. 
39, megaloDregresterol' and 'euschemonesteroi' (338a4). Here, Hippias takes account of Prodicus' fourth criterion - 
that the conversation should give enjoyment to its listeners. 
27 
is trivial and irrelevant. In fact, Prodicus enables them to establish a practical way 
forward, by laying the foundation upon which Hippias builds. 
Allen describes Hippias' contribution as 'wholly impractical'. 40 In doing so, he 
disregards the fact that the assembled company do accept Hippias' proposal and 
encourage Socrates and Protagoras to do the same. So, whether or not his proposal 
is practical, Hippias does make a positive contribution to enabling the argument to 
move forward. 
Furthermore, I would suggest that it is highly significant that the solution to the 
immediate question (about dialectic) - the proposal of a standard of measurement - 
has strong similarities to the conclusion that will be reached to the dialogue's central 
question - that arete is an art of measurement. By demonstrating that the agreement 
of a standard for dialectic (a standard for a kalliste sounousia) has achieved a firm 
basis upon which to continue their discussion, Plato hints to us through this apparent 
digression about dialectic that there is a more fundamental need for Socrates and 
Protagoras to establish a clear standard for a life which is kalliste 41 Otherwise, 
Socrates will be unable to address Protagoras' criticism that their conversation is 
failing to refer to what a good life entails. 
1.6 Beginning the search for a standard 
At 349d Socrates and Protagoras finally resume their discussion about the 
relationship between the different parts of arete. Protagoras concedes (349d2 - 9) 
that they have established that wisdom, good sense, justice and holiness are fairly 
similar to each other, but maintains that courage is totally different. It is, perhaps, 
surprising that Protagoras is prepared to concede as much as he does (since he 
objected to the validity of each of Socrates' arguments which 'established' the 
similarity which Socrates now claims they have agreed upon). However, Protagoras 
is perhaps just reluctant to go back over old ground, and prefers to move forward 
40 According to Allen (1996, p. 115), 'Hippias, a noted polymath whom Plato delighted In portraying as obtuse, uses an 
abstract theory whose meaning is dubious - the contrast between nature and convention - to recommend a 
suggestion which is wholly impractical and seasons his wit with an atrocious concoction of metaphors'. 
" Prodicus' use of the term kallis 6 to describe excellence in philosophical conversation reminds us that this is same 
the value which Socrates, from the outset, has used to describe excellence in life. In the opening frame we are told 
that he regarded Protagoras as alli8 than Alcibiades because of his wisdom. At the same time we are reminded by 
Prodicus' careful semantic distinctions that Socrates and Protagoras do not have any definition of a life which Is 
kaion, let alone one as precise as Prodicus has proposed for their sunousia. 
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with a new subject of discussion - the relationship of courage to the other parts of 
arete. He suggests that courage is totally different from the rest of arete: 
'And this is how you will know that what I say is true: you will find many men who are 
totally unjust and irreligious and wanton and ignorant, but most outstandingly 
courageous. ' (349d5 - 9, Taylor, 1991) 
Socrates argues against this claim. Taylor (1991, p. 150) summarises his argument 
as follows: 
349e2 1. The courageous are daring. 
349e3 -8 2. Every part of excellence is something fine. 
349e8 - 350b1 3. Knowledgeable men are more daring than those who lack 
knowledge. 
350b1- 6 4. Those who are daring but lacking in knowledge are mad, 
which is a shameful state. 
5. Hence, the state of being daring but lacking in knowledge is 
not a part of excellence (by 2 and 4). 
350b4 - 5, cl -2 6. Hence, those who are daring but lacking in knowledge are 
not courageous (since courage is admitted to be a part of 
excellence) (by 5). 
350c2 -4 7. Those who are wisest are most daring (by 3), and hence 
most courageous (by ? ). 
350c4 -5 8. Therefore, courage is wisdom (by ? ). 
Protagoras criticises the logic of Socrates' argument. He says that Socrates only 
asked him if to be daring (more specifically, to have the kind of daring that is founded 
upon knowledge)42 is a necessary condition of being courageous. In other words, he 
admitted only that anyone who is courageous must, necessarily, be daring: 
'You are not correctly recalling, he said, what I said in answer to your question, 
Socrates. You asked me if the courageous are daring and I agreed that they are. ' 
(350c6 - 8, Taylor, 1991) 
"2 As opposed to the kind of daring which is founded upon ignorance. Protagoras agrees that this kind of daring is a 
form of madness and cannot be part of rte. 
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Protagoras objects, however, that he did not admit that to be daring is a sufficient 
condition of being courageous. In other words, he did not agree that anyone who is 
daring will, by being daring, also be courageous: 
'but you didn't ask me if, in addition, the daring are courageous - for if you had asked 
me that, I should have said that not all are. ' (350c8 - dl, Taylor, 1991) 
He claims (350e - 351 a) that Socrates is muddling the relationship between being 
courageous and being daring in the same way that one might muddle the relationship 
between strength ischus and capability dunatos . Capability is a necessary 
condition for strength and so everyone who is strong must, necessarily, be capable. 
However, capability is not a sufficient condition for strength, and it would be false to 
say that everyone who is capable must, by being capable, also be strong. Protagoras 
explains that this is because capability is not the essence of strength; instead its 
essence is 'a good natural condition and nurture of the body'. 
It is this same mistake which, Protagoras suggests, Socrates has made in the case 
of courage. Being daring is not the essence of courage; instead its essence is 'a 
good natural condition and nurture of the soul'. Knowledge (and the daring it brings) 
is necessary for courage, but it is not what courage is all about. Protagoras believes 
that there is more to courage than wisdom and that Socrates has failed to recognise 
this. 
Interpretation of Socrates' argument from 349e - 350c has focused on two main 
issues: 
" the precise nature of the fallacy (if any) it contains and the extent to which 
Protagoras correctly diagnoses this; 43 
" the extent to which any fallacy in the argument is deliberate on Socrates'/Plato's 
part. 44 
The real basis of Socrates' and Protagoras' problem, however, is not so much the 
logic of their argument, but rather that they do not have any shared basis for 
43 This question Is discussed by Mastos (1956, pp. xxxi - xxxvi), Klosko (1979, pp. 136 -141), Taylor (1991, pp. 150 - 
161). 
" Klosko (1979) suggests that the argument contains one of several deliberate fallacies used by Socrates In the 
Protagoras to expose Protagoras' weakness at philosophical argument. 
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resolving their differences over the logic of the argument. Their argument is founded 
upon the agreement (stage 2 above) that every part of arete is kalon, but it turns out 
that they both mean rather different things by kalon. For Socrates a life which is kalon 
is nothing other than a life in which one acts with wisdom and it is on this basis, I 
would suggest, that he feels justified in making the conversion (stage 7 above) from: 
" those who are most daring are wisest, to 
" those who are wisest are the most courageous. 
This conversion is based upon their agreement that a life which is courageous will be 
kalon and upon Socrates' personal understanding of what kalon means. For 
Protagoras, however, a life which is kalon involves something more than acting with 
wisdom. So, for him, Socrates is not justified, on the basis of their agreement that all 
arete is kalon, in making the conversion described above. Once more, Socrates and 
Protagoras are talking in many-sided terms but are lacking a standard for a good life 
to which they can refer in their discussion. The difficulty which has beset them 
throughout their conversation has raised its head once again. This time, it is the term 
kalon which is proving oip kilon and pantodapon. This time, however, Socrates is 
aware of the difficulty and understands how they must address it. In his interpretation 
of Simonides' poem, he has acknowledged his awareness of their need for a 
standard for a good life to which they can refer in their discussion. Otherwise, the 
truth of their arguments will be impossible to establish. So, at this point in the 
dialogue Socrates begins the search for this standard. He asks: 
'And do you maintain, Protagoras, I said, that some men live well and others badly? ' 
(351 b3 - 4, Taylor, 1991) 
Socrates then asks Protagoras whether to live well is to live pleasantly and whether 
to live pleasantly is good. Protagoras replies that it depends on whether one takes 
pleasure in fine (kalois) things. 
Socrates' question at 351b about the nature of living well is often regarded as a 
rather abrupt change of tack and as a recognition that the argument about courage 
has reached a dead end. 45 In fact, the question is not at all a change of tack, but a 
45 Hubbard and Kamofsky (1982, p. 140) ask why Plato'has made Socrates put forward an argument which is easily 
rebutted and never mentioned again. ' They suggest a number of possible answers to this question, of which the last 
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direct attempt to continue and resolve this question by establishing the standard for a 
good life upon which its resolution depends. 
1.7 Conclusion 
Later in the dialogue Socrates will suggest that pleasure is the standard by which a 
good life should be judged. Having established this standard with Protagoras and the 
other sophists, he will build upon it a model of knowledge as the art of measuring 
pleasure in our lives - the metretike techne. Many commentators have denied that 
Plato/Socrates is serious either in proposing hedonism as a standard for our lives, or 
about the model of knowledge he constructs upon this standard. They suggest that 
the metretike techne is an ad hominem device, designed only to respond to specific 
arguments raised by Protagoras and the many and to defend the truth of the Socratic 
principle that knowledge is sufficient for arete. At the most it is only a 'placeholder', 
intended to provide a temporary fix until Socrates can come up with something 
better. 
In portraying the metretike techne as a placeholder, or an ad hominem strategy, 
commentators overlook the direct relationship between the first and second parts of 
the dialogue. The first part of the dialogue makes clear that Socrates believes that 
the safety and well-being of the soul depends upon identifying what type of wisdom 
will enable us to live a good life. It presents the `techne question' (Is the wisdom we 
need to live a good life a techne? ) as central to discovering the type of knowledge we 
need, and suggests that this question can only be settled when we have established 
a clear standard for a good life. The second part of the dialogue provides a direct 
response to these issues and, in doing so, it requires us to take the metretike techne 
seriously. It is not just a response to particular arguments which Protagoras or the 
many have put forward against the sufficiency of knowledge, but to a question which 
Socrates raised at the very outset of the dialogue and about which he made clear he 
was entirely serious. The sketch of wisdom which we encounter in the second part of 
is that 'This is the beginning of a process of elimination: having excluded the possibility that na dreh is soohia In the 
sense that it involves simply having expert knowledge, Socrates is left with the second alternative to pursue'. The 
'second alternative' to which they refer is that wisdom is 'a broader understanding of ends - the ability to form rational 
long-term plans' (p. 136). Hubbard and Kamofsky suggest that Socrates' abandonment of this line of argument 
enables him to move the discussion from focusing on one type of knowledge to another. I would suggest, however, 
that Socrates does not abandon the argument, but continues to try and resolve it, by seeking to establish a standard 
for a good kal n) life to which they can refer in their argument. 
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the dialogue is one which Socrates commissioned and which is carried out entirely to 
his specification. 
In the next chapter I will explore the development of this sketch, and will focus upon 
how the metretike techne earns its description as the 'salvation of our lives'. I will 
suggest that it does so by offering an account of our motivation to live a good life and 
a determinate basis for making the right decisions in our lives. In doing so, it captures 
the two essential characteristics of a model of knowledge which would be sufficient 
for arete. 
33 
Sketching the `Söteria Tou Biou' 
Plato and the Art of Measurement 
Chapter 2- Creating the Sketch 
(Protagoras 351 b- 357e) 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that in the Protagoras, up to 351 b, Socrates plans 
and prepares for a sketch of the type of knowledge which would, on its own, be 
sufficient for a good life. In doing so, he identifies two essential features which must 
be part of the sketch. Firstly, it must show whether the type of wisdom required for 
such a life is essentially technical or non-technical. Secondly, it must show what 
standard we must achieve in our lives through wisdom in order to preserve the safety 
of the soul. The sketch must be convincing enough to overcome Protagoras' 
personal conviction that each part of arete has its own distinguishing characteristics 
and that wisdom on its own cannot be sufficient for a good life. ' In this chapter I will 
explore how, from 351 b, Socrates creates the sketch which he has been planning up 
to this point in the dialogue. 
What standard must we achieve in our lives through wisdom? 
I will start by suggesting in section two that, through the medical analogy which 
Socrates uses at 352a1 - b3, he indicates that pleasure will have a central role within 
the sketch and that the role of pleasure within a good life should now be the focus of 
their enquiry. The medical analogy (which has received relatively little attention from 
commentators) is, therefore, programmatic in establishing the course of the 
discussion from 352. 
' In chapter one I showed how this conviction becomes clear In the course of the dialogue up to 351 b and Is reflected 
dramatically In Protagoras' becoming Increasingly resistant to and annoyed with Socrates' attempts to establish the 
unity of pr a. Furthermore, Protagoras cannot bring himself to abandon his conviction even though it would clearly 
be in his Interest to do so. If living well as a good citizen entails far more than the technical knowledge li ik 
jqghA ) which he claims to teach (319a3 - 7), then his pupils are probably wasting their money. 
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From 352b, Socrates pursues the line of enquiry which he has advocated through the 
medical analogy. He does so by instigating a conversation with the many and 
exploring their view of pleasure. In section three I show how, through this 
conversation, Socrates leads the many not only to acknowledge their belief that a 
good life is one in which pleasure is maximised, but also to accept that everything 
they do is motivated by the pursuit of pleasure. 2 Having gained the agreement of the 
many to this view of a good life, 3 Socrates draws the conclusion at 357c6 - d6 that 
this view entails that knowledge will be sufficient for a good life and that ignorance is 
the only possible explanation for wrongdoing. 
In section four, I discuss the argument by which Socrates reaches this conclusion, 
and explore the widely differing views of commentators on precisely how he derives it 
from the opinion of the many (and on whether his conclusion is sound in the light of 
what the many have agreed to). I conclude that there is a direct and sound 
relationship between the many's consistent motivation to pursue pleasure as 
something good and Socrates' conclusion that ignorance is the only possible 
explanation for their wrongdoing. With this conclusion reached, one feature of 
Socrates' sketch is in place; he has portrayed a good life - with the maximisation of 
pleasure as its standard - for which, if we accept his argument, knowledge is 
sufficient. 
An illustration of wisdom as a technd 
At 357d6 -7 he confirms that the type of wisdom which is sufficient to achieve such a 
life is a techne - more specifically, it is the techne of measuring pleasure. In doing 
so, he draws in the second feature of his sketch. In section five I explore how the 
need for such a techne derives from the rather complex version of hedonism which 
Socrates has attributed to the many - according to which pleasure can be judged only 
in terms of quantity and in which, furthermore, the quantity of pleasure arising from 
our actions can only be judged over a lifetime. 
2 In 2.3, I discuss the disagreement amongst commentators as to whether the many acknowledge that they are 
psychologically driven to pursue pleasure in their lives. I support the view that there is limited textual evidence that 
they are psychologically compelled to pursue pleasure, but suggest that there Is strong evidence that they are 
consistently motivated to pursue it. Their motivation Is consistent In the sense that: (i) it is only pleasure (or 
avoidance of pain) which they are motivated to pursue as a goal In their actions and (ii) they are always active In 
pursuit of this goal. 
The many present a very different view initially, suggesting that some pleasures are bad and (along with other bad 
influences such as pain, fear and lust) cause them to act against their knowledge of what It is best to do (352b2 - c2). 
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A convincing sketch? 
There remains, however, the task of gaining Protagoras' commitment (and the 
reader's) to this sketch of arete. In the next chapter I will suggest that Socrates 
attempts to do this from 359a if. by resuming the argument (which he abandoned at 
351 b) to establish the unity of courage and wisdom and introducing the metretike 
techne within this argument. 
Many commentators, however, have suggested that Socrates' sketch of arete has 
not even convinced himself. They argue that he does not take the metretike techne 
seriously and that his attempts to convince Protagoras are only ad hominem. In 
section six I argue that Socrates does demonstrate that he is entirely serious about 
the metretike techne. He does so by emphasising its strengths5 and making clear 
that the metretike techne can provide: 
"a determinate standard for a good life; 
"a practical means of making accurate judgements, founded upon a objective 
truth about how we should live; 
" an account of our motivation to act upon and follow these judgements. 
At the same time, Socrates does recognise that the metretike techne is only a sketch 
and that there is much work to be done before it can be regarded as a full illustration 
of the type of wisdom which is sufficient for arete. I argue that Socrates' statement at 
357b4 - cl (which has caused commentators considerable difficulty) should be 
interpreted as his acknowledgement that there is more work to do and detail to fill in, 
before this sketch can be regarded as a full and accurate illustration. 
2.2 Establishing a role for pleasure: medical analogy (352a1- b3) 
In the previous chapter I discussed how, in the dialogue up to 352a, Socrates has 
highlighted a dilemma for Protagoras. He has done so by examining Protagoras' 
claim that arete is a techne which can be taught, and exploring the full implications of 
this claim. If arete is nothing more than a techne, then all its so-called 'parts' 
`This view is adopted by, for example, Sullivan (1961), Zeyl (1980) and Stokes (1986). 
5 That is, strengths in relation to its sufficiency for ar . 
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(courage, holiness, söphrosune, justice and wisdom) must, in fact, be homogeneous 
and amount to one and the same techne. Protagoras resists each of Socrates' 
arguments to establish the unity of the different parts of arete. The problem comes to 
a head when Socrates attempts to establish the unity of courage and wisdom. 
Protagoras cannot bring himself to admit that courage can be reduced to knowledge 
(even though doing so would actually support his claim that arete, as a techne, is 
teachable, and that he can teach it). At 351 b, Socrates appears to abandon his 
attempts to convince an increasingly irritable Protagoras that the different parts of 
arete amount to one and the same thing. Instead, he asks Protagoras a seemingly 
unrelated question about the role of pleasure in a good life: 
'And do you maintain, Protagoras, I said, that some men live well and others badly? 
[Protagoras] I do. 
Well, now, do you think a man would live well if he lived in misery and suffering? 
[Protagoras] No. 
And what if he had a pleasant life to the end? Don't you think that he would have 
lived well like that? 
[Protagoras] Yes, I do. 
So to have a pleasant life is good, and to have an unpleasant life bad? 
[Protagoras] Provided one takes pleasure in praiseworthy things. ' (351 b3 - c2, 
Taylor, 1991) 
So, why does Socrates introduce pleasure into their argument at this stage? How 
does the introduction of a question about pleasure's role in a good life help to resolve 
Protagoras' dilemma? At 352a1 - b3 Socrates uses a medical analogy which, I will 
suggest, explains how pleasure is directly relevant to the issue they have been 
discussing. I will argue that the analogy is programmatic in establishing that pleasure 
will play a central part within a sketch of a type of wisdom which is sufficient for arete 
and that the role of pleasure within a good life should, therefore, be the focus of the 
discussion from this point: 
'Well, then, I said, perhaps things might become clear if we go about it like this. 
Imagine someone looking at a man and trying to assess his health or some other 
bodily function from his appearance, and saying, once he had seen his face and 
hands, "Come now, uncover your chest and back and let me see them, so that I can 
confirm my examination. " I too want something of the sort as regards our question. 
I've seen that your view about the good and the pleasant is as you say, and now I 
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want to say something like this: "Come now, Protagoras, uncover for me this part of 
your mind as well; how do you stand as regards knowledge? Do you agree with the 
majority there too, or do you think otherwise? " ' (352a1 - b3, Taylor, 1991 amended) 
The context and structure of the analogy 
This analogy is usually described as a medical analogy. Socrates says that his initial 
question about the relationship between pleasure and goodness in life corresponds 
to an examination (presumably by a doctor, although the text doesn't state this) of the 
face and hands, before examining the rest of the body. The analogy does not 
specifically refer to examination by a doctor and Socrates suggests that the 
examination may not always be concerned with the health of its subject but with 
'some other bodily function' (352a3). However, 'episker sömai' (352a5) is, as Adam 
and Adam (1905, p. 178) point out, often used by Plato to describe a medical 
inspection and this seems the most reasonable interpretation of the analogy. 
Socrates compares the examination (skepsin - 352a6) of Protagoras' views to an 
examination of a man's health or'some other bodily function'. The translation of 'tön 
tou sömatos ergön' (352a3) as 'bodily function' by most commentators does not 
make very clear what is meant by this phrase. Adam and Adam (1905, p. 178) 
suggest that different kinds of bodily labour would be examples of 'sömatos erga'. 
The general picture painted by the analogy appears to be an examination of the state 
of the patient's body either to assess their general health or their fitness for a variety 
of activities. The basis of comparison within the analogy is thus between: 
" an examination of the state/condition of a body, and 
" an examination of the state/condition of Protagoras' opinions. 
Socrates describes how the first stage of the examination of a body is to look at the 
face and hands. Following this initial examination, there is a further examination of 
the patient's back and chest. Socrates then compares an examination of the body 
with his own examination of Protagoras' opinion on arete. He explains that, having 
asked initially about the good and pleasant, he now wants to examine Protagoras' 
views on the sufficiency of knowledge for arete. Socrates' instruction to Protagoras at 
352a8 - b1 to 'uncover' his views on knowledge indicates that he is drawing a direct 
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parallel with the examination of a body which he has just described, where the 
patient is asked to uncover his chest and back. So, we are justified in linking: 
" the examination of the face and hands by a doctor with Socrates' examination of 
Protagoras' views on pleasure; 
" the examination of the chest and back by a doctor with Socrates' examination of 
Protagoras' views on the sufficiency of knowledge for arete. 
The analogy, therefore, offers a description (at the point in the dialogue where the 
discussion of pleasure is first introduced) of the relationship between the discussion 
of pleasure and the dialogue's predominant theme of wisdom. So, the analogy is 
important in its potential to throw some light upon the role of pleasure within Plato's 
examination of wisdom in the Protagoras. 
Interpretations of the analoay 
Taylor (1991, p. 171) suggests that: 'The medical analogy makes it clear that the 
question of the relation between pleasure and goodness (corresponding to the 
inspection of the face and hands) is subsidiary to the question of the relation between 
courage and knowledge (corresponding to the complete physical examination). ' 
Taylor sees the analogy as a statement that the discussion of pleasure, on its own, 
will provide only a limited understanding of a more fundamental question about the 
relationship between knowledge and arete. 
Stokes (1986, p. 371) generally supports this interpretation. He suggests that: 
`Knowledge is much more important than pleasure in the dialogue as a whole. If 
either were an interloper here it would be pleasure. Taylor6 has well pointed out that 
Plato's Socrates regards the issue of pleasure as in a sense subordinate to that of 
the status of knowledge. There is sufficient indication of this in Socrates' medical 
simile here (352a - b). ' However, Stokes does concede that the relationship between 
knowledge and pleasure in life is a theme of continued interest to Plato and one 
which forms an integral part of his discussion of knowledge. 
Taylor's and Stokes' interpretation of the analogy could be supported by the 
language Socrates uses. In particular, he describes the examination of the chest and 
6 Refers to Taylor (1976). 
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back as enabling the doctor to examine the patient'saahesteron' (352a5). Most 
translations of the Protagoras interpret'saphesteron' as meaning 'more thoroughly. 
Thus Jowett (1953) translates 'hing episkepsömai saphesteron' (352a5 - 6) as'I 
want to make a more searching examination' and Ostwald (1956) as 'that I may have 
a better view'. Hubbard and Karnofsky (1982) translate it as 'so that I can examine 
you more thoroughly'. These translations could lead us to assume that, since the 
examination of Protagoras' views on knowledge represents the more thorough 
examination, the examination of his views on pleasure is merely superficial and 
insignificant. 
However, 'saphes' can also be translated as 'clear' or'certain'. If it is read in this way 
here, it puts a different emphasis upon the second part of the examination. The 
examination of the chest and back provides a clearer or more certain view of 
symptoms which have already been indicated by looking at the face and hands. 
Similarly, examination of Protagoras' views on knowledge provides confirmation or 
clarification of a truth which has already been indicated by his views on pleasure. I 
am suggesting that this is the more likely interpretation of 'saphes' and have, 
therefore, amended Taylor's translation of 'hina episkepsömai saphesteron' to read: 
'so that I can confirm my examination'. 
If this interpretation is correct, Plato may be using the medical analogy to make a 
stronger statement about his introduction of pleasure into the conversation at this 
stage - that it is the basis for an understanding of arete. Rather than being secondary 
in importance to understanding the relationship between knowledge and arete, it is 
an integral part of understanding this relationship. This interpretation of the analogy is 
supported by the context of ancient medicine. 
The context of ancient medicine 
The examination of the face and hands referred to by Socrates in the medical 
analogy at 352a1 - b3 is taken by Taylor and Stokes to represent an examination 
which is secondary in importance to the examination of the rest of the body. This 
reflects the reality of modern medicine, where examination of the patient's external 
appearance is, at the most, a starting point for a more thorough examination and 
investigation of the patient's health using the range of tools and techniques available. 
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However, in ancient medicine, and particularly within the Hippocratic School, the 
emphasis was often more upon a prognosis of the patient's health, rather than upon 
a diagnosis of their illness. Jones (1923), in an introduction to his translation of the 
Prognostic (pp. ix - xiii), suggests that this was in part due to a need, in the absence 
of recognised medical qualifications, for doctors to demonstrate that their professed 
skill was genuine. An accurate prognosis of the course of their patient's illness 
provided a basis for doing this. Jones also suggests that the emphasis on prognosis 
was, in part, due to the limited range of treatments available. In the absence of a 
wide range of treatments, it was less useful to diagnose a wide range of diseases. 
Instead, it was of more value to predict the course of a patient's illness and to support 
recovery or assuage pain as far as possible at each stage. 
Within the science of prognosis, as described in the Prognostic, the first stage was to 
use certain visible aspects of the patient's condition as the basis for a general 
understanding of their state of health and, in particular, of whether the condition was 
fatal. The face was the starting point for this approach: 
'In acute diseases the physician must conduct his inquiries in the following way. First 
he must examine the face of the patient and see whether it is like the faces of healthy 
people and especially whether it is like its usual self. Such likeness will be the best 
sign, and the greatest unlikeness will be the most dangerous sign. The latter will be 
as follows. Nose sharp, eyes hollow, temples sunken, ears cold and contracted with 
their lobes turned outwards, the skin about the face hard and tense and parched, the 
colour of the face as a whole being yellow or black. ' (Prognostic II, 1- 11, Jones, 
1923) 
The initial stage of prognosis also took account of the posture of the patient and the 
position and movements of their limbs: 
'As to the motions of the arms, I observe the following facts. In acute fevers, 
pneumonia, phrenitis and headache, if they move before the face, hunt in the empty 
air, pluck nap from the bedclothes, pick up bits and snatch chaff from the walls - all 
these signs are bad, in fact deadly. ' (Prognostic IV, 1-7, Jones, 1923) 
The temperature of the patient's head, hands and feet was also important in 
prognosis: 
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'For the head, hands, and feet to be cold is a bad sign if the belly and sides be warm; 
but it is a very good sign when the whole body is evenly warm and soft. ' (Prognostic 
IX, 1 -4, Jones, 1923) 
Socrates' choice of the face (prosöDon) and hands (cheiras akras) at 352a3 - 4, to 
represent the initial stages of examination, broadly reflects the first stage of the 
medical examination recommended in Prognostic. So, the kind of external 
examination of the face and hands which Socrates refers to in the medical analogy at 
352a and which he equates with an examination of pleasure was of importance in 
Greek medicine. External symptoms provided a reflection of the patient's general 
state of health and guided the doctor as to what further examination was required. 
Rather than being unimportant, they are the external (visible) reflection of the true 
state of the patient's health and thus lead us towards the truth about the future 
course of their illness. 
The second stage of prognosis, as described by the Prognostic, entailed further 
examination of symptoms and provided the doctor with confirmation of the likely 
course of the illness. Since chest complaints, pneumonia and pleurisy were some of 
the main diseases in Hippocrates' time, examination of the chest (to monitor 
breathing, for example) was an important aspect of this examination. ' This second 
stage of examination is represented within Socrates' medical analogy and compared 
directly with his request to examine Protagoras' views on the sufficiency of 
knowledge of arete. 
So, the stages represented in Socrates' medical analogy broadly mirror one 
description (in the Prognostic) of the stages of prognosis in ancient medicine. If the 
Prognostic is, as has been suggested, attributed to a late-fifth or early-fourth century 
authorship the ideas it contains are likely to have been familiar to Plato's generation. 
Socrates' reference to Hippocrates at 311 b5 demonstrates Plato's assumption that 
he was a familiar figure to his readers. Thus it seems reasonable to interpret the 
analogy within the context of Hippocratic medicine. The description of their 
investigation as 'ten skepsin' (352a6) reflects the language of the Prognostic and of 
'For example, Hippocrates suggests that: 
'Rapid respiration indicates pain or inflammation in the parts above the diaphragm. Deep and slow respiration 
indicates delirium. Cold breath from the nostril and mouth is a very fatal sign indeed. Good respiration must be 
considered to have a very great influence on recovery in all the acute diseases that are accompanied by fever and 
reach a crisis in forty days. ' (Prognostic V, 1 -9, Jones 1923) 
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fifth/fourth century medical practice generally. " This puts a rather different 
interpretation on Socrates' equation of his examination of Protagoras' views on 
pleasure with an examination of the face and hands. Against the context of 
Hippocratic medicine, the medical analogy can be read as a statement that the 
examination of the role of pleasure in a good life which Socrates has just instigated 
will be essential in guiding and informing their examination of the role of knowledge 
within a good life -just as examination of the face and external limbs would guide the 
rest of the medical examination towards a sound conclusion and an accurate 
prognosis. Having made this point through the medical analogy, Socrates sets out to 
gain an understanding of the role of pleasure within a good life by introducing and 
exploring the opinion of the many. 
2.3 The Opinion of the Many 
At 353a, Socrates asks Protagoras to clarify, once again, the relationship between 
wisdom and living a good life. This time, however, he puts the question within the 
context of popular opinion. He asks Protagoras whether he believes wisdom is 
sufficient for a good life or whether he agrees with the opinion of the many that it is a 
slave to other emotions: 
'Do you agree with the majority there too, or do you think otherwise? The opinion of 
the majority about knowledge is that it is not anything strong, which controls and 
rules; they don't look at it that way at all, but think that often a man who possesses 
knowledge is ruled not by it but by something else, in one case passion, in another 
pleasure, in another pain, sometimes lust, very often fear; they just look at knowledge 
as a slave who gets dragged about by all the rest. Now are you of a similar opinion 
about knowledge, or do you think that it is something fine and such as to rule man, 
and that if someone knows what is good and bad, he would never be conquered by 
anything so as to do other than what knowledge bids him? In fact, that intelligence is 
a sufficient safeguard for man? ' (352b2 - c7, Taylor, 1991) 
Protagoras responds by rejecting popular opinion: 
At Prognostic 11,1, for example, it is stated that: 
'In acute diseases the physician must conduct his Inquiries (skeotesthai) In the following way. ' (Jones, 1923) 
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'My opinion is indeed as you say, Socrates, he replied, and moreover it would be an 
especial disgrace to me of all people not to maintain that wisdom and knowledge is 
the mightiest of human things. ' (352c9 - d2, Taylor, 1991) 
Here, Protagoras asserts that wisdom is sufficient for a good life, but Socrates' 
question has reminded him of the dilemma he is in. Protagoras' has argued from the 
outset that there is more to arete than wisdom alone, 9 but as a teacher of arete, he 
now acknowledges that it is 'disgraceful' for him to admit this. He might as well admit 
that his pupils are wasting their money or, at the very least, that he can only partly 
fulfill his claim to turn them into good citizens. Socrates explains that the view of the 
many that knowledge is insufficient for a good life (a view which we know is not 
nearly as far from Protagoras' own as he has just claimed) is underpinned by the 
belief that wrongdoing is the result of being overcome by pleasure or pain: 
'Now do you know that the majority of people don't agree with us, but hold that many 
people who know what is best to do are not willing to do it, though it is in their power, 
but do something else. And those whom I've asked about the cause of this say that 
people who act in that way do so because they are overcome by pleasure or pain or 
under the influence of one of the things I mentioned just now. 
[Protagoras] Yes, Socrates, he said, people have many other wrong ideas too. 
[Socrates] Join me, then, in trying to win them over and to teach them the real nature 
of the experience that they call being overcome by pleasure and for that reason 
failing to do what is best, when one knows what it is. For perhaps if we told them that 
they are wrong and mistaken they would ask, "Well, if this experience isn't being 
overcome by pleasure, what is it then? What do you call it? Tell us. " ' (352d4 - 
353a6, Taylor, 1991) 
In introducing this popular view about the influence of pleasure on a good life, 
Socrates begins to pursue the line of enquiry which he advocated through the 
medical analogy at 352a1 - b3. Through this analogy he suggested that achieving an 
understanding of the true role of pleasure in a good life would offer a way of 
achieving their ultimate objective -a sketch of the type of wisdom which would be 
sufficient for a good life. Protagoras, however, fails to recognise the point of 
Socrates' line of enquiry, and asks why they should be interested in popular opinion. 
He feel particularly strongly that courage is completely different [tinny p"ll is hrn, 349d4 - 5] from any other 
aspect of ar . He claims that this 
is demonstrated by the fact that one can have courage while lacking all the virtues 
(349d6 - 8). 
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'But why, Socrates, must we examine the opinion of the mass of people, who say 
whatever comes into their heads? ' (353a7 - 8, Taylor, 1991) 
In replying to Protagoras' question, Socrates suggests that an exploration of popular 
opinion is the basis for resolving the differences of opinion which have beset their 
enquiry up to this point, and which resulted in the abandonment of the argument 
about courage: 
'I think, I replied, that this is relevant to our question of how courage is related to the 
other parts of excellence. So, if you are willing to abide by what we just agreed, that I 
should conduct the discussion in the way that I think best suited to make the matter 
clear, please follow my lead. But if not, if you had rather, I'll let the matter go. ' (353b1 
- 5, Taylor, 1991) 
Socrates doesn't appear to justify his claim that that an exploration of popular opinion 
may be the answer to all their problems. We might question why, after an initial 
protest, Protagoras gives in so readily1° and goes along with this line of questioning 
when all Socrates appears to have said is "trust me, because I think this might be 
useful and I'm in charge". In fact, Socrates has already paved the way for this line of 
argument through the medical analogy. Here he suggested through this analogy that 
establishing the truth about the role of pleasure in a good life is the basis for 
achieving the ultimate object of their enquiry - the truth about the role of wisdom in a 
good life. 
If Socrates' statement at 353b1 -5 is to be dramatically convincing as a justification 
(to a very reluctant Protagoras) for going ahead with an exploration of the opinion of 
the many about pleasure, then we must understand it as referring to and reminding 
Protagoras of the point which Socrates first made through the medical analogy. 
When we read Socrates' reply to Protagoras' objection in the light of this analogy, we 
can understand the basis of his claim that the opinion of the many is directly relevant 
to their enquiry. The opinion of the many is about the role of pleasure in a good life, 
and the medical analogy has already indicated that establishing the truth about the 
role of pleasure within a good life is fundamental to achieving the object of their 
enquiry. 
10 'You're quite right, he said. Go on as you've begun. ' (353b6. Taylor, 1991) 
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Socrates' statement at 353b1 -5 thus relies upon the interpretation of the medical 
analogy which I offered in the previous section - as a statement that an 
understanding of the role of pleasure in a good life will make a direct contribution to 
reaching the object of their enquiry (rather than being of secondary importance to it 
as some commentators have assumed). At 353b1 - 5, Socrates takes it as read that 
the importance of pleasure to their enquiry has already been established and that he 
only needs to remind Protagoras of this. Protagoras' willingness to proceed with this 
line of enquiry confirms that this is the case. 
In exploring the opinion of the many on pleasure, Socrates highlights two key aspects 
of the many's account of the role of pleasure within a good life: 
(i) Pleasure is the only criterion that the many have for a good life 
` "And are these things" good for any other reason than that they result in pleasures 
and the relief from and avoidance of pains? Or can you point to any goal which you 
focus upon when you call them good, other than pleasures and pains? " They would 
say no, I think. ' (354b5 - c2, Taylor, 1991, amended) 
Here, Socrates makes the point that pleasure is the only criterion or standard by 
which the many judge a life to be good. Taylor (1991, pp. 177 - 8) suggests that it is 
not clear from Socrates' discussion with the many whether he is making the point that 
the many regard pleasure as: 
the only thing that is good in life; 
the same thing as a good life, 
So, in Taylor's view, Socrates does not make it clear in what respect pleasure is the 
many's only criterion for goodness - we are left wondering whether they see the 
relationship between pleasure and goodness as a relationship of exclusivity (i. e. they 
believe pleasure is the only good) or of identity (i. e. they believe pleasure is identical 
with the good). 
1 "These things' are aspects of life described by Socrates at 354b3 - 5: 'things like health and good bodily condition 
and the safety of the city and rule over others and wealth'. (Taylor, 1991) 
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They are consistently motivated to pursue pleasure in their lives 
In fact, Socrates does subsequently clarify precisely in what sense pleasure is the 
many's only standard for a good life (although it turns out not to be either of the 
options which Taylor identifies). Pleasure is the only thing which motivates them to 
act and which they pursue as a goal in their lives: 
'So oukoun you pursue pleasure as good, and avoid pain as evil? ' (354c3 - 5, 
Taylor, 1991) 
There is considerable disagreement amongst commentators as to whether there is 
evidence in the text that the many are psychological hedonists who are 
psychologically driven to pursue pleasure in their lives and have no choice other than 
to do so. Santas (1966), for example, argues that there is clear evidence of 
psychological hedonism at 356a8 - cl and suggests that it is upon this that Socrates 
bases his conclusion that ignorance is the only possible explanation for the many's 
wrongdoing. Taylor (1991, pp. 189 - 90) rejects this view arguing that there is no 
clear precedent for Santas' interpretation (pp. 49 - 50) of the verbal adjectives 
employed in this passage12 to imply psychological compulsion. Klosko (1980) argues 
that the evidence of psychological hedonism is, in fact, at 354c3 -6 (quoted above). 
He suggests (p. 313) that: "Psychological hedonism is introduced into the argument, 
quite in passing, at 354c3 - 6. This is the first appearance of Egoism in the 
argument, and the very off-handedness of its introduction is of some interest. " He 
goes on to say: "The inference here (oukoun) clearly has the following structure. 
Since it has been demonstrated that pleasure is the good and pain the bad, granted 
the obvious truth (Egoism) that people pursue [sc. are psychologically driven to 
pursue] that which they believe to be good and avoid that which they take to be bad, 
it follows that people pursue pleasure and shun pain - as the good and the evil. " 
So, Kloskso suggests that psychological hedonism is implicit in Socrates' statement 
at 354c3 - 6. On Klosko's interpretation, this statement builds upon what the many 
have agreed to about the nature of a good life, to draw a conclusion about why they 
pursue such a life (that is, because they are compelled to). Yet if we take 354c3 -6 at 
face value, it is no more than a straightforward suggestion that the many do, in 
practice, pursue pleasure as something good and avoid pain as something bad. 
12 tea', 'pr akteon and ' rraktea'. 
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Socrates does not say explicitly that the many are psychologically compelled (or 
indeed compelled in any other way) to do so. I would suggest instead that 354c3 -6 
does not identify the reason why the many pursue pleasure, but simply confirms that 
they do pursue pleasure as something good in all their actions. If we interpret it in this 
way, it does not require us to assume any so-called 'obvious truth' about egoism. Nor 
does it portray Socrates as randomly introducing psychological hedonism into the 
argument without any apparent justification or preparation for doing so. Instead it 
forms an integral part of Socrates' illustration that, in their actions, the many 
demonstrate a consistent motivation to achieve pleasure in their lives. 
Socrates shows that the many's motivation to pursue pleasure is consistent in two 
respects. Firstly, pleasure (or avoidance of pain) is the only thing which they pursue 
as a goal in their actions. Socrates emphasises that pleasure is the only goal telos 
the many have13 and he describes it as the telos of their actions three times - at 
354b7, d2 and d8. Secondly, Socrates makes clear that the many's pursuit of 
pleasure is consistent in the sense that they are always active in pursuit of this goal - 
there are never occasions where they choose not to act at all and to have a rest from 
pursuing anything. 14 The language Socrates uses demonstrates that the many 
actively pursue this goal throughout their lives. Pleasure is not a goal about which 
they are half-hearted, they focus all their attention upon it (aa oblepein15 - 354c1, d2, 
d8), pursue it (diökein - 354c4) and flee from (pheugein - 354c4) any pain which will 
prevent them from achieving it. 
Socrates challenges the many on three successive occasions16 to name another 
goal within their lives, and emphasises that they are unable to do so. The recurring 
phrase `allo ti' telos is used to drive home the point that there is nothing else which 
motivates the actions of the many. After making this point for the third time, Socrates 
explains why he is labouring it: 
"Taylor's translation of eý as 'result' fails to reflect adequately that the many are motivated to pursue pleasure. 
Not only do they regard it as the only good outcome/result of an action (as Taylor's translation suggests), but it is the 
only goal that they aim at in their actions and which they are motivated to achieve. 
14 Even though the many have acknowledged that pleasure Is their only goal, this still leaves open the possibility that 
sometimes they choose not to act and, therefore, not to pursue any goal at all. Socrates takes care to rule out this 
possibility. 
15 AoobleDei n usually carries the meaning of looking away from all other objects, at one - In this case pleasure. 
Taylor translates it as 'refer to' and in doing so loses the sense that pleasure is the sole focus of the many's attention 
and efforts in their actions. 
16 354b7 - c2,354d 1- 3,354d7 - e2. 
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'Well once again I said, if you asked me, "But why are you going on at such length 
and elaboration about this eri toutou "? " I should say, I beg your pardon. First of 
all, it isn't easy to show the real nature of what you call being weaker than pleasures; 
secondly the whole argument depends upon this en tout6 18. ' (354e3 - 8, Taylor, 
1991) 
Here Socrates makes clear that he regards the consistent motivation of the many to 
pursue pleasure in their lives as the foundation of his argument for the impossibility of 
akrasia. In the next section, I will explore how he constructs this argument and 
reaches the conclusion that ignorance is the only possible explanation for 
wrongdoing. 
2.4 Ignorance is the only possible explanation for wrongdoing 
Socrates begins by reminding the many of their belief that a person can act against 
his knowledge of what it is best to do because he is overcome by a desire for 
pleasure. He suggests that it is an absurd belief in the light of their view of what a 
good life entails: 
'Now if you are content with that, 19 and aren't able to call anything good or bad 
except what results in that, listen to what follows. I maintain that, if that is your 
position, it is absurd for you to say that a man often does bad things though he 
knows they are bad and could refrain from doing them, because he is driven and 
overwhelmed by pleasures. And then again you say that though a man knows what is 
good, he is not willing to do it, because he is overcome by immediate pleasures. ' 
(355a3 - b3, Taylor, 1991) 
To demonstrate this absurdity, (355b -c), Socrates suggests substituting the word 
'pleasant' with the word 'good' (and 'painful' with 'bad'), claiming that the many's 
previous agreement that pleasure is the only good entitles him to do this: 
'Now that this is absurd will become perfectly clear if we stop using many terms all at 
once, 'pleasant', 'painful', 'good' and 'bad', and instead, since there turned out to be 
"'toutou' being the consistent motivation of the many to pursue pleasure, which is demonstrated in how they live 
their lives. 
7$ See preceding footnote. 
19 That is, with the position that a good life is a pleasant life without pain. 
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just two things, we use just two names for them, first of all 'good' and 'bad', and then 
'pleasant' and `painful'. ' (355b3 - cl, Taylor, 1991) 
Socrates then applies the substitution he has suggested; the many's belief in the 
power of pleasure to make a person knowingly do wrong, is thus reframed as the 
belief that a man can knowingly do what is bad because he is overcome by the good: 
'Let's agree on that, then, and say, "Though a man knows that some things are bad, 
he does them all the same. " Now if someone asks, "Why? " we shall say "Because he 
is overcome". "Overcome by what? " he will ask. And we can no longer say "By 
pleasure", for it has got another name, 'good', instead of 'pleasure' and so when he 
says "Overcome by what? " we shall answer, if you please, "Overcome by the good". ' 
(355c1 - c8, Taylor, 1991) 
At this stage, Socrates introduces an 'ill-mannered questioner' who suggests that this 
position is absurd: 
'Now if our questioner happens to be an ill-mannered fellow, he'll burst out laughing 
and say "What an absurd thing to say! That somebody should do bad things, though 
he knows they are bad, and doesn't have to do them, because he is overcome by 
good things. " '(355c8 - d3, Taylor, 1991) 
The ill-mannered questioner goes on to point out that since what is good (pleasant) 
can be measured only in terms of its quantity, the many are claiming that they 
sometimes choose a smaller quantity of good things (pleasure) and opt instead of a 
larger quantity of bad things (pain): 
"'What is it then", he will perhaps ask, "which makes good things not worth bad 
things or bad not worth good? Is it anything apart from the one's being larger and the 
other smaller; or the one's being more and the other fewer? " We shan't be able to 
suggest anything else. "Its clear, then", he will say, "that what you mean by being 
overcome is taking fewer good things at the cost of greater evils. " ' (355d6 - e3, 
Taylor, 1991) 
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Interpretations of Socrates' argument 
There is considerable disagreement amongst commentators about precisely what 
Socrates believes to be the absurdity in the opinion of the many (and about the way 
in which he attempts to show this absurdity). Similarly, there is disagreement as to 
whether Socrates does demonstrate a real weakness in their opinion or whether his 
argument is flawed. Taylor (1991, pp. 181 - 186) discusses four different 
interpretations of precisely where Socrates believes the weakness in the opinion of 
the many lies: 
(i) The opinion of the many contains 'a kind of self-contradiction' (Vlastos, 1956). 
Gallop (1964) interprets Vlastos' position as the thesis 'that the view in 
question is presented as self-evidently absurd' - in other words, Socrates is 
suggesting that it contains a self-contradiction which is so obvious that it 
doesn't even need to be argued for. 
(ii) The expression 'being overcome by pleasure' results in an 'explicit self- 
contradiction' (Gallop, 1964). According to Gallop, a contradiction is exposed 
between the many's acceptance (at 357d3 - 7) that anyone who fails to make 
correct choices does not employ the appropriate knowledge and their original 
claim that they knowingly fail to make correct choices. 
(iii) The opinion of the many is at odds with their commitment to psychological 
hedonism (Santas, 1966). 
(iv) The opinion of the many is not actually self-contradictory , 
20 but is absurd in 
the sense that it commits them to accepting that they willingly make absurd 
choices - of fewer good things at the cost of greater evils (Vlastos, 1969). 
Taylor dismisses (i) as being vague and hard to distinguish from (ii). Furthermore, he 
points out that, to the extent that it can be distinguished from (ii), it is incorrect in its 
assumption that Socrates does not argue for/make explicit the absurdity in the 
opinion of the many. That is precisely what the ill-mannered questioner's analysis is 
designed to achieve. 
Taylor rejects (iv) because, he claims, the many do provide empirical evidence that 
people really do make such 'absurd' choices. He rules (iii) out because he does not 
20 In the sense of containing directly contradictory statements. Instead, Vlastos argues that the many's position 
presents them as making absurd choices for which (once their commitment to hedonism has been made clear to 
them) they cannot offer any valid or logical explanation. 
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accept that the many are, in fact, committed to psychological hedonism. So, Taylor 
opts for interpretation (ii) and claims that Socrates is exposing an explicit self- 
contradiction in the many's claim that they knowingly make wrong choices. Taylor 
suggests (p. 192), however, that this interpretation assumes a fallacy in Socrates' 
argument. 21 
Klosko (1980) argues against Taylor's interpretation of this part of the dialogue. He 
claims instead that the weakness which Socrates exposes is that the opinion of the 
many is at odds with their psychological hedonism (i. e. (iii) above). Klosko argues 
that the psychological hedonism of the many is first introduced at 354c3 - 5, then 
used to expose the weakness in the opinion of the many, and finally, used at the end 
of the dialogue to establish the unity of courage and wisdom. He suggests that it is 
upon psychological hedonism which Socrates builds the'ignorance theorem' (i. e. that 
ignorance is the only possible explanation for wrongdoing) which is essential for the 
remainder of his argument. 
According to Klosko's account of Socrates' argument, the weakness in the opinion of 
the many on knowledge is that it is at odds with their psychological motivation. The 
many give an explanation of their wrongdoing which directly contradicts their 
explanation of what motivates all their actions. Raphael Woolf (2002,224 ff. ) offers a 
similar interpretation to Klosko, but he suggests that the contradiction to which 
Socrates draws attention is not between one statement (about the weakness of 
knowledge) and another (about their psychological motivation). Instead, he claims, 
the contradiction is between the many's statement (about the weakness of 
knowledge) and their actions (in which they always, because of their psychological 
compulsion to do so, pursue what they know to be best). He refers to this as 'word 
deed inconsistency' (WDI) and suggests that the akrasia argument is 'both untypical 
and paradigmatic of Socratic inquiry' (p. 251). It is untypical because it focuses on 
inconsistency between word and deed (WDI) rather than between one statement and 
another ('word word inconsistency' - WWI). It is paradigmatic because: 'The onus in 
deciding matters is [therefore] placed on our reflective assessment of the principles 
by which we live our lives' (p. 251). In this particular (untypical) case, Woolf suggests, 
Z1 Taylor claims that Socrates makes a false move from gaining the many's agreement (357b1 - 4) 'that if anyone 
regularly makes correct choices of pleasures and pain he employs the appropriate sort of knowledge', to assuming 
their agreement (357d3 - 7) 'that anyone who fails to make correct choices does not employ the appropriate 
knowledge. ' Taylor points out that Socrates cannot Infer from 357b1- 4 that the many have agreed that acting 
wrongly is always due to a lack of knowledge; it could also be due to a failure to act upon their knowledge. 
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Socrates uses our actual actions as well as our statements of beliefs to illustrate the 
principles by which we live our lives and to lead us to reflect upon the consistency of 
these principles. 
Klosko's and Woolf's interpretations are attractive in the sense that they do not 
depend upon there being any fallacy in Socrates' argument. Both interpretations 
suggest that the absurdity which Socrates claims to exist is a valid inference from the 
psychological hedonism of the many. As I suggested in 2.3 above, however, there is 
limited textual evidence that the many are psychologically compelled to pursue 
pleasure. 
The stages of Socrates' argument 
I would suggest that Socrates actually bases his argument upon the many's 
acknowledgement that they are consistently motivated to pursue pleasure as a goal 
in their lives (as discussed in 2.3 above). He achieves this in three main stages: 
Stage I 
In the first stage of Socrates' argument, he uses the many's acknowledgement that 
pleasure is the only goal they pursue as good in order to discount their empirical 
evidence of wrongdoing. He shows that their claim that they sometimes knowingly do 
wrong because they are overcome by a desire for pleasure is entirely at odds with 
their acknowledgement that they consistently pursue pleasure as a goal because 
they believe it is the only good. Socrates illustrates this (355b - c) by the substitution 
of good and bad (for pleasant and painful) into the many's account of akrasia and by 
the ill-mannered questioner's subsequent assertion (355c1 - 8) that this renders their 
account of wrongdoing absurd. It turns out that what the many cite as evidence of 
wrongdoing is, in fact, further evidence of their pursuing what is good. 
Stage 2 
In the second stage of Socrates' argument, he formulates an account of wrongdoing 
based on the many's account of a good life as the consistent pursuit of pleasure (to 
replace their own account which has turned out to be invalid). He demonstrates (with 
the help of the ill-mannered questioner) that, in the light of the hedonism of the many, 
the only account of wrongdoing they can provide is to choose a smaller amount of 
pleasure in preference to a larger amount of pleasure. The ill-mannered questioner 
makes this point at 355d6 - e3. 
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Stage 3 
Finally, having established this as the only valid account of wrongdoing, Socrates 
concludes at 357c6 ff. that the only possible explanation for such wrongdoing is 
ignorance of the right course of action: 
Well, if this experience isn't being overcome by pleasure, what is it then? What do 
you call it? Tell us. If we had then straight away said "Error" you would have laughed 
at us; but now, if you laugh at us you will be laughing at yourselves. For you have 
agreed that those who go wrong in their choice of pleasures and pains - which is to 
say, of good and bad things - go wrong from lack of knowledge ... And you surely 
know yourselves that wrong action done without knowledge is done in error. ' (357c6 
- el, Taylor, 1991) 
The basis for Socrates' conclusion 
The basis for Socrates' conclusion at stage 3 is not clearly stated at this point in the 
dialogue. It has, however, already been stated at 354e3 - 8. Here Socrates made a 
clear statement that 'the whole argument' for the impossibility of akrasia depended 
upon the consistent motivation of the many to pursue pleasure in their lives. We 
should, therefore, read his conclusion at 357c6 - el in the light of this statement. 
When we do so, we find that the conclusion is a valid one which is not (as other 
commentators have suggested) founded upon a fallacious argument or upon an 
assumption of psychological hedonism for which there is limited evidence in the text. 
Instead, it is founded directly upon the many's acknowledgement that they are 
consistently motivated to pursue pleasure because they believe it is the only good. 
Based on what the many have agreed to about their actions, the only possible 
account of wrongdoing (with wrongdoing defined as failing to choose the greatest 
amount of pleasure) is ignorance of the right course of action. Their acceptance that, 
in practice, maximisation of pleasure in their lives is the only goal they pursue rules 
out the possibility that they would knowingly pursue a different goal. So, there is no 
possibility (based on what they have told Socrates about the reality of their actions) 
that they would knowingly choose a smaller quantity of pleasure. Furthermore, their 
acknowledgement that that they actively pursue pleasure throughout their lives rules 
out the possibility that they would ever fail to pursue any goal at all (and thus, by their 
inactivity, 'choose' a smaller quantity of pleasure). 
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So, of the interpretations discussed above, I would suggest Gallop's (1964) is the 
most accurate. Socrates does, as Gallop claims, expose a self-contradiction between 
the many's original claim that they knowingly fail to make correct choices and their 
acknowledgement that anyone who fails to make correct choices does not employ 
the appropriate knowledge. However, Socrates exposes a genuine contradiction and 
his argument is not fallacious as Taylor suggests. The possibility of a failure to act 
upon the knowledge they possess (which Taylor claims is the flaw in Socrates' 
argument) has been carefully ruled out by the many's account of how they act in 
reality and by their recognition that they actively pursue pleasure in everything they 
do. 
Word Deed Inconsistency 
Socrates' argument has thus exposed a genuine inconsistency between: 
(i) the many's belief in the weakness of knowledge; 
(ii) their account of their actions as consistently motivated towards the pursuit of a 
single goal (what is good/most pleasant). 
Socrates has, as Woolf22 argues, demonstrated an inconsistency between the 
many's belief about the nature of arete and the reality of their actions (that is, the 
principle they actually live their lives by). This does set it apart from many other 
Socratic arguments which focus on exposing inconsistency between the interlocutor's 
beliefs. I would suggest that Socrates' basis of this particular argument on an 
examination of the reality of the interlocutor's actions underlines that fact that the 
Protagoras as a whole is concerned with identifying a practical model of arete - one 
which will save our lives by enabling us consistently to do what is right. The 
arguments which establish such a model must, therefore, focus on how we act in 
practice as well as upon our beliefs about what is right. 
The conclusion which Socrates reaches at 357c - el represents the completion of 
the first part of the practical sketch of the type of wisdom which would be sufficient for 
a good life. He has offered an account - the many's account - of a good life which 
wisdom alone would be sufficient to achieve. It is a life founded upon the belief that 
pleasure is the only good. 
22 As discussed above. 
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2.5 Wisdom as the Techne of Measurement 
Having drawn in the first feature of his sketch at 357c6 - d6, Socrates immediately 
adds the second feature which he has identified as a key part of the sketch - namely 
for it to illustrate clearly whether the type of wisdom which is sufficient for a good life 
is essentially technical or non-technical. At 357d6 -7 he confirms that the type of 
wisdom which is sufficient to achieve a good life (as defined by the many) is a techne 
- more specifically, it is the techne of measuring pleasure. 
Socrates makes clear that the need for a technical model of wisdom as measurement 
is directly related to the many's account of a good life: 
Well then, gentlemen; since we have seen that the preservation of our life depends 
on a correct choice of pleasure and pain, be it more or less, larger or smaller or 
further or nearer, doesn't it seem that the thing that saves our lives is some technique 
of measurement, to determine which are more, or less, or equal to one another? ' 
(357a5 - b3, Taylor, 1991) 
357a5 - b3 clarifies that this technical model of wisdom is derived not just from a 
hedonistic account of a good life, but from the specific type of hedonism which the 
many have agreed to, in which a good life can be judged only by the quantity of 
pleasure achieved. Socrates has already established with the many that quantity is 
the only valid criterion for measuring pleasure: 
What is it then, he [the ill-mannered questioner] will perhaps ask, which makes good 
things not worth bad things or bad not worth good? Is it anything apart from the one's 
being larger and the other smaller; or the one's being more and the other fewer? We 
shan't be able to suggest anything else. ' (355d6 - e2, Taylor, 1991) 
Furthermore, the many have agreed that the quantity of pleasure can only be 
calculated over the long-term. An action which results in immediate pleasure in the 
short-term but causes greater pain in the long-term is bad (i. e. it adds to the overall 
amount of pain in our life). Similarly, an action which results in immediate pain, but 
leads to greater pleasure in the long-term, is good (i. e. it adds to the overall amount 
of pleasure in our life): 
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'So it's pain which you regard as evil, and pleasure as good, since you even call 
enjoyment itself bad when it deprives you of greater pleasures than it has in itself or 
leads to pains which are greater than its own pleasures....... And again, surely it's the 
same about suffering pain itself. Don't you call suffering pain itself good when it gets 
rid of greater pains than it has in itself, or when it leads to pleasures which are 
greater than the pains? ' (354c5 - e7, Taylor 1991) 
In fact, a good (pleasant) life can only be measured over a lifetime: 
`But even now you are at liberty to withdraw, if you can give any other23 account of 
the good than pleasure, or of evil than pain. Or are you content to say that it is a 
pleasant life without pains? ' (354e8 - 355a3, Taylor, 1991)24 
It is much harder for anyone to judge which of several possible actions will result in 
the predominance of pleasure over a lifetime than it is to judge which will result in the 
most immediate pleasure. Socrates draws attention to two factors which are likely to 
distort the former kind of judgement: 
" the proximity/distance in time of the pleasure to be obtained 
" the proximity/distance in space of the pleasure to be obtained 
(i) Proximity/distance in time 
Given the choice between receiving £100 now and receiving £500 in a year's time, it 
is credible that someone would choose the former because of its immediacy. This 
appears to be the argument which Socrates is addressing at 356a when he 
introduces an imaginary objector: 
'But, Socrates, there is a great difference between immediate pleasure and pleasure 
and pain at a later time. ' (356a5 - 7, Taylor, 1991) 
1 Here again, Socrates uses the motif of'allo If to stress exactly what the many's view of a good life entails. 
Previously he used this phrase to emphasise that they were not motivated by any goal other than pleasure (see note 
13 above). Here he uses it to make clear that they do not evaluate pleasure in any way other than by its quantity. 
24 Taylor (1991, pp. 178 - 9) points out that 353e5 - 354a1 has made it clear that'pleasant' is to be understood as an 
abbreviation for'the predominance of pleasure over pain'. 
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Socrates answers this objection by saying that the quantity of pleasure and pain is 
the only factor which can be taken into account. His reply reflects the principle to 
which the many have agreed - that the only measure of a good life is a life in which 
pleasure predominates. Taylor (1991, p. 193) supports the imaginary objector and 
argues that influence by temporal proximity does not represent a distortion of 
judgement, but rather the choice of one factor (immediacy) over another (quantity of 
pleasure). He does not, however, take into account the particular type of hedonism 
which Socrates has attributed to the many. The many have conceded that no factor 
other than the quantity of pleasure can influence their actions. So, the only possible 
explanation for the many giving undue weight to the proximity rather than the quantity 
of pleasure is a failure to judge accurately the quantity of pleasure which will arise 
from one's actions in the long-term (because the proximity of the pleasure makes its 
appear larger than it is and thus distorts our judgement). 
(ii) Proximity/distance in space 
From 356c, Socrates discusses another factor which may distort one's judgement: 
'Now since that is so, I shall say, answer me this. Do the same magnitudes look 
bigger when you see them from near at hand, and smaller at a distance, or not? They 
will say that they do. And similarly with thicknesses and numbers? And the same 
sounds are louder near at hand and softer at a distance? ' (356c4 - 8, Taylor, 1991) 
Taylor (1991, p. 193) believes Socrates is drawing a parallel between actions which 
are motivated/influenced by the temporal proximity of their object and those which 
are motivated/influenced by the spatial proximity of their object. He suggests that 
Socrates is using the latter to illustrate the former. However, it is not clear from the 
text that Socrates is using spatial proximity as an example to illustrate the effect of 
temporal proximity. The phrase 'now since this is so' (356c4), which introduces the 
discussion of distance in space, follows Socrates' statement that the quantity of 
pleasure should be the only criterion for judgement. Therefore, it seems likely that it 
refers directly to this statement, and serves to introduce distance in space as a 
further factor which can distort our judgement (rather than to illustrate the previous 
factor). So, for example, the beauty of an object (and the pleasure to be derived from 
it) may be underestimated if it is viewed from a distance. 
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The model of knowledge as the art of measurement is then introduced (357a5 - b3, 
Taylor, 1991) as the means of overcoming these misleading appearances - as such 
Socrates presents it as the salvation of our lives. Socrates suggests that, by 
providing accurate quantitative information, on an ordinal scale of value (where the 
greater quantity of pleasure is of more value than the less), it offers a practical means 
of reaching the right decision about the quantity of pleasure that will result, over a 
lifetime, from our actions. It thus provides a means of putting into practice the rather 
complex version of hedonism which Socrates has attributed to the many. 
2.6 A Serious Theory of Knowledge? 
Many commentators have rejected the possibility that Socrates intends us to take 
seriously the Protagoras' model of knowledge as the art of measurement. Whilst 
accepting that Socrates is committed to establishing that arete is knowledge and to 
disproving the possibility of akrasia, they believe that his use of the model of 
knowledge as measurement (and the hedonistic calculus on which it is founded) to 
achieve this is ad hominem 25 
An alternative, or more extreme, version of this position denies that Plato is actually 
committed to defending a purely intellectualist position (i. e. the position that 
knowledge is sufficient for arete and that we, therefore, do not need to account 
for/acknowledge the power of irrational desires in explaining arete). Annas (1999, 
chapter 6), for example, points to evidence from later Platonists which suggests that 
Plato never held a purely intellectualist position which did not acknowledge or 
account for irrational desires. In their account of Platonic psychology, later Platonists 
assumed that Plato always took account of irrational desires, while accepting that 
these received less attention in some dialogues than others. On this interpretation, 
Plato had never, in fact, denied the power of irrational desire or believed in the 
hedonism on which this denial is based. This leaves us with the question of precisely 
what Plato is trying to achieve in his discussion of hedonism in the Protagoras. 
Annas devotes an Appendix (pp. 167 -171) to this question. She suggests that: 'all 
we can reasonably infer is that Plato thought hedonism in this form worth formulating 
and discussing, and so, introduced it into Socrates' argument. ' She doesn't accept, 
25 This View Is adopted by e. g. Sullivan (1961), Zeyl (1980) and Stokes (1986). However, Zeyl suggests that 
Socrates' primary objective in the dialogue Is to attack the sophists rather than to establish any particular 
philosophical position. 
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however, that hedonism is of significance beyond its immediate context in the 
Protagoras. 
Kahn (1996) adopts a similar position, rejecting the view that Socrates is defending 
an intellectualist model of arete. He suggests that'Socrates is here deluding the 
sophists with a rationalist theory of choice, just as he has deluded them with Laconic 
philosophy in the interpretation of Simonides' poem............ ' (p. 242). Kahn suggests 
that, while Plato remains committed to the truth of the paradox that no one does 
wrong willingly, his use of Socratic intellectualism to establish its truth is ad hominem. 
For Kahn, 'He [Plato] is no more committed to hedonism and the rationalist decision 
theory than he is to the virtuoso interpretation of Simonides' poem. ' (p. 242) 
A number of commentators do, however, believe that Socrates intends us to take 
seriously the hedonist philosophy which he introduces. Most concentrate either on 
providing textual evidence from the Protagoras to support the view that hedonism is a 
Socratic thesis26 or on establishing some consistency between the version of arete 
presented in the Protagoras and in other Socratic dialogues27. Irwin (1995, chapter 
6), while adopting a pro-hedonist reading of the Protagoras, presents a different case 
in support of this. He argues (p. 91) that: 'The appeal to hedonism in the Protagoras is 
intelligible if the dialogue presents Plato's reflections on Socratic method and ethical 
theory. ' Irwin presents the hedonistic calculus as a restatement of Socratic 
intellectualism, which takes account of the non-cognitive aspects of arete (i. e. 
motivation) which had not been addressed in earlier Socratic dialogues. 
The scale of controversy over the textual evidence as to Socrates' own attitude 
towards hedonism and to the hedonistic calculus on which the art of measurement is 
founded is a reflection of the ambiguity which exists in the text with regard to 
Socrates'/Plato's own opinion of a model of knowledge as measurement with its sole 
criterion as pleasure. Yet those who believe that the metretike techne is no more 
than an ad hominem device which Socrates regards as a bit of a joke must bear in 
mind that it is the conclusion to a search for the 'söteria tou biou' which Socrates 
28 E. g. Taylor (1991, pp. 208 - 210) argues that 360a2 -3 provides 'the strongest evidence that Socrates is 
represented by Plato as sharing the assumptions of the common man'. The basis for his argument is that Socrates' 
proposition here - that everything good is also pleasant - Is not essential to his argument at this stage in the dialogue. 
Therefore, Taylor suggests, the only reason for Including this proposition would be if Socrates himself supports it. 
27 E. g. Gosling & Taylor (1982, ch3 - 4), Rudebusch (1999). 
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instigated at the outset of the dialogue and about which (as I argued in chapter one) 
he made clear he was entirely serious. 
More powerful than any individual piece of textual evidence, however, is the 
challenge which the metretike techne presents to those who reject it. Anyone who 
rejects this model of arete (but who accepts that knowledge is sufficient for aretd) 
must provide an alternative account which offers, as the metretike techne does: 
"a determinate standard for a good life; 
"a practical means of making accurate judgements, founded upon a objective 
truth about how we should live; 
" an account of our motivation to act upon and follow these judgements. 
Determinacy 
By introducing a model of arete within which what is good is defined as the greatest 
amount of pleasure over a lifetime, Socrates has introduced a standard for a good life 
which can be expressed purely in terms of quantity. In doing so, he has shown how 
the determinate structure of mathematics can be applied to the question of how we 
should live our lives. The metretike techne enables us to reduce difficult ethical 
choices to determinate arithmetical calculations. Socrates makes this clear in three 
stages. Firstly, he explains (356a3 - 5) exactly how the amount of pleasure in our 
lives can be quantified - in terms of size (meiz6 to kai smikrotera), number (Iei6 kai 
elatt6) or intensity (mallon kai hetton). Secondly, he rules out the possibility that the 
value of pleasure can be judged against standards other than quantity, and makes a 
strong statement that quantity is the only standard against which pleasure should be 
measured: 
`For if you weigh pleasant things against pleasant, you always have to take the larger 
and the more, and if you weigh painful against painful, you always have to take the 
less and the smaller. And if you weigh pleasant against painful, if the painful are 
outweighed by the pleasant, no matter which are nearer and which more distant, you 
have to do whatever brings the pleasant about, and if the pleasant are outweighed by 
the painful, you have to avoid doing it. ' (356b3 - cl, Taylor 1991) 
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Finally, Socrates introduces the metretike techne as 'the art concerned with larger 
and smaller quantities' (357a2) - an art which enables us to determine what is good 
(most pleasant) in our lives. In doing so, Socrates highlights the potential of 
mathematics to bring determinacy to the question of how we live our lives and offers 
a practical model through which this potential can be realised. 
Socrates had drawn attention to the need for a model of this kind in an earlier 
dialogue - the Euthyphro - where he acknowledged the difficulty of reaching the truth 
about subjects which cannot be measured accurately or whose nature cannot be 
expressed numerically. In this category he included beauty, justice and goodness 
itself: 
`[Socrates] What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger? Let us 
look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the 
greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other, or would 
we proceed to count and soon resolve our difference about this? 
[Euthyphro] We would certainly do so. 
[Socrates] Again, if we differed about the larger and the smaller, we would turn to 
measurement and soon cease to differ. 
[Euthyphro] That is so. 
[Socrates] And about the heavier and the lighter, we would resort to weighing and be 
reconciled. 
[Euthyphro] Of course. 
[Socrates] What subject of difference would make us angry and hostile to each other 
if we were unable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, 
but examine as I tell you whether these subjects are the just and the unjust, the 
beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad. Are these not the subjects of difference 
about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and 
other men become hostile to each other whenever we do? 
[Euthyphro] That is the difference, Socrates, about those subjects. ' (Euthyphro 7b6 - 
d8, Grube, Hackett edition, 1997) 
This can be interpreted as a negative or sceptical statement by Socrates to the effect 
that the attempt to reach an understanding of piety (the main subject of discussion in 
this dialogue) or of other parts of arete is a futile one; arete cannot be expressed 
accurately and precisely and lacks the determinacy of mathematical subjects which 
can be expressed and judged precisely, in terms of number and quantity. A more 
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positive interpretation of the passage, however, is offered by Nussbaum (1986, 
p. 106) who suggests that'already in the Euthyphro, Socrates sees its [mathematics'] 
attraction as a model for practical deliberation'. Nussbaum believes that 
Socrates/Plato has recognised the potential of mathematics for bringing some 
determinacy to the question of how it is right to live. 
Nussbaum's interpretation is supported by the Protagoras where, through the model 
of knowledge as measurement, Plato explores the potential of arithmetic as a basis 
for arete. The metretike techne has goodness as its object, but it is a version of 
goodness (pleasure) which has quantity as its only standard of measurement and 
where all instances of goodness are commensurable. 28 So, through the art of 
measurement Socrates explores how we can accurately express the value of the 
choices we have in life by fixing a numerical quantity to each choice. In doing this we 
have reduced difficult choices to determinate, commensurate quantities. 
The strength of the art of measurement rests in its potential for applying the 
determinate structure of mathematics to the question of how we should live our lives. 
28 1 would suggest that there Is sufficient evidence from the text of the Protagoras that underpinning the model of 
knowledge as measurement is the principle that all pleasures are commensurable. In other words, Socrates Is 
suggesting that, ultimately, all pleasures can be reduced to a homogeneous quantity, which can be measured, 
compared and the maximum quantity of pleasure identified. Measurement of such homogeneous quantities provides 
a means of choosing between them; the maximum quantity of pleasure should always be chosen. The analogy of 
weighing which Socrates uses at 356b3 - cl supports this interpretation. Weighing Involves comparing different 
quantities on a single scale of measurement and making a decision on this basis. 
Richardson (1990) suggests that most commentators on the Protagoras have assumed that the principle of 
commensurability of pleasure underpins the model of knowledge as measurement He refers, in particular, to Irwin 
(1977) and Nussbaum (1986) who 'treat commensurability as the key to a proper understanding of the Protagoras' 
(p. 9). Richardson argues against this assumption which, he claims, has significantly skewed interpretation of this 
model of knowledge and the account of its development. Richardson claims (p. 19) that: 'Instead, he [Socrates] 
leaves the door open for a possible incommensurability of pleasures and pains. The very least one can say is that 
Socrates (or Plato) in the Protagoras is not concerned to pin down the standard of choice In any precise way as 
involving the maximization of a homogeneous quantity'. Richardson's main evidence for his interpretation comes 
from the fact that Socrates expresses the standard(s) for quantification In several ways: 
. 'the one being larger and the other smaller, or the one being more and the other fewer' (355d8 - e1); 
- 'an excess or deficiency with respect to each other' (356a2 - 3); 
- 'greater or smaller with respect to each other, or more or fewer, or more and less' (356a3 - 5, Richardson, 
1990). 
Richardson attaches significance to these differences and suggests that Plato has Socrates 'devote extra words to 
keeping the door open for the incommensurability of pleasures and pains' (p. 15). Yet within the immediate context - 
Socrates' introduction of measurement as a model for accurate knowledge and right action - it seems more logical to 
interpret 355d - 356a as a detailed discussion of how different pleasures can, in fact, be commensurable. Socrates is 
suggesting that, if we are to measure pleasure accurately, we must take into account a range of factors within our 
measurement - but all of these are ultimately reducible to the quantity of pleasure in our life. 
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Practical Accuracy and Objective Truth 
In introducing the metretike techne, Socrates emphasises that living a good life 
entails making correct choices about the quantity of pleasure in our lives. He refers, 
three times, to the need to make correct, comparative choices between different 
quantities of pleasure. In doing so, he makes the point that achieving a good life 
depends upon a capacity for accurate mathematical judgement and that the art of 
measurement enables us to achieve this: 
'Well then, gentlemen; since we have seen that the preservation of our life depends 
on a correct choice of pleasure and pain, be it more or less, larger or smaller or 
further or nearer, doesn't it seem that the thing that saves our lives is some technique 
of measurement, to determine which are more, or less, or equal to each other? ' 
(357a5 - b3, Taylor 1991, my italics) 
Socrates is suggesting here that the ability of measurement to save our lives rests in 
its capacity to enable us to make correct choices, based on accurate information 
about the quantity of pleasure which will result from our actions. Immediately after 
this, at 357b5, he makes the claim that measurement is necessarily both a techne 
and an episteme. It is helpful to read his use of these two terms in the light of 357a5 
- W. Both can describe a specific field of knowledge or expertise which brings with it 
practical reliability - the ability to get things right in practice. So, in fact, either one 
would have been sufficient to describe the arithmetical skill of measurement, which 
will result in accurate decisions about how we should live. Taylor's translation of 
'techne kai episteme' - 'an art which embodies exact knowledge' - implies that 
Socrates is simply using episteme to emphasise the 'exact knowledge' (of arithmetic) 
that is an integral part of the techne of measurement. 
However, as well as generally describing a field of knowledge/expertise, episteme 
can also refer, more specifically, to a science -a body of knowledge founded upon 
objectively established truths (such as geometry, medicine or astronomy). In this 
sense, it would not normally be applied to practical crafts such as carpentry and 
shipbuilding. I would suggest that it is in the sense of a science that Socrates is using 
episteme here and that his purpose in doing so is to raise the status of the art of 
measurement. He is making the point that not only does it bring technical skill and 
expertise (although it does do this) but that it is founded upon a scientific truth about 
how we should live. It is not just a humble techne which consists purely in the ability 
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to calculate quantities of pleasure accurately, but is also a precise science of how 
we should live, founded upon an objective truth - the truth that what is good is the 
maximum quantity of pleasure over a lifetime. The metretike techne, therefore, offers 
the best of both worlds - an objective truth about what constitutes a good life and the 
practical skill to transfer this truth into practice. The combination of the two means 
that, if we possess the metretike techne, we will never be misled or mistaken in our 
decisions about how we should live. 
Socrates' discussion with the ill-mannered questioner illustrates the ability of the 
metretike techne to bring practical accuracy and scientific precision to the decisions 
we make. Through this discussion, Socrates shows how the metretike techne uses 
the practical skill of measurement (which he compares to weighing) to make accurate 
choices about what is most pleasant and rule out misleading appearances: 
'Rather like someone who is good at weighing things, add up all the pleasant things 
and all the painful, and put the element of nearness and distance in the scale as well, 
and then say which are the more. ' (356a8 - b3, Taylor, 1991) 
This very practical activity not only results in accurate calculations, but also gives us 
a clear view of the objective truth about how we should act/live. 
'... but measurement would have made these appearances powerless, and given us 
peace of mind by showing us the truth and letting us get a firm grasp of it, and so 
would have saved our lives. ' (356d7 - e2, Taylor, 1991) 
Motivation 
The metretike techne also provides a comprehensive account, founded upon 
hedonism, of our motivation to act in accordance with our knowledge of what it is 
best to do. If we reject pleasure as the foundation of arete, then we must offer an 
alternative account of what motivates us to act unfailingly in pursuit of what is good. 
The strength of the metretike techne rests in its ability to incorporate these three 
factors which are an essential part of any account of wisdom which is sufficient for 
arete. Socrates is clearly aware of its strength in this respect, and to this extent, it is 
difficult to deny that he takes the model seriously. At the very least, he presents it as 
a challenge to come up with something better - something that still brings 
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determinacy and accuracy to our understanding of the nature of a good life and a 
clear account of why we would always act upon this understanding. 
At the same time, Socrates does acknowledge that the metretike techne is only a 
sketch which will require more detail and refinement before it is complete. He makes 
clear that there is more hard work left to do before we can rest secure in the fact that 
measurement is the salvation of our lives. He says: 
'And since it's measurement, then necessarily it's an art which embodies exact 
knowledge. 
[Protagoras] Yes. 
Now which art and what knowledge, we shall enquire later. But this suffices to show 
that it is knowledge, and to provide the demonstration that Protagoras and I are 
required to give in reply to your question. ' (357b4 - cl, Taylor, 1991) 
Taylor (1991, pp. 194-5), commenting on this statement, suggests that'since we 
already know that the art in question is the art of measuring pleasures and pains, 
Socrates must mean that the specification of the art will give details of how pleasures 
and pains are measured, e. g. what the unit of measurement is. ' He points out that 
Socrates doesn't actually keep this undertaking in the Protagoras or in later 
dialogues. Adam & Adam (2"d edition 1905, p. 187) mention that Siebeck (Zur 
Chronologie der Platonischen Dialogen p. 121 ff. ) sees this as a reference to 
Statesman 283d if. where measurement reemerges as the basilike techne. 
Both of these interpretations suggest that Socrates means there is more detail to 
supply about the metretike techne - precisely how it works and what it looks like. 
Socrates has sketched a broad outline and will tell us the detail later. However, I 
would suggest that Socrates is making a different point here. He has shown, as he 
points out at 357b4 - cl, that a technical model of knowledge is required to disprove 
the many's belief in akrasia. What remains to be done is to show how a techn6 can 
be reconciled with arete. A different translation of 357b5 -6 would reflect this better: 
'So, what sort of techne and wisdom this is, 29 we will investigate later. ' (my 
translation) 
29 In other words, What sort of techn4 can also be a form of wisdom that is sufficient for rt, we will investigate 
later. ' 
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Socrates is not suggesting a need to explore in further detail how we can measure 
pleasure. As far as he is concerned, he has already discussed this at length at 356a 
- c. Instead, he is acknowledging that his sketch of wisdom as a techne does not 
address how the way we should live our lives can, in practice, be reduced to a 
technical skill - particularly one as precise as measurement. Socrates recognises 
that this must be explored before his sketch can be developed into a full illustration. 
At the same time, he is asserting that the principle that wisdom is a techne, with the 
determinacy that brings to the question of how we live our lives, is not open to 
debate. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the argument through which Socrates creates a sketch 
of the type of wisdom which would be sufficient for a good life. I have suggested that 
his sketch of the metretike techne represents the conclusion of the search which 
Socrates instigated at the very beginning of the dialogue for a practical model of 
wisdom which will enable us to achieve a good life and, in doing so, will be 'the 
salvation of our lives'. The sketch is carefully constructed upon and validly derived 
from the specific type of hedonism which Socrates has attributed to the many and 
does not, as many commentators have assumed, depend upon any fallacy in 
Socrates' argument. 
I have shown that Socrates clearly identifies the strengths of the metretike techne as 
a practical means of achieving a good life. He demonstrates that it brings 
determinacy and practical accuracy to the decisions we have to make about how we 
should live, and is founded on an objective truth about the nature of a good life. In 
addition, it offers an account of our motivation to act consistently upon our knowledge 
of what is right to do. The care Socrates takes to emphasise these strengths counts 
against those who argue that he does not take the metrdtike techne seriously. 
I have also shown, however, that Socrates is well aware (as he points out at 357b4 - 
cl) that there is more work to do to demonstrate that arete is, as his sketch entails, 
really reconcilable with a techne. In the next chapter I will discuss how, from 
Protagoras 358a, Socrates evaluates his sketch of wisdom as the metretike techne. 
He does this by resuming his argument to establish the unity of courage with wisdom 
and applying the metretike techne within this argument. In doing so, he appears to 
establish that a technical model of wisdom (founded upon hedonism) can indeed be 
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sufficient for arete and to demonstrate that Protagoras' concern30 about this has no 
validity. I will suggest, however, that the reluctance with which Protagoras accepts 
this conclusion draws attention to some genuine weaknesses within Socrates' 
argument and indicates dramatically that the objections which Protagoras raised 
earlier in the dialogue have not been fully addressed. I will also discuss the evidence 
that, in Socrates' presentation of the argument from 358a, he hints that he himself is 
aware of these weaknesses. 
In later chapters, however, I will suggest that Socrates does not abandon the 
metretike techne in subsequent dialogues, although it is some time before it again 
plays as prominent a part as it does in the Protagoras. During the time when the 
metretike techne appears to be 'on the back burner', Socrates is actively developing 
and refining it (particularly in the Gorgias, Phaedo and Republic). I will argue that, 
throughout this process, Socrates continues to accept the two main features of the 
metretike techne - namely the fundamental role it gives pleasure within a good life 
and its account of arete as essentially technical. In the Statesman the metretike 
techne finally re-emerges as the basilike techne, which is the basis for arete in the 
city. While its form has developed considerably from the metretike techne, the 
essential features of Socrates' original sketch remain intact. 
30 His instinct that each part of Q has Its own distinguishing characteristics and that there must, therefore, be more 
to it than technical knowledge alone. 
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Sketching the `Soteria Tou Biou' 
Plato and the Art of Measurement 
Chapter 3- Evaluating the Sketch 
(Protagoras 358a - 362a) 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter one I suggested that, in the opening frames of the Protagoras, Socrates 
establishes that his principal objective within the dialogue is to identify what type of 
knowledge would be sufficient for arete. He makes clear that he wants to achieve an 
understanding of the type of wisdom which, by enabling us to live a life which is truly 
kalon', will be the 'salvation of our lives'. At the same time he emphasises the 
importance of accomplishing this objective, by stressing that our lives are 
endangered when we are exposed to the wrong type of teaching. Socrates warns 
Hippocrates (313 - 4) that, before becoming a pupil of Protagoras, he must carefully 
examine exactly what kind of knowledge he will acquire, just as he would inspect 
food before he eats it. 
Socrates devotes the first part of the Protagoras, up to 351 b, to planning and 
preparing for a sketch of the type of knowledge which would be sufficient for a good 
life. In doing so, he identifies three essential features which must be part of the 
sketch. Firstly it must illustrate (that is, provide a model of) a good life for which 
wisdom alone would be sufficient. Secondly, it must show whether the type of 
wisdom required for such a life is essentially technical or non-technical. Finally, it 
must enable Socrates to overcome Protagoras' strongly-held conviction that each 
part of arete has its own distinguishing characteristics and that wisdom on its own 
cannot be sufficient for a good life. 
In chapter two I discussed how, from 351 b, Socrates starts to create the sketch 
which he has been planning up to this point in the dialogue. I suggested that, by 
357e, he has completed a sketch of the metretikd techne -a model of wisdom which, 
1 In chapter one I argue that the first frame (309a1 - 310a7) establishes Lo c alon within the dialogue as a standard of 
value for what is good and, therefore, desirable In living our lives. Socrates and his companion compare Alcibiades 
and Protagoras on this basis and Socrates argues that Protagoras Is alli6 on account of his wisdom. 
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it appears, would be sufficient for arete. 2 I argued that Socrates is entirely serious in 
his introduction of this model and presents it as the basis for a practical account of 
arete. At 357b5 - cl, however, Socrates acknowledges that this model will need 
further examination. Here, Socrates is not referring to the need to explore further how 
pleasure can be measured (as some commentators have assumed) but to the need 
to examine whether the ability to measure pleasure accurately in our lives can, in 
practice, provide the wisdom we need to achieve arete. In fact, he is demonstrating a 
commitment to inspect and evaluate his own model of knowledge in order to see 
whether it will, in reality, be sufficient to achieve a life which is truly kalon. In doing 
so, Socrates acknowledges that the advice he gave to Hippocrates applies to his own 
account of wisdom just as much as to any other - the metretike techne must be 
'tested before use' to ensure that it does not endanger our lives. 
In this chapter I will discuss how Socrates fulfils the commitment which he made at 
357b to evaluate the metretike techne and thus ensure that it is 'safe' for us to use in 
living our lives. He begins to do this at 358a, when he resumes the argument 
(abandoned at 351 b) to establish the unity of courage with wisdom and applies the 
principles which underpin the metretike techne within his argument. In sections two 
and three, I will argue against those who claim that Socrates' argument from 358a is 
flawed and will attempt to demonstrate that Socrates does put forward a valid 
argument, derived directly from premises that the sophists have agreed to, to 
demonstrate that the metretike techne can be sufficient for arete. 
Yet, at the conclusion of this argument (360d4 - 5), Socrates refers only to the 
sufficiency of wisdom for courage - he does not state that this wisdom is the art of 
measurement. In the remaining sections I will explore why he fails to refer explicitly to 
the metretike techne at this stage, even though he has formerly presented it as the 
salvation of life and his argument from 358a appears to have established its 
sufficiency for a good life. In section four, I will discuss Anne Balansard's (2001) 
suggestion that Socrates does not, in fact, accept techne as a model for arete, but 
instead presents it as founded upon the art of the sophists and uses it only to refute 
the sophists 3 Balansard's argument focuses upon Socrates' use of the suffix -ikos in 
the language he uses to describe techne -a suffix which Balansard demonstrates 
Z Based upon the many's view of what aretO entails. 
3 Balansard's argument is based on evidence from a range of Socratic dialogues including the Protagoras, but she 
does not refer specifically to the metr6tikO hn .I explore the relevance for the metrOtik techne of her general line 
of argument 
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was, in fifth century literature, closely connected with the activities and opinions of 
the sophists. While accepting the sophistic connotations of this suffix I argue that, in 
the case of the metretike techne, Socrates is not using the suffix to represent the 
opinions of the sophists but rather to present it as compatible with their art and 
convince them of its sufficiency for arete. In fact, the metretike techne has its 
foundation in the opinion of the many (not of the sophists) and Socrates has to 
present it very carefully to ensure that the sophists agree to it. The obvious effort he 
makes to do so indicates that he has a genuine commitment to using it within his 
argument to establish the sufficiency of wisdom for arete. This makes it even 
stranger that he fails to refer to it directly as the conclusion of his argument. 
In section five I suggest that Plato's portrayal of Protagoras' reaction to Socrates' 
argument from 358a throws light upon Socrates' own reluctance to state specifically 
at the conclusion of this argument that the wisdom that is courage is the metretike 
techne. Socrates has carefully chosen courage as the aspect of virtue to which he 
applies the metretike techne because it is the aspect about which Protagoras feels 
most strongly. Protagoras believes courage is completely different anu olu 
diapheron, 349d4 - 5] from all other aspects and that it is the finest [kalliston, 349e5] 
part of virtue. I will explore how Socrates' presentation of the argument (and of 
Protagoras' reaction to it) highlights how much Protagoras must give up from his own 
conception of courage if he is to accept the metretike techne. 4 He must accept that 
courage is no more than the possession and application of accurate technical 
knowledge. Furthermore, he must acknowledge that the 'fineness' of a courageous 
man rests in nothing more than the correct use of a technique of calculating his own 
best interests (defined as the greatest amount of pleasure). I would suggest that, far 
from relishing Protagoras' evident difficulty in accepting this model of arete, Socrates 
identifies with Protagoras and shares the same difficulty. He recognises how much 
he too must give up from own his conception of arete if he is to gain the practical 
model of arete which the metretike techne offers. Socrates demonstrates his 
sympathy with Protagoras by refusing to state openly that courage is the metretike 
techne. 
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates claims (361 a) that the conclusion they have 
reached about arete is jeering at them both, because their initial positions have 
reversed - Socrates has come to realise that arete is teachable and Protagoras now 
4 And thus gain the benefits that this will bring for his profession. 
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believes that it isn't. In section six I suggest that, in making this claim, Socrates 
implicitly acknowledges that the metretike techne is as much at odds with his own 
view of what a good life entails as it is with Protagoras' view. It is jeering at him 
because the object of his search - for a type of wisdom which is sufficient for arete 
and can thus be the salvation of our lives - has turned out to be no more than a 
technical calculation of our self-interests. Socrates is faced with the choice of either 
abandoning a model which has considerable strengths in terms of its sufficiency for 
wisdom or abandoning his instinctive sense of what living a good life entails. It is this 
dilemma which jeers at him at the end of the Protagoras. 
3.2 Establishing the key premises 
When Socrates concludes at 357 that wrongdoing is due to ignorance of the 
metretike techne, the other sophists agree immediately. Socrates tells us that: 
'They were all completely satisfied that it was true. '5 (358a5, Taylor, 1991) 
Their agreement is easily gained because Socrates has made clear to them (through 
his conversation with the many) that their professional credibility depends upon it. If 
the many don't accept that arete is a techne, then they won't accept it can be taught. 
Yet if it they believe it can't be taught, they won't pay the sophists to teach it to their 
children. The metretike techne must be an integral part of the sophists' marketing 
strategy: 
'But because you think that it [wrong action] is something other than error you neither 
consult these sophists yourselves nor send your sons to them to have them taught 
this [knowledge of the metretike techne : you don't believe that it can be taught, so 
you hang on to your money instead of giving it to them, and as a result you do badly 
both as private individuals and in public affairs. ' (357e4 - 8, Taylor, 1991) 
b Plato makes dear (358a1- 4), however, that this willing agreement is actually expressed by Prodicus and Hippias 
on behalf of Protagoras and Socrates and then attributed to the whole of the assembled company (358a4); 
Protagoras does not actually agree to it himself. Thus Plato enables Socrates to secure agreement to the premises 
which underpin the me r tik hn and to proceed with his argument, while distancing Protagoras from this 
agreement By establishing this distance, Plato prepares the ground for Protagoras' subsequent resistance of the 
application of these premises and for his role in highlighting difficulties with the metretikO technO which I will discuss 
in section five of this chapter. 
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Socrates could rely upon the sophists' ready agreement to the metretike techne - 
dramatically there is no need for further argument. However, he chooses not to do so 
but instead systematically outlines the principles upon which the metretike techne 
has been constructed and asks the sophists to agree to each of these in turn. This 
serves three purposes. Firstly, it shows that Socrates has not simply bullied the 
sophists into agreeing to the metretike techne by suggesting that they will be 
unemployed if they don't. Instead he makes clear to them exactly what they are 
agreeing to and checks that they are prepared to accept this. Secondly, it marks the 
formal adoption of principles - which, up to this point, have only been agreed with a 
hypothetical interlocutor (the many) - by the dialogue's real interlocutors. Finally, it 
reminds the reader of the principles which underpin the metretike techne and 
establishes them formally as agreed premises upon which an argument to 
demonstrate the sufficiency of the metretike techne for arete can be based. 
Premise I- Pleasure is the only criterion for a good life 
At 358a5 - 6, Socrates asks the sophists about the relationship between pleasure 
and goodness: 
'You agree then, [I said], that what is pleasant is good and what is painful bad? ' 
(Taylor, 1991) 
He then clarifies precisely what he is asking them to agree to when, at 358b, he 
suggests: 
'Well, gentlemen, [I said], what about this? Aren't all actions praiseworthy alai 
which lead to a painless and pleasant life? And isn't praiseworthy kalon activity 
good a athon and beneficial föphelimonl? ' (358b3 - 6, Taylor, 1991) 
Here Socrates equates what is pleasant with what is kalon and, then, what is kalon 
with what is good and . The sophists readily accept this and their acceptance 
contrasts with Protagoras' earlier assertion (351 c1 - 2) that a pleasant life is only 
good if the pleasures it contains are kalon. Socrates is suggesting that the discussion 
with the many has now established pleasure as the only criterion for a good life. 
Taylor translates kalon (in 358b3 - 6) as 'praiseworthy'. His translation implies that 
pleasure is now being identified with moral goodness or, at least, social propriety. 
However, even if kalon is translated less specifically as 'fine', the force of Socrates' 
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premise remains the same - there is only one criterion for a good life and that is 
pleasure. All value judgements about our actions, whether moral, social or aesthetic 
(and the language we use to express these judgements), ultimately express the 
same value - pleasantness. 
Stokes (1986, pp. 414 - 5) argues that a stronger doctrine emerged from Socrates' 
discussion with the many than the one which is presented here. He claims that what 
actually emerged from the discussion with the many was that'the pleasant is the only 
good, the painful the only bad'. He suggests that a weaker position is presented here 
and concludes that this is because Socrates sees 'no point in raising sophistic 
hackles beyond necessity' (p. 415). Stokes' argument refers mainly to Socrates' 
proposition at 358a5 -6, which is certainly weaker than the principle agreed with the 
many. However, at 358b3 - 6, Socrates builds upon this with the stronger proposition 
that pleasure is the only value against which a good life can be judged. This does 
reflect his earlier agreement with the many that pleasure is the only good, although 
there is a distinct difference in the way Socrates presents this proposition to the 
sophists. Socrates asked the many to agree that pleasure is the only good in the 
sense of being the only criterion which motivates them to act and which they can cite 
as a goal in their lives (emphasising their inability to cite any other goal). s In contrast, 
Socrates asks the sophists to agree that pleasure is the only good in the sense that it 
is the only value against which they judge a good life (emphasising that the values 
they hold are synonymous with it). 7 Socrates thus refers specifically to the concerns 
which have been raised by the sophists, rather than relying upon the arguments he 
used with the many. Nevertheless, it seems surprising that the sophists agree so 
readily to the reduction of their values to pleasure alone -I discuss this at the end of 
this section. 
Premise 2- No one willingly fails to do what he knows or believes to be best or 
willingly does what he knows or believes to be bad. 
Next, Socrates establishes with the sophists that, in living their lives, people are 
consistently motivated to pursue pleasure and will do so in all their actions, whenever 
it is within their power: 8 
° Responding to the many's claim that they are often driven by pleasure to do wrong. 
7Responding to Protagoras' claim (351 c1 - 2) that only pleasures which are kalon are good. 
° This was established with the many at 354c - e. 
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`So, if what is pleasant is good, [I said] no one who either knows or believes that 
something else is better than what he is doing, and is in his power to do, 
subsequently does the other, when he can do what is better. ' (358b - cl, Taylor, 
1991) 
Conversely, no one will willingly do what he knows or believes to be bad: 
'Now surely, [I said], no one freely goes for bad things or things he believes to be 
bad; it's not, it seems to me, in human nature to be prepared to go for what you think 
to be bad in preference to what is good. ' (358c6 -dI, Taylor, 1991) 
Taylor (1991, p. 202) points out that the impossibility of acting against one's belief (as 
opposed to against one's knowledge) was not established during the discussion with 
the many, although Socrates appears to assume that it was. Taylor suggests two 
possible reasons for the inclusion of belief in Socrates' summary of the discussion: (i) 
Plato was actually talking about true belief throughout the dialogue or (ii) Plato had 
not reached a clear distinction between knowledge and true belief at the time he 
wrote the Protagoras. Taylor assumes, therefore, that Plato has true belief in mind 
here and is simply identifying true belief with knowledge. He implies that there is no 
particular significance in the addition of belief to Socrates' original thesis. I would 
suggest, however, that Socrates' denial of the impossibility of acting against one's 
belief is an important part of his preparation for his subsequent argument that 
courage is the metretike techne. In this argument it emerges that both courageous 
and cowardly men have the motivation to pursue what they believe is good; but only 
the courageous man has the knowledge to recognise and choose accurately what is, 
in reality, good. The courageous man has knowledge of what is good, which will 
consistently enable him to choose accurately the greatest quantity of pleasure and 
thus to maximise his pleasure over a lifetime. The coward, however, has only belief 
about the quantity of pleasure which will result from his actions and, in many cases, 
this belief will prove to be false? As a result belief is not sufficient to maximise his 
pleasure over a lifetime and, therefore, not sufficient to enable him to be courageous. 
A distinction between knowledge and belief will underpin Socrates' conclusion that 
knowledge is the essence of arete. At this stage, therefore, it is important for 
would suggest that Socrates Is referring not just, as Taylor suggests, to true belief but to belief as a whole - both 
true and false. 
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Socrates to introduce this distinction which was not made sufficiently clear in his 
conversation with the many. 1° 
Premise 3- Wrongdoing is false opinion and arete is wisdom 
Socrates then reintroduces the conclusion" that wrongdoing is ignorance and arete 
is wisdom: 
'Nor is giving in to oneself anything other than ignorance, nor controlling oneself 
anything other than wisdom. ' (358c1 - 3, Taylor, 1991 amended) 
However, he goes on to clarify that what is meant by ignorance is false opinion: 
Well now. Is this what you mean by ignorance, having false opinions and being 
mistaken about matters of importance? ' (358c3 - 5, Taylor, 1991, amended) 
Here, Socrates builds on the distinction between knowledge and opinion and 
establishes with the sophists that, if we give in to other influences which conflict with 
what is best for us, then we do not have knowledge but only belief. Opinion on its 
own will frequently be false and this will result in wrongdoing. The proof of our 
knowledge is in our actions and choices. If we do not, in living our lives, consistently 
demonstrate the judgement required to recognise and choose what is best for us, 
then we do not have wisdom but only opinion. 
Premise 4- Pleasure and pain can be judged only in terms of quantity 
Finally, Socrates establishes that the quantity of pleasure or pain in their lives is the 
only criterion the sophists can use to judge the goodness (pleasantness) of their 
lives. Pleasure and pain cannot be measured in any other way: 
'And when you are forced to choose one of two evils nobody will choose the greater 
when he can have the lesser. Isn't that so? ' (358d2 - 4, Taylor, 1991) 
'° Although it is entirely compatible with this conversation. The many accept that they pursue what is good in all their 
actions - this would include actions based on belief as well as on knowledge. 
"The conclusion which was reached at 357c6 - d3: 
Well, if this experience isn't being overcome by pleasure, what is it then? What do you call It? Tell us. If we had 
straightaway said 'Error' you would have laughed at us: but now, if you laugh at us you will be laughing at 
yourselves. ' 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, Socrates has emphasised this principle at 
length in his conversation with the many. He now gets the sophists to agree to it, 
focussing on the measurement of evil (pain). This leads conveniently into a 
discussion of the nature of fear (from 358d), which Socrates suggests can be defined 
as the expectation of evil. 
The sophists agree to each of the above premises without challenging or questioning 
Socrates' statements. This could be seen as dramatically unconvincing, and it may 
appear that Socrates is really delivering a monologue at this stage, with the sophists 
as no more than token interlocutors. Socrates is asking them to abandon any values 
they have, other than the quantity of pleasure in their lives, 12 and yet they accept this 
without resistance. It is possible that this is due to Socrates' claim that their 
profession depends upon their accepting the metretike techne. However, it also 
depends upon their ability to appeal to potential pupils and their families - to whom 
the model of a good life which the metretike techne entails would seem entirely alien. 
Admittedly, Socrates has demonstrated how the many (who were initially concerned 
about acknowledging that they were hedonists) can be convinced by this type of 
hedonism. Nevertheless, if the sophists only agree to the premises which underpin 
the metretike techne because of an implicit threat by Socrates, then his subsequent 
argument (which builds upon these premises) will be built on an unsound foundation. 
Another possibility is that the sophists genuinely share the many's inability to cite any 
basis for their actions other than the maximisation of pleasure over a lifetime. To 
argue that they accept the metretike techne on this basis, however, would be to 
attribute a surprising lack of resourcefulness to the sophists, particularly to Prodicus 
who has demonstrated his ability to articulate minute distinctions on any possible 
subject area. It is highly unlikely that he can't suggest more than one source of 
motivation for his actions. 
A more reasonable explanation for the sophists' willing acceptance of the metretike 
techne is that they are actually made more comfortable (rather than threatened by) 
the way Socrates presents the proposition and, particularly, his suggestion (358a6 - 
b2) that what is kalon and 6phelimon will always be pleasant. It is credible that the 
sophists are willing to accept, in principle, a form of hedonism where they can take 
12 And, furthermore, in the lives of those whom they teach. 
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pleasure in what is kalon and which appears to resolve any conflict in their values. In 
the final argument of the dialogue, Socrates will 'unpack' precisely what this form of 
hedonism commits them to and, in doing so, makes clear the difficulties not only for 
the sophists but also for himself. In the meantime, however, he presents hedonism in 
its most palatable form for the sophists. 13 Russell (2000) takes this view and offers a 
convincing explanation for the sophists' willingness to accept the metretike techne. 
He suggests (p. 329 ff. ) that their agreement is based upon a version of hedonism 
which offers pleasure and pain as an explanation for the rightness and wrongness of 
how they live their lives, Russell calls this 'explanatory hedonism'. It does not require 
the many to change what they believe is right or wrong, but instead offers 
pleasantness as the explanation for their belief. Thus it makes it possible for a 
traditional account of virtue to be aligned with hedonism while offering a practical and 
teachable model of a good life. I would suggest that 358b3 -6 is the point where 
Socrates demonstrates this alignment and suggests that everything which is good 
kalon and 6phelimon) is good because it is pleasant. This leaves open the possibility 
that the sophists and their pupils, by virtue of their good character, will naturally take 
pleasure in the 'right' things and so their value system will remain intact. 
While I accept Russell's interpretation of the sophist's co-operation, I disagree with 
his overall argument that the metretike techne is not proposed by Socrates as a 
serious model of arete, but is an ad hominem strategy (sufficient to convince the 
sophists) to refute Protagoras' assertions about the nature of courage. He suggests 
(p. 312) that'Socrates' arguments are best treated as aimed primarily at the refutation 
of Protagoras' assertions, and not primarily at the establishment of Socratic doctrine. ' 
I will show in section five how Socrates actually draws attention to the weaknesses of 
the model when it is tested against Protagoras' view of courage. His doing so would 
be hard to explain if the model is entirely ad hominem. 
" By referring to Prodicus' precise distinction, Socrates invites the sophists to interpret pleasure in whatever way 
makes them feel most comfortable: 'You agree, then, I said, that what is pleasant Is good and what Is painful bad. I 
leave aside our friend Prodicus' distinction of names; for whether you call it "pleasant" or "delightful" or *enjoyable', or 
however you care to apply such names, my dear Prodicus, give your answer according to the sense of my question: 
(358a6 - b2, Taylor, 1991). This dearly does set the sophists' minds at rest and contributes to getting their 
agreement 'Prodicus laughed, and Indicated his agreement, and so did the rest. ' (358b2 - 3, Taylor, 1991) 
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3.3 Applying the Premises 
At 358d Socrates returns to the subject of courage, which he had abandoned at 
351b2. He begins by agreeing with the sophists a definition of fear as'an expectation 
of evil' (358d6 - 7). Frede (in Lombardo & BeI11992) points out that Socrates here 
characterises fear'as a certain kind of belief, namely, as the expectation of 
something bad' (p. xxx). On Frede's interpretation, Socrates is suggesting that, 
whenever we act in accordance with our passions (in this case, our fears), we act in 
accordance with our rational appraisal of what is going to happen. Frede argues that 
this account of fear is an essential basis for Socrates' subsequent denial of akrasia. It 
rules out the possibility (in the context of courage) that our passions lead us to act 
against our knowledge or beliefs and presents them instead as part of a rational 
decision-making process. Through his definition of fear, Socrates prevents the 
sophists from re-introducing the many's suggestion that their emotions lead them to 
act against their knowledge of what is best (courageous). In doing so, Socrates lays 
the foundation for an intellectualist account of arete and of wrongdoing, based on a 
distinction between knowledge and belief (rather than between reason and emotion). 
As Frede points out: 'Socrates does want to claim that knowledge or wisdom 
provides one with a special ability or strength that mere belief does not' (p. xxx). 
Having established this definition of fear, Socrates systematically applies each of the 
premises to which they have just agreed, in order to reach the conclusion that 
courage is the art of measurement. Furthermore, he emphasises that his argument 
will use these premises, by introducing the argument with the proviso that'if what has 
just been said is true' (358e2). This creates a direct link between the argument which 
follows and the premises which have just been agreed. 
Application of Premise 2: 
No one willingly does what he fears 
Firstly, Socrates applies the second premise - that no one willingly does what he 
knows or believes to be bad. He suggests that, as a result of this, no one will willingly 
do what he fears: 
`The point is this. If what has just been said is true, will any man be willing to go for 
what he fears, when he can go for what he doesn't fear. Or is that impossible, 
according to what we have agreed? For if anyone fears something, it was agreed that 
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he thinks it bad; and no one who thinks anything bad goes for it or takes it of his own 
free will. ' (358e2 - 6, Taylor, 1991) 
In applying the premise, Socrates uses their agreed definition of fear as the 
expectation of evil. However, while our expectation could be founded on either 
knowledge or belief (and the definition leaves either possibility open), it is noticeable 
that Socrates, in applying the definition, focuses on expectation which is founded 
upon belief (heaeisthai, 358e5). Thus he uses only one part of the earlier premise - 
which referred to the role of both belief and knowledge in driving our actions. So, why 
does Socrates not to refer to knowledge at this stage of the argument? I would 
suggest that, at this stage, Socrates is more concerned with embedding a purely 
intellectualist account of our actions. Before going on to explore what sets the 
courageous man apart from the coward, Socrates wants to make the point that both 
courageous and cowardly men will pursue what they believe is good. In doing so, he 
rules out any account of our actions other than one based upon reason. 
Application of Premise 1: 
Courageous actions are pleasant 
At 359e, Protagoras cites going to war as an example of an action of a courageous 
man. He agrees with Socrates that his is a praiseworthy (kalon) action. This enables 
Socrates to draw the conclusion that courageous actions are pleasant: 
(i) 'So, if it's praiseworthy, we agreed previously that it is good; for we agreed 
that all praiseworthy actions are good. ' (359e5 - 6, Taylor 1991) 
(ii) 'Well, now, I said, if it's praiseworthy and good, is it also pleasant? ' (360a2 - 
3, Taylor, 1991) 
These statements apply, in the context of courage, the first premise agreed with the 
sophists in Socrates' summary of his discussion with the many - that pleasure is the 
only criterion for a good life. So, courageous actions, because they are good, are 
pleasant. 
Santas (1979, p. 171) raises an objection to this stage of the argument. He says: 
`Some of the statements in these two sub-arguments appear preposterous, at least in 
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the sense of being obviously false. Possibly some wars or some goings-to-war are 
honourable, and possibly some are good, but is it even plausible to maintain that all 
are? Worse yet, is it even plausible to maintain that any war or going-to-war is 
pleasant? ' 
Santas then concedes that this may seem slightly less preposterous a statement in 
the light of the many's commitment to the psychological and ethical hedonism on 
which this argument is based. However, he does not acknowledge that Socrates has 
taken the trouble to gain the agreement both of the many (354e8 - 355a5) and of the 
sophists (358b3 - 6) to pleasure as the only criterion of goodness. As a result, his 
statement that war is pleasant is a valid inference from an agreed premise. Whether 
it seems 'obviously false' is a separate issue which raises the question of what we 
mean by pleasant. It could be argued that, given an appropriate definition of 
pleasant, going to war could be pleasant. Admittedly, this is a question which 
Socrates sidesteps here, but Santas' criticism seems over-harsh in the light of the 
secure foundation which Socrates has built for his claim that courageous actions are 
pleasant. 
Application of Premise 4: 
Both the coward and the courageous man will always pursue the greatest 
quantity of pleasure in their actions 
Socrates then applies the fourth premise which he has agreed with the sophists, 
namely that pleasure and pain can be judged only in terms of quantity. He makes 
Protagoras concede that the actions of both the coward and the courageous man will 
always be based upon a judgement about the greatest quantity of pleasure in their 
lives - as it has already been established that quantity is the only way in which what 
is good (pleasant) can be judged. 
'So cowards are unwilling, in full knowledge of the facts, to go for what is more 
praiseworthy and better and pleasanter? 
But if we agree to that, he said, we shall contradict our previously agreed 
conclusions. 
And what about the courageous man? Does he not go for what is more praiseworthy 
and better and pleasanter? ' (360a4 - 8, Taylor, 1991) 
81 
Application of Premise 3: 
Cowardice is Ignorance and Courage is Wisdom 
From 360b, Socrates begins to explore what sets the coward apart from the 
courageous man. He suggests that the difference is in the nature of their fear and 
confidence: 
'Now in general, when a courageous man is afraid, his fear is not something 
disgraceful, nor his confidence when he is confident? 
That's right, he said. 
And if not disgraceful, are they not praiseworthy? 
He agreed. 
And if praiseworthy, good as well? 
Yes. 
Now by contrast the fear and confidence of cowards, madmen, and the foolhardy are 
disgraceful? ' 
He agreed. ' (360a9 - b6, Taylor, 1991) 
Here, Socrates appears to award the state of mind which drives the courageous 
man's and the coward's actions with the character of the actions themselves. So, the 
fear or confidence which drives the coward to do what is disgraceful is itself 
described as disgraceful or praiseworthy. Santas (1979, pp. 175 - 6) questions this 
description of fear and confidence, both in terms of what it means and in terms of its 
value in the argument. I would suggest, however, that this description does have a 
valuable role in the dialogue. Here, Socrates builds on the principle established at 
358d -7- that fear forms part of our rational decision-making process - by explaining 
how this helps us understand the difference between courage and cowardice. Where 
the courageous man does something praiseworthy or the coward does something 
disgraceful it is, in each case, because of a rational appraisal of what is going to 
happen which manifests itself in either the fear or the confidence that drives their 
actions. Having reinforced the view that both cowardice and courage have their basis 
in a rational decision about what is to be feared, Socrates establishes that the only 
possible difference between the two is that the former is founded upon ignorance 
about what is to be feared and the latter is founded upon knowledge. 
'So cowardice proves to be ignorance about what is to be feared and what isn't. ' 
(360c6 -7, Taylor, 1991 amended) 
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'So wisdom about what is to be feared and what isn't is courage, since it is the 
opposite of ignorance about that? ' (360d4 - 5, Taylor, 1991 amended) 
This conclusion applies the third of the premises agreed with the sophists, namely 
that wrongdoing is ignorance (resulting from false opinion) and arete is wisdom. 
Courage has turned out to be the wisdom to judge accurately which actions will result 
in the greatest pleasure, and we know, from the earlier conversation with the many, 
that this wisdom is the metretike techne. It is a conclusion that has been validly 
derived from premises which have been clearly agreed with the sophists. Socrates 
has tested his proposed model of wisdom against a real example of arete and it has 
stood up to the test. Yet Socrates does not refer directly to the metretike techne and 
his failure to do so, which contrasts with his earlier claim that it represents the 
salvation of life for the many, appears to have gone unnoticed by most 
commentators. Protagoras' obvious disgust at the conclusion and his refusal to agree 
to it is apparent, but the fact that Socrates cannot bring himself to express openly the 
type of wisdom that they are identifying with courage implies that he has just as much 
difficulty with the conclusion as Protagoras. Socrates refuses to acknowledge openly 
the metretike techne as sufficient for arete in exactly the same way that Protagoras 
does and in the following sections I will explore why this is the case. 
3.4 Techne and Sophistry 
One possible explanation for Socrates' failure to acknowledge openly the metretike 
techne as the conclusion of his search for the type of wisdom which is sufficient for 
arete is put forward by Balansard (2001). Balansard denies that, even in his earliest 
dialogues, Plato is seriously proposing techne as a model for arete. She suggests 
that the claim by many commentators that he does14 is founded upon an assumption 
that Plato is presenting techne as a rational and productive art which is synonymous 
with episteme. Balansard argues that this assumption is wrong and is the result of 
undue influence both from our own modern view of technology and from the ancient 
Greek conception of the demiourgos. We assume that the techne to which Socrates 
refers has the characteristics of modern technology (e. g. engineering) - which uses 
a determinate process to achieve a desired end result or product. In addition, we 
assume that it has the characteristics of the manual trades of the ancient Greek 
'4 Luc Brisson, in his preface to Balansard (2001), cites Irwin (1972 & 1996) as an example. 
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demiourgos, as presented by Homer or Hesiod, and look to these as a basis for 
interpreting Socrates' arguments. 
Balansard argues that the concept of techne gradually spread beyond its original 
sphere (the world of the demiourgos) and, by the fifth century, had also been 
appropriated by the sophists to refer to their art. She claims (chapter 2) that this 
appropriation is demonstrated by a development in the vocabulary of techne and in 
particular, in the development of forms of techne ending in -ikos. 15 Firstly, Balansard 
draws attention to the rapid increase in the use of the suffix -ikos in the second half of 
the fifth century - particular in those authors whom we recognise as particularly 
influenced by or interested in the style or ideas of the sophists (e. g. Euripides, 
Thucydides, Isocrates and Aristophanes). Balansard suggests (p. 45) that'La 
diffusion de ces formes est en effet concurrente du developpement de la sophistique 
et d'une nouvelle practique intellectuelle. ' Aristophanes (Knights, 1375 - 1380) is 
cited as an example of the direct association of the suffix -ikon with the sophists. 
Secondly, Balansard claims that this general development of the use of the suffix 
was reflected specifically in the vocabulary of techne where 'I'adjectif feminine en ike 
se developpe pour designer les arts et les techniques' (p38). Again, she 
demonstrates how this use increased rapidly in the fifth century and is particularly 
prevalent amongst the pre-Socratic philosophers. 
According to Balansard, Plato is not only aware of, but actively makes use of, this 
development in the vocabulary of techne. Sometimes he uses ordinary common 
nouns to describe technai and other times he uses derivatives of these nouns, 
ending in -ikos. Balansard suggests that there is a clear pattern as to which of these 
two forms he chooses - 'les formes en ikos sont en effet des formes plus 
sophistiquees' (p. 45). Her argument is that when, in discussing techne, Plato aims to 
reflect the point of view of the sophists, he uses 'sophistic' vocabulary. Where techne 
is simply referred to within the discussion (but with no particular view point conveyed) 
Plato uses straightforward common nouns. So, for example, at the start of the 
Protagoras (318d7 - e5), Protagoras lists what other sophists claim to teach16 and, in 
15 She makes a distinction (p. 38) between the use of the suffix as the derivative of proper nouns (specifically, place 
names) to designate ethnic identity/origin (e. g. Attikos, Dbrikos etc. ) and its use as the derivative of a wide range of 
common nouns. The former use, she argues, was present in Greek literature from the outset, whereas the latter 
developed slowly until the fifth century when It increased significantly. 
16 Arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music and literature. 
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doing so, does not use the -ikos suffix. " This conveys the fact that this aspect of the 
sophists' teaching is entirely conservative and uncontroversial - it does not set the 
sophists apart from other teachers or from the views of ordinary citizens about what 
techne embraces. However, when Protagoras describes his own role as a teacher of 
the art of being a good citizen, he refers to this art as the ` olitike techne' (319a4). In 
doing so he makes a controversial claim to teach something that would not normally 
be regarded as a techne. According to Balansard, the -ikos suffix reflects his 
controversial opinion that living well is a teachable art: `La techne que lui, Protagoras, 
enseigne, presente seule un caractere novateur. ' (p. 43) 
In chapter 3 of her book, Balansard argues that Plato also uses the -ikos suffix to 
demonstrate that the sophists regard their own techne as very different from that of 
the demiouraos. She refers, for example (pp. 92 - 4), to Protagoras 322b, where 
Protagoras (within his myth of the creation of mankind) makes a distinction between 
the `demiouraike techne', which was sufficient to provide mankind with food, and the 
` old itike techne', which they needed in order to be able to live together as a 
community and protect themselves against attack by wild beasts. Balansard 
suggests that the distinction here is between a manual, productive techne. which is 
the province of craftsmen, and a higher, non-productive art which is the province of 
the sophists. Here, the -ikos suffix is used to convey the sophists' view of their art as 
a 'liberal' art which is not concerned with producing a particular end product or result 
but with living well. 
Balansard does not specifically discuss the Protagoras' model of arete as the 
metretike techne. Her general argument, however, is that, throughout Plato's work, 
the -ikos suffix is used to convey the opinion or perspective of the sophists and, 
furthermore, forms an integral part of his refutation of the sophists' claims to arete: 
'Mais la techne s'avere aussi dans son ancrage sophistique: l'interlocuteur pour qui 
la techne fait sens, car eile est instrument de pouvoir, c'est d-abord le sophiste. II faut 
donc render A Cesar ce qui appartient ä Cesar: au sophiste, la pretention d'enseigner 
I'arete'. (p. 316). If we apply Balansard's argument to the metretike techne, then it 
would appear that Socrates is not proposing it as a serious model of arete, but as an 
integral part of the sophists' claim to teach politik& techne. It is an illustration of what 
"Except in the case of music m sik) which, Balansard argues, is an exception to the rule and should be treated 
like a common noun. 
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their claim to teach aretd entails - it reduces a good life to a selfish calculation of how 
we can maximise our own pleasures. 
Yet, the 'ancrage' (or foundation) of the metretike techne is very clearly in the opinion 
of the many, and not in sophistry. Socrates has demonstrated at length how its 
existence is required by the many's inability to cite anything except the quantity of 
pleasure as the measure of a good life. To get the sophists to agree to it, Socrates 
has to present the hedonism on which it is founded in its most palatable form - as a 
form of hedonism where they can take pleasure in what is kalon and which appears 
to resolve any conflict in their values between what is good and what is pleasant. 
While their acceptance of this model of arete has advantages for them, it is 
misleading to suggest that is founded upon or represents their opinion. Furthermore, 
it has far more in common with the techne of the demiourcos than the 'liberal' art of 
the sophists. Socrates has demonstrated that the art of measurement is a clearly 
defined rational and objective process which achieves a specific end product - the 
largest quantity of pleasure. If Socrates is presenting the metretike techne as 
something which directly reflects the opinion of the sophists or the nature of their 
teaching, then he is trying to return to Caesar what never belonged to Caesar in the 
first place. 
I would suggest instead that the 'sophistic' language used serves to persuade the 
sophists of the sufficiency of the metretike techne for the type of wisdom they profess 
to teach. Socrates uses the -ikos suffix in order to present it as a liberal art of the 
kind they would identify with and to suggest that it is compatible with their values. 
Here the -ikon suffix is not so much reflecting the opinion of the sophists as courting 
their support. This interpretation is supported by the care Socrates has taken to 
present each of the principles that underpin the metretike techne in a way that is 
acceptable to them. In making an effort to gain their agreement, Socrates suggests 
that he has a genuine commitment to using the metretike techne within his argument 
to establish the sufficiency of wisdom for arete. It is a genuine sketch of wisdom not a 
tool of refutation. Yet this still leaves us with the question of why Socrates fails to 
refer to it directly as the conclusion of his argument. 
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3.5 Protagoras' reluctance to accept the metretike techne 
Protagoras' reaction to Socrates' attempts to apply the metretike techne to courage 
throws light upon Socrates' own reluctance to pronounce the metretike techne as the 
conclusion of their argument. Plato's characterisation of Protagoras during the final 
argument highlights just how much Protagoras must give up from his conception of 
courage if he is to accept the sufficiency of the metretike techne for courage. I will 
argue in section six that, in exploring Protagoras' reaction to the metretike techne, 
Socrates comes to recognises that it presents just as many problems for him as it 
does for Protagoras. 
Protaqoras' conception of courage 
Plato's choice of courage as the aspect of arete to which Socrates applies the 
metretike techne (in order to demonstrate the sufficiency of wisdom for arete) is a 
careful choice, designed to highlight the difficulty which Protagoras has with the 
metretike techne. At the beginning of their discussion about courage, Protagoras 
makes clear that it is the aspect of arete which he believes is completely different 
anu polo diapheron, 349d4 - 5] from all others. He claims that this is demonstrated 
by the fact that one can have courage while lacking all the other virtues (349d6 - 8). 
While Protagoras does not articulate exactly what he believes sets courage apart, it 
is very clear that he does not accept that it is synonymous with wisdom (or with any 
other part of arete). In fact, Protagoras thinks that every part of arete is different from 
the others, but he feels this most strongly and articulates it most clearly in the case of 
courage. In the case of courage he is not prepared to give in to Socrates' attempt to 
demonstrate its unity with the other virtues (as he is with other aspects of arete about 
which he feels less strongly) and from 350c - 351 b he raises a detailed objection to 
the logic of the argument which Socrates has put forward. At the conclusion of this he 
states clearly his belief (351 b1 - 2) that courage, as opposed to daring tharsos , 
comes from 'a good natural condition husis and nurture of the soul eutro hia ' and 
cannot, therefore, be reduced to wisdom alone: 
'For daring results both from skill and from animal boldness and madness, like 
capability, but courage from a good natural condition and nurture of the soul' (351a7 
- b2, Taylor, 1991) 
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Whether or not Protagoras' objection to the logic of Socrates' argument is valid, 
351a7 - b2 represents a clear statement of his position about courage - that there is 
more to it than techne. Underpinning Protagoras' conception of courage is a view of a 
good life as a life in which all our actions are kalon. At 351 c7 - d7 he emphasises 
that what is kalon is not identical with what is pleasant -a pleasant life is only good if 
we take pleasure in (i. e. act in pursuit of) things which are kala. 
`So to have a pleasant life is good, and to have an unpleasant life bad? 
[Protagoras] Provided one takes pleasure in praiseworthy kalois things. ' (351 b7 - 
c2, Taylor, 1991) 
It is likely that Protagoras still has courage in mind when he makes this point (as 
Socrates raises the question in the middle of their discussion of courage) and so it 
throws further light upon his view of courage. Protagoras believes that truly 
courageous actions require us to go beyond a rational calculation of our best 
interests (in this case represented by what is most pleasant for us) and to act purely 
in pursuit of what is kalon. I would suggest that, for Protagoras, this is what sets 
courage apart from the other aspects of arete and what makes it pane olu 
diapheron. More than any other aspect of arete, courage1' requires us to go beyond 
what we calculate as being good for us and to do what is right regardless of this. As a 
result, more than any other aspect of arete it cannot be reduced to wisdom. 
Protaqoras' low profile 
In asking Protagoras to agree to the metretike techne, Socrates is, therefore, 
challenging his firm belief that to kalon (the value by which Protagoras judges the 
whole of his life) is not identical with pleasantness. In doing so he is challenging 
Protagoras' whole conception of arete and, particularly, of courage. By giving 
Protagoras a very low profile within the sophists' acceptance of the metretike techne, 
Plato indicates that Protagoras has not been convinced, through the conversation 
with the many, that pleasure is, in fact, the only standard by which a good life can be 
judged. 
Immediately after the discussion with the many (from which a good life emerges as 
the met retike techne , Socrates asks Hippias and Prodicus (but not Protagoras) 
11 Which Protagoras regards as the finest k Ilis , 349e5] part of virtue. 
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whether they accept the truth of what he is saying. Socrates then reports to his 
unnamed companion that 'They were all ha asin completely satisfied that it was 
true' (358a4 - 5). 'All' seems a strange way of referring to Hippias and Prodicus, and 
Socrates is probably referring to the assembled company. Protagoras' agreement, 
however, is not specifically referred to and it is debatable whether it can be assumed. 
Socrates then asks the sophists (358a5 - b3) to confirm that they now accept that 
what is pleasant is good and what is painful bad (and reminds Prodicus not to be too 
pedantic about it). He reports that'Prodicus laughed, and indicated his agreement, 
and so did the rest hoi alloi ' (358b2 - 3, Taylor, 1991). Again, it is not clear who the 
rest' includes, and Protagoras' personal agreement is noticeable by its absence. 
By giving Protagoras a low profile, Socrates is able to gain agreement to the 
metretike techne and thus earn it a valid position within his argument, while 
highlighting that Protagoras' is reluctant to agree to this model. 
Characterisation of Protagoras in the final argument 
When Socrates begins to apply the metretike techne to the question of courage, he 
no longer speaks to the sophists collectively but brings Protagoras back into the 
conversation (359a) and forces him to actively resume his role as the main 
interlocutor. Protagoras willingly agrees to those stages of the argument which he 
can genuinely accept. He is happy, for example, to accept at 359e that all 
praiseworthy alas actions are good: 
'That's true; I remain of that opinion. ' (359e7 - 8, Taylor, 1991) 
But when he is asked whether going to war is, by virtue of being kalon, pleasant he 
replies: 
Well, that's what was agreed [hömologetail. ' (360a3, Taylor, 1991) 
Here, Protagoras' use of the third person form of homologeö distances him from what 
was agreed and reminds us that, while the other sophists agreed to the equivalence 
of pleasure and to kalon, Protagoras did not (unless we count his silence as 
agreement). Socrates is now asking Protagoras to accept this equivalence by 
agreeing that, if going to war is courageous, it will, necessarily, be pleasant. This is 
entirely at odds with Protagoras' conception of courage which is not identifiable with 
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our self-interest (pleasure). Through the impersonal hömologetai, Protagoras 
registers his objection and distances himself from this, to him, alien model of 
courage. The scenario of going to war is carefully chosen by Socrates to highlight 
Protagoras' difficulty - the courage displayed in war is, for Protagoras, a classic 
example of how courage requires us to set aside any rational calculation of our own 
self-interest. 
In the remainder of the argument, Protagoras makes clear that he accepts the 
equivalence of pleasure and to kalon only to avoid contradicting what, collectively, 
the sophists have agreed: 19 
'But if we agree to that 20 he said, we shall contradict the previously agreed 
conclusions. ' (360a5 - 6, my translation)21 
He emphasises that his agreement is enforced rather than willing: 'I have Lana ke 22 
to agree, he said. ' (360a8, Taylor, 1991) 
As Socrates moves steadily towards the identification of courage with the metretike 
techne, Protagoras can no longer bear to speak and will only nod in reply (360c7, 
360d3) and then he can hardly bear mo is to nod. (360d3 - 4). When Socrates 
concludes that courage is wisdom about what is to be feared (that is, about what is 
pleasant and unpleasant), Protagoras cannot bring himself even to nod in 
agreement. He tries to withdraw from the discussion and tells Socrates to carry on 
himself (360d8). When pressed by Socrates, he accepts that ignorance precludes 
courage, but this is a weaker conclusion than the one Socrates has been trying to 
reach - that wisdom alone is sufficient for courage. Furthermore, Protagoras indicates 
that he is only agreeing because of the principles the sophists agreed to collectively. 
19 And perhaps also because Protagoras has in common with the other sophists the need to protect his livelihood by 
agreeing to Socrates' argument. 
20 i. e. that cowards can be acting In full knowledge of what is k Ili n better/ more pleasant. 
21 My translation differs slightly from Taylor's here - he translates'141 emorosthen homologias' as'our previously 
agreed conclusions'. Protagoras doesn't actually say that they are 'our conclusions' but only that they are 'the 
conclusions'. In fact, he didn't agree to these conclusions, although collectively the sophists did and so Protagoras 
feels obliged to go along with them. 
22 AnaakO could be interpreted as referring to logical necessity (i. e. the logic of the argument requires his agreement) 
but when Interpreted In the light of Protagoras' subsequent refusal to speak, it clearly implies that he feels that his 
arm is being twisted. 
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'I see that you insist, Socrates, he said, that I must answer. So, I'll oblige you; I 
declare that from what we have agreed it seems to me impossible. ' (360e4 - 5, 
Taylor, 1991) 
Through his characterisation of Protagoras, Plato shows just how much the metretike 
techne requires Protagoras to give up from his conception of courage. Protagoras 
believes that courage epitomises how living a good life goes beyond a rational 
calculation of our best interests. The metretike techne has reduced courage - the 
aspect of virtue which is most important to him - to a technical calculation about the 
amount of pleasure resulting from our actions. This is a parody of what Protagoras 
believes courage truly is and he refuses to accept it as a model of arete. 
3.6 Socrates' dilemma 
It is easy to assume that Socrates is enjoying Protagoras' evident difficulty with 
accepting this model of arete. Socrates may appear to be taunting Protagoras by 
applying the metretike techne to Protagoras' 'favourite' virtue and by making him 
agree that examples of great bravery displayed in war boil down, in fact, to no more 
than the pursuit of pleasure. This would support an ad hominem account of the 
metretike techne as a device used by Socrates' purely to undermine Protagoras' 
claim to teach arete. On this account, Socrates is showing Protagoras the type of 
arete he must accept if his claim that it is a teachable techne is to hold. Socrates 
knows that Protagoras cannot accept this and will, therefore, be forced to abandon 
his claim to teach arete. 
I would suggest, however, that Socrates applies the metretike techne within their 
discussion of courage, not in order to taunt Protagoras, but to ensure that the 
metretike techne is stringently tested and evaluated. He achieves this by'testing' it 
on (applying it to) the aspect of arete about which his interlocutor feels most strongly. 
By doing this Socrates fulfils the commitment which he made at 357b5 - cl to 
evaluate the metretikd techne and check whether it is 'safe' for us to use in living our 
lives, as he advised Hippocrates to do in the opening frame of the Protagoras. There 
is evidence that, far from enjoying Protagoras' difficulties with the metretike techne, 
Socrates identifies and sympathises with them. He recognises how much he too 
must give up from own his conception of arete if he is to gain the practical model of 
arete which the metretike techne offers. Socrates demonstrates his own difficulty with 
the met_ techne by avoiding stating openly that it is identical with courage, even 
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though his argument has established his right to do so. If Socrates was aiming to 
make Protagoras as uncomfortable as possible, surely he would not have hesitated 
to emphasise that courage has turned out to be no more than a technique for 
calculating pleasure. 
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates claims (361 a) that the conclusion they have 
reached about arete is jeering at them both, because their initial positions have 
reversed - Socrates has come to believe that arete is teachable and Protagoras now 
believes that it isn't. Their failure to reach agreement with each other reflects the 
dilemma that has emerged for each of them individually. Their search for a type of 
wisdom which is sufficient for arete and which can thus be the salvation of life has led 
them to an art of measuring quantities of pleasure. In doing so, it has presented them 
both with a stark choice between: 
(i) accepting a model - the metretike techne - which has considerable strengths in 
terms of its sufficiency for arete23 and its 'teachability'; 
(ii) maintaining their instinctive sense of what living a good kalon life entails. 
In reality, it is this personal dilemma (reflected dramatically in their failure to agree 
with each other) that jeers at both Socrates and Protagoras equally at the end of the 
dialogue. In the next chapter I suggest that Socrates attempts to rise to this challenge 
in the Gorgias and begins to sketch an entirely different picture of arete as a state of 
order in the soul. This sketch, however, fails to offer the strengths that the metretike 
techne can provide and so the metretike techne continues to jeer at him. 
2' In chapter two, I argued that Socrates makes dear that the metrftO techne offers three main strengths with 
regard to sufficiency for r1: 
(i) it is founded upon an objective truth about the nature of a good life; 
(ii) it offers an account (founded In hedonism) of our motivation to act consistently upon our knowledge of what it Is 
right to do; 
(iii) it brings determinacy and practical accuracy to the decisions we make about how we live. 
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Sketching the `Söteria Tou Biou' 
Plato and the Art of Measurement 
Chapter 4- Challenging the metretike techne 
(Gorgias 447a - 506e) 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will explore how, in the Gorgias, Socrates attributes to one of his 
interlocutors - Callicles -a model of arete as the ability to maximise pleasure in our 
lives. Socrates reaches the conclusion that this model is untenable and I will argue 
that this conclusion has direct implications for the model of arete as the metretike 
techne which Socrates proposed in the Protagoras and which he presented as the 
'salvation of life'. 
In section two I will argue that the model of arete which Socrates attributes to 
Callicles has the same key features as the Protagoras' metretike techne. Calliclean 
arete, like the metretike techne, is concerned with achieving the greatest quantity of 
pleasure in our lives and is founded upon the principle that all pleasure is good. In 
one respect, however, Callicles develops the account of arete provided by the 
metretike techne - by emphasising that pleasure occurs in the process of satisfying 
one's desires, rather than in the state of desire satisfaction. Callicles demonstrates 
that this account of pleasure is required by any model of arete which is concerned 
with maximising pleasure in our lives. His argument is as relevant to the metretike 
techne as to Callicles' own account of arete and, in this respect, the Gorgias 
develops and adds detail to the Protagoras'sketch of arete. In doing so, however, it 
also lays the foundation for one of Socrates' main arguments against it (Gorgias 
495e - 497d). 
In section three I will show how Socrates demonstrates that Callicles is the best 
possible advocate for a model of arete as the maximisation of pleasure. He makes 
clear that Callicles' hedonistic account of arete is an integral part of his firmly held 
conviction that a good life is nothing more than a life successfully devoted to 
satisfying one's own desires. Furthermore, Callicles (unlike Gorgias and Polus who 
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precede him as interlocutors) is free of any sense of shame about his beliefs which 
could inhibit his ability to defend them well. Socrates thus emphasises that this model 
of arete is being put to the test with representation by the best possible advocate - if 
Callicles cannot defend it, then no-one can. 
In section four I will examine Socrates' arguments against Callicles' account of arete 
and suggest that he puts forward two valid arguments which are derived directly from 
premises to which Callicles has agreed. Firstly, Socrates argues (495e - 497d) that 
Callicles' hedonistic view of a good life actually requires the compresence of good 
(pleasant) and bad (painful) states - in order to maximise our pleasure, we must also 
maximise our pain. Secondly, he demonstrates (497e - 499a) that Calliclean 
hedonism requires him to value human qualities (cowardice and ignorance) which, 
according to his own account of arete, are bad. Taken together, the two arguments 
suggest that Callicles is proposing a contradictory account of a good life, in which 
living the kind of life he claims to be good depends upon both living and valuing the 
kind of life he believes to be bad. 
In section five I will explore why Socrates is now prepared to argue directly against a 
model of arete which, at the end of the Protagoras, was jeering at both Socrates and 
Protagoras from a position of strength. I suggest that Socrates now has a different 
model in mind -a model which he introduces immediately after his attack on 
Calliclean hedonism when he proposes an account of arete as order of the soul 
(506e1 - 5). It is a model which he believes can overcome the weaknesses of the 
metretike techne while retaining its strengths - it represents a refinement of this 
sketch rather than the abandonment of it. 
My interpretation of Plato's treatment of arete in the Protagoras and the Gorgias 
leads me to support those commentators who date the Gorgias as the later of the two 
dialogues. ' Whether or not this is correct, however, the principal conclusion of my 
analysis is that there is a close and complementary relationship between the 
treatment of hedonism in the Protagoras and the Gorgias and that, taken together, 
the two dialogues present a richer picture of Socratic hedonism and its relationship 
with arete than they do separately. Both dialogues paint a picture of a model of arete 
founded on maximisation of pleasure but each picture is strikingly different. The 
'On the basis that, in the Gorgias, Socrates explores In depth and challenges a model of arrg1 which, in the 
Protagoras, he is prepared to use as the basis of his argument while only hinting at its weaknesses. 
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Protagoras depicts the model as the'salvation of life' whereas the Gorgias draws 
attention to its weaknesses. The Protagoras emphasises the strengths of such a 
model - its convincing account of our motivation to live a good life and its objective 
basis for determining how we should live - whereas the Gorgias highlights the 
practical difficulties which must be addressed if this model is to survive. 
4.2 Calliclean Arete 
From Gorgias 481 b, Callicles replaces Polus as Socrates' interlocutor in a discussion 
about the nature of rhetoric and, more specifically, its relationship with justice. From 
Callicles' presentation of his views on the nature of justice, a model of arete emerges 
which has the same key features as the Protagoras' metretike techne in that: 
- it is founded upon hedonism; 
- it is concerned with maximising pleasure over a life-time; 
- maximisation of pleasure is achieved by a judgement about the 
quantity of pleasure to be gained from our actions; 
- all pleasure is regarded as good. 
In one respect, however, Callicles clarifies and develops the Protagoras' account of 
arete - by emphasising that pleasure occurs in the process of satisfying one's 
desires, rather than in the state of desire satisfaction. 
In this section I will discuss each of the key features of Calliclean arete: 
(i) Calliclean arete is founded upon hedonism 
When, from 488b, Socrates explores what Callicles means by the justice of nature 
husis , it gradually 
becomes apparent that Callicles' view of what a good life entails 
is founded upon hedonism. In a long speech (from 482c4 ff. ), Callicles has 
introduced a distinction between the false justice of convention nomos and the true 
justice of nature husis . In this speech he claims that Socrates has shamed Polus 
into agreeing that committing injustice is more shameful aischion than suffering it 
and that he has done so by using a false notion of justice - the justice of nomos. 
Callicles summarises his understanding of the true justice of nature husis thus: 
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'But I've told you - [sc. the better and superior are] those who are wise in the city's 
affairs, and brave. For it is fitting for these to rule cities, and the just is this, for them 
to have more than the rest - for the rulers to have more than the ruled. ' (491 c6 - d3, 
Irwin, 1979) 
Socrates asks Callicles to clarify the implications of this type of justice for the life of 
the ruler. In particular, he wants to know whether the ruler must himself be 
temperate. As a result of this question the discussion moves from being specifically 
about the nature of justice to being about the relationship of justice with arete as a 
whole. Callicles suggests: 
`The fine and just according to nature is this, what I'm speaking freely of to you now - 
the man who is to live rightly should let his appetites grow as large as possible and 
not restrain them, and when these are as large as possible, he must have the power 
to serve them, because of his bravery and wisdom, and to fill them with whatever he 
has an appetite for at any time. ' (491 e6 - 492a3, Irwin, 1979) 
For Callicles arete entails the cultivation of the largest possible appetite and the 
satisfaction of this appetite. It therefore excludes temperance and necessitates the 
freedom to indulge one's appetites: 
'But in truth, Socrates - the truth you say you pursue - it is this way; luxury, 
intemperance, and freedom, if it is well supplied, this is virtue arete and happiness; 
and those other things, those ornaments, those agreements of men contrary to 
nature, those are rubbish, worth nothing. ' (492c3 - 8, Irwin, 1979) 
In order to clarify Callicles' view of arete, Socrates introduces the myth of the water- 
carrier at 493a. In this myth, a water carrier carries water in a sieve and pours it into 
a leaky jar. Socrates explains that a wise man suggested to him that this myth is an 
allegory for the idea that we are already dead and our soul is entombed in our body, 
with the most wretched souls being condemned continuously to satisfy insatiable 
2'But what about themselves, my friend? Rulers or ruled in what way? 
[Callides] What are you talking about? 
I'm talking about each one of them ruling himself. Or shouldn't he do this at all, rule himself, but only rule the others? 
[Callicles] What are you talking about, 'ruling himself? 
Nothing complicated, but just as the many say - temperate, master of himself, ruling the pleasures and appetites 
within him. ' (491d4 - e1, Irwin, 1979) 
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desires. Socrates suggests that the life Callicles describes is like the life to which this 
myth refers. He selects one part of the myth - the leaky jar - and urges Callicles to 
consider whether the life of the owner of a sound jar would be happier because, once 
full, his needs would be perpetually satisfied: 
'Now if this is how each man's life is, do you say that the intemperate man's life is 
happier than the orderly man's? When I tell you this, do I persuade you at all to 
concede that the orderly life is better than the intemperate, or don't I persuade you? ' 
(494a2 - 5, Irwin, 1979) 
Callicles explains that such a man would not be happier or live a better life: 
'No, you don't Socrates. For that one who has filled up has no more pleasure at all 
any more. It's what I was saying just now - living like a stone once he has filled up, 
with no more enjoyment or distress. No; living pleasantly is in this - in having as 
much as possible h6s pleiston flowing in. ' (494a6 - b2, Irwin, 1979, my italics) 
Socrates has asked Callicles a question about the nature of a [good and] happy life, 
yet Callicles' reply is about the nature of a pleasant life. From his response, it 
becomes clear that, for him, a good and happy life is synonymous with a pleasant 
life. He regards the maximisation of appetite as the basis of a good and happy life, 
specifically because it results in the pleasantest life. This is Callicles' first direct 
reference to pleasure within his discussion of a good life. It is noticeable that Plato 
did not immediately portray him as a hedonist (when he was first introduced as 
interlocutor), but that this aspect of Callicles' beliefs emerges from a discussion of his 
view of justice and of arete. Through this gradual introduction of Calliclean hedonism, 
Socrates demonstrates that it is an integral part of Callicles' beliefs about justice and 
about the kind of life which his model of justice entails. In fact, it is the basis for 
achieving the type of life which Callicles advocates. Justice, according to Callicles, is 
for the better man to rule and have more. Arete involves living in accordance with this 
model of justice and doing so, Callicles believes, entails living the life of a hedonist - 
it is in living the pleasantest life that the ruler has more than those whom he rules. 
(ii) Calliclean arete is concerned with maximising pleasure 
Callicles considers that a good life is one in which the maximum pleasure is 
achieved. This is clearest at 494a6 - b2 (quoted above) where he responds to 
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Socrates' suggestion that the life of the owner of a sound jar would be happier 
because, once full, his needs would be satisfied. Callicles' response is that the owner 
of the sound jar cannot have the better life because his pleasure is finite; once his jar 
is full he will not, according to Callicles, get any more pleasure. For Callicles, a good 
life is one in which pleasure can be maximised and in which we ensure that we have 
as much pleasure as possible hös pleiston 'flowing in'. The Protagoras' metretike 
techne is, similarly, concerned with maximising pleasure: 
[Socrates] `And what other way is there for pleasure not to be worth pain except that 
one should be more and the other less? And that is a matter of being larger and 
smaller, or more and fewer, or more and less intense. ' (Protagoras 356a1 - 5, Taylor, 
1991) 
Some commentators claim that Calliclean hedonism differs from the hedonism used 
by Socrates in the Protagoras, because they believe Calliclean hedonism is 
concerned with maximising immediate pleasure whereas the Protagoras' art of 
measurement is concerned with maximising pleasure over a lifetime. They have 
suggested that Socrates objects to Calliclean hedonism only because of its 
preoccupation with immediate pleasure. This is the view taken by Gosling and Taylor 
(1982, pp. 72 - 73). Berman (1991) supports and develops3 Gosling and Taylor's 
argument. 
Both Gosling and Taylor and Berman believe that Calliclean hedonism is concerned 
only with maximising immediate pleasures, with no concern for their long-term 
consequences. Callicles is, in fact, concerned with the quality of one's life overall or, 
as he puts it, with the actions of 'the man who is to live rightly. The strategy which he 
advocates for achieving a good life overall is to let one's appetite for pleasure grow 
as large as possible before satisfying it: - 
'... the man who is to live rightly should let his appetites grow as large as possible and 
not restrain them, and when these are as large as possible, he must have the power 
to serve them... ' (491 e6 - 492a3, Irwin, 1979) 
3 Berman develops Gosling and Taylor's argument by explaining their distinction between Calliclean hedonism 
(which, they claim, is concerned with short-term pleasure) and Socratic hedonism (which Is concerned with 
measuring pleasure in the long-term), In terms of an understanding of the structure of pleasures. Berman suggests 
that Socrates understands that pleasures have structures, but Callides does not (the structure of a pleasure being 
the relationship between the pleasure itself, its short-term effects and its long-term consequences). 
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So, like Socrates, Callicles is concerned with achieving a good life overall and does 
not advocate the immediate satisfaction of every pleasure. Both Callicles (in the 
Gorgias) and Socrates (in the Protagoras) express the need to avoid letting 
consideration of the immediacy of pleasure take precedence over considerations of 
quantity. Callicles suggests that this is achieved by ensuring that one's desires are 
allowed to grow as large as possible before they are satisfied (a strategy which 
actually precludes the immediate satisfaction of desire). This suggestion is not at 
odds with Socrates' suggestion in the Protagoras that a good life requires us to 
maximise our pleasure over a lifetime - in fact it offers a strategy for putting this into 
practice. 
It can, however, still be argued that Callicles does not show any concern for the long- 
term, potentially painful, consequences of desire satisfaction. So, for example, we 
can assume that Callicles would advocate letting our appetite for chocolate cake 
grow as large as possible and then indulging it. In contrast, we may argue that the 
metretike techne would require us to set aside the pleasure of eating large amounts 
of chocolate cake for the long-term, greater pleasure of good health. 4 I would 
suggest, however, that Callicles is concerned with maximising pleasure over a life- 
time but that he does not see the consequences of desire satisfaction as relevant to 
this, because of his view of pleasure as occurring in the process of desire satisfaction 
(as discussed in iv below) rather than in the state of being satisfied. To maximise 
pleasure over a life-time, according to Callicles' view of pleasure, we need to satisfy 
all our desires and to do this at the point where they are as large as possible so that 
the pleasure we get from the process of desire satisfaction is as intense as possible. 5 
Returning to the question of chocolate cake versus health, health will only become 
relevant to the calculation of our pleasure when we have an active desire for it. Even 
then, our desire for health should not be given precedence, unless it is greater than 
our desire for chocolate. Calliclean arete is concerned with maximising pleasure 
through the process of fulfilling desires which are as large as possible. This is entirely 
in line with the Protagoras principle that nothing should take precedence over the 
quantity of pleasure to be gained from our actions. The only difference is that 
4 In the Protagoras, Socrates emphasises that the mr ik e hn requires us to weigh up the quantity of pleasure 
that will result over a lifetime. 
a Intensity was, in the Protagoras, Identified by Socrates as one of the criteria by which the quantity of pleasure can 
be judged. Socrates claimed (356a3 - 5) that the amount of pleasure In our lives can be quantified in terms of size 
mi ig ca mik r ), number (I iM elattb) or intensity m llo ggj h6tton). 
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Callicles has clarified that anything which does not contribute to the process of desire 
satisfaction (either by increasing the intensity of the desire or by enabling us to 
satisfy a desire which is as intense as possible) is irrelevant to this calculation. 
(iii) Calliclean arete entails that all pleasure is good 
The objective of Calliclean hedonism is to maximise pleasure, whatever the source 
and nature of this pleasure: 
'Do you say that a man must not restrain his appetites, if he's to be as he should be, 
but should let them grow as great as possible, and find fulfilment for them from 
anywhere at all, and that virtue is this? 
[Callicles] That's what I say. ' (492d5 - e2, Irwin 1979, my italics) 
Similarly, the hedonism upon which the Protagoras' metretike techne is founded does 
not admit any qualitative distinction between pleasures. In the Protagoras, this 
feature of hedonism is derived from the beliefs of the many, who eventually 
acknowledge that pleasure is the only qualitative standard that they have for judging 
goodness in their lives and the only goal which they pursue in their actions (354d1 - 
355a3). Since it is their only standard of goodness, there isn't any qualitative basis 
for distinguishing between different pleasures (356a1 - 5). The value of pleasure can 
only be judged by its quantity; more pleasure (over a lifetime) will always be better 
than less. However, the practical implications of this for our lives are not explored in 
the Protagoras, whereas, in the Gorgias, Socrates explores them in depth. He 
selects the most unpalatable examples of pleasure which he can find and challenges 
Callicles to accept that they are good (i. e. that they can contribute to a happy life). 
Callicles, however, rises to the challenge and insists (494c - d) that the pleasures of 
scratching an itch and of the life of a catamite are both good. 
Socrates does not suggest to Callicles that the pleasure experienced in scratching an 
itch and in the life of a catamite is not real. He appears to accept that, if the person of 
whom Callicles is speaking experiences pleasure, then this experience is sufficient 
proof of the reality of the pleasure. Socrates tries instead to persuade Callicles to 
distinguish between good pleasures which contribute to a happy life and bad 
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pleasures which do not. 6 It is upon Callicles' refusal to accept this distinction that 
Socrates constructs his second argument against Calliclean arete (from 497d). 7 
(iv) Pleasure occurs in the process of satisfying desire 
Callicles makes clear that, while acknowledging that our pleasure is derived from 
getting what we desire, he believes that it occurs in the process of satisfying desire 
rather than in the state of having all our desires satisfied. 8 He argues (494a6 - b2) 
against an account of pleasure as a state of desire satisfaction and suggests that 
once we have achieved this state (like the owner of the sound jar) we are not living a 
pleasant life but the life of a stone! Instead, he argues, our pleasure is derived from 
O'But tell me even now, do you say that the same thing is pleasant and good, or that there is something of pleasant 
things which is not good? ' (495a2 - 4, Irwin, 1979) 
Gosling & Taylor (1982), Berman (1991) and Rudebusch (1999) suggest that Socrates' argument In the Gorgias is 
against the type of pleasures with which Calliclean hedonism is concerned. For Gosling & Taylor (pp. 72 -3), it is an 
argument against short-term pleasures. For Berman (pp. 130 - 1) it is an argument against pleasures that are not 
'taken In an action which has a meanstends hierarchical structure such that it In fact leads to the best possible 
outcome for the agent over the course of a life-time. ' Rudebusch (pp. 33 - 63) believes Socrates Is arguing against 
the pleasures of appetite satisfaction (as opposed to the pleasures which satisfy one's real desires). Socrates dearly 
does not approve of the pleasures which Callicles advocates, but he makes clear that what he is specifically arguing 
against in the Gorgias Is Callicles' failure to distinguish between good and bad pleasures - Callicies' stubborn 
insistence on the pleasantness of scratching an itch and being a catamite are simply examples of the failure to make 
such a distinction: 
[Callides]'Aren't you ashamed to lead the discussion to such things, Socrates? 
[Socrates] Well, Is it me who's leading it there, my noble friend, or is it whoever says with no qualification that those 
who have enjoyment are happy, and doesn't distinguish among pleasures those which are good and bad? (494e7 - 
495a2, Irwin, 1979) 
Socrates' specific criticism is not that Callides believes that such things are pleasant/good but that he fails to make a 
distinction between good and bad pleasures or to acknowledge that any pleasure can be bad. It Is Important to clarify 
this point because the argument which follows, and particularly the argument from 497d (see section 2.2), has 
implications for any model of hedonism which fails to distinguish between good and bad pleasures - not just those 
concerned with a particular type of pleasure. The hedonism of the Protagoras, in Its failure to distinguish between 
good and bad pleasures, Is just as vulnerable as Calliclean hedonism to Socrates' argument from Gorgias 497d. 
It should also be noted that Socrates does not, at any point, suggest to Callicles that the pleasure of scratching an 
itch and being a catamite is not real/true pleasure. He appears to accept in the Gorgias that, if a person experiences 
pleasure, then this experience Is sufficient proof of the reality of the pleasure. Socrates' concern in the Gorgias is to 
establish the existence of bad pleasures. There appears no direct evidence here of the distinction between true and 
false pleasure which emerges in Republic IX (583b ff. ). Again, this means that Socrates' argument in the Gorgias 
represents a challenge to any model of hedonism which regards all pleasure as good. 
Gosling & Taylor (1982, chapter 6) argue that, In the Gorgias, Plato is not clear on the distinction between 
'replenishment and 'repletion' and that he remains unclear on this distinction throughout his discussion of pleasure In 
Republic IX. I would suggest that 494a6 - b2 shows that Plato has a very dear understanding of the distinction 
between the two and is at pains to show that, according to Calliclean hedonism, pleasure Is replenishment (the 
process of satisfying desire) rather than repletion (the state of having all one's desires satisfied). 
A. 
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the process of desire satisfaction and, by maximising the number and intensity of our 
desires, we will have 'as much [pleasure] as possible flowing in'. 
In making this point, Callicles acknowledges that his account of a good life as a life 
devoted to the maximisation of pleasure is incompatible with an account of pleasure 
as a state of desire satisfaction. Such a state, by definition, results in our being 
happy with a finite amount of pleasure and, therefore, lacking the motivation to 
pursue any more. As a result, we would not, according to Callicles' model of arete, 
be living a good life .9 Instead, we must accept that pleasure occurs in the process of 
fulfilling our desires and that it is in our interests to nurture our desires to make them 
as wide ranging and intense as possible. In this way we will create unlimited 
opportunities to experience pleasure, and thus to maximise pleasure in our lives. 
It could be argued that this account of pleasure sets Calliclean arete apart from the 
metretike techne. Socrates does not, in the Protagoras, offer any account of how or 
when pleasure actually occurs. However, Callicles' clarification of the definition of 
pleasure upon which his own account of arete depends has implications for any 
account of arete as the maximisation of pleasure in our lives and this includes the 
Protagoras' metretike techne. In fact, Callicles' argument adds detail to the 
Protagoras' 'sketch' of arete by clarifying the definition/account of pleasure on which 
it depends and offering a practical strategy for pursuing pleasure. In doing so, the 
Gorgias begins to fulfil the promise which Socrates made at Protagoras 357b4 - cl 
to add more detail to the initial sketch of arete. 
On the other hand, it is upon Callicles' account of pleasure as the process of 
satisfying desire that Socrates constructs the first part of his argument against 
Calliclean hedonism. Callicles' clarity about what his vision of a good life entails is, in 
the end, the basis of his downfall. 
4.3 Establishing the Right Environment 
In the next section I will explore how, in the Gorgias, Socrates subjects the model of 
arete which he proposed in the Protagoras to a thorough and rigorous examination. 
9 Santas (2001, p. 55 note 16) claims that Callicles does not distinguish between desire-satisfaction and hedonistic 
theories of good. However, I would suggest that he makes a clear distinction and, furthermore, explores the 
relationship between the two. He demonstrates that hedonism is compatible with the pursuit of desire satisfaction, but 
not with the state of desire satisfaction. 
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In this section I will first show how, before doing this, Plato takes care to establish the 
right environment for this examination by making sure that this model of arete as the 
maximisation of pleasure in our lives is: 
represented by the most appropriate interlocutor; 
examined in an environment which is free from any sense of shame which 
may influence the interlocutor's beliefs and inhibit his replies. 
(i) The right interlocutor 
The transition in the first part of the Gorgias from Gorgias to Polus as interlocutor (at 
461 b) and then from Polus to Callicles (at 481 b) serves not only to present three 
different models of a good life but also to explore three different characters and their 
beliefs. The reader comes to recognise that Callicles is the right person to defend a 
model of arete founded upon hedonism, because it is in line with his genuinely held 
beliefs (as discussed in 4.2 above). 
The differences between the three interlocutors are explored through their respective 
attempts to define rhetoric and to justify Polus' claim (448c9 & e5) that rhetoric is the 
finest Fkallistd techne. As a result of this claim, to kalon is the value through which 
their understanding of the nature of rhetoric and its role within a good life is explored 
by Socrates. 
Gorgias' account of rhetoric refers not only to the ability to use persuasion in order to 
satisfy his personal desire for power, but also to the ability to do this justly. Although 
he advocates achieving personal power as a key objective of rhetoric, 10 he is not 
prepared to accept that rhetoricians can practise their art without knowledge of 
justice. " Gorgias' account of the kalliste techne is two dimensional - it embraces 
practising justice as well as pursuing his own success. We recognise, therefore, that 
he could not accept a one dimensional account of a good life founded upon 
hedonism - and in fact, Gorgias does not refer at all to the pursuit of pleasure. 
Although we can argue that it is implicit that Gorgias takes pleasure in achieving 
personal power - in satisfying his desire for'freedom for a man himself and 'rule over 
others in his own city' (452e) - he clearly believes that achieving such 'pleasure' 
t0 For example at 452e1- 8. 
11 He concedes this at 460a3 - 4. 
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through injustice is not kalon. Justice is, ultimately, as important to Gorgias as the 
pleasure of personal success. 
Gorgias is replaced by Polus who, initially, seems the ideal candidate to represent 
hedonism. His high regard for Archelaus' life (470e - 471 d) illustrates his initial 
position that to satisfy one's own desires (which, for Polus, entails obtaining personal 
power) is kalon because it is the basis of a happy life. Furthermore, he regards desire 
satisfaction as integrally connected with pleasure and is delighted when Socrates 
suggests (474d ff. ) that something is kalon either because it is pleasant or useful 
ata ten chreian, 474d6], chresimon, 474d7] or beneficial Lc Lia 6Dhelian, 474e3]. In 
accepting this definition of to kalon, Polus appears to be interpreting 'useful' and 
'beneficial' in the light of his reference to Archelaus, to mean 'contributing to the 
satisfaction of my desires'. 
However, it gradually emerges that, for Polus, justice does have value in its own 
right, even when it results in less pleasure for him. This becomes apparent when he 
accepts that committing injustice is more shameful aischion than suffering injustice 
and that paying the penalty for injustice is a finer kallion action than avoiding 
punishment. '2 At 476e Polus accepts directly that just things are fine kala and we 
recognise that he is really no different from Gorgias - his account of to kalon is not 
purely based upon pleasure. For Polus, too, there is more to a good life (and to a 
happy life)13 than maximising his own pleasure. 
Polus is replaced as interlocutor by Callicles, whose introductory speech (481 b- 
484c) on the distinction between nature (hp usis) and convention (nomos) makes 
clear that for him there is no other dimension to a good life than maximising one's 
pleasure by cultivating desires and actively pursing their satisfaction. Callicles' 
hedonism (see 4.2i above) is underpinned by his rejection of a conventional view of 
arete and a genuine belief that there is nothing more to a kalon life than serving one's 
own interests as far as possible. The reader can recognise that Callicles' total 
freedom from conventional notions of arete which distinguish justice from the pursuit 
of personal success, sets him apart from both Gorgias and Polus, and makes him a 
formidable advocate for hedonism. 
12 Socrates' questioning forces Polus to admit that things can be'useful' and 'beneficial' for reasons other than their 
pleasantness, and that just actions are an example of this. 
'3 Socrates' questioning leads Polus to admit that, despite his Initial position, justice is more important in living a 
happy life than desire satisfaction because Injustice is more harmful to the soul. 
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(ii) Establishing free speech 
Plato's treatment of the motifs of shame Faischron/aischun6l and free speech 
arresia ), which are prominent throughout Socrates' conversation with Polus and 
Callicies, 14 contributes to creating the right environment for an exploration of 
hedonism. The right environment is one free of any sense of shame which may 
influence the interlocutor's beliefs and inhibit his replies. Wherever the motif of 
shame occurs in the Gorgias, shame is presented as a misleading or inhibiting factor. 
So, for example, Polus complains that Socrates is playing upon Gorgias' sense of 
shame and using this to influence his replies: 
What, Socrates? Do you really believe what you're saying now about rhetoric? Do 
you really suppose - just because Gorgias was ashamed not to agree further with 
you that the rhetor would also know the just, the fine, and the good things, and that if 
he didn't know them when he came to Gorgias, Gorgias himself would teach him, 
and then perhaps from that agreement some opposition came about in his 
statements - the thing that you're so satisfied about, when you yourself led him into 
those questions - for who do you suppose would deny that he himself knew the just 
things and would teach others? It's simply the height of bad breeding to lead the 
discussion to such things. ' (461b3 - c4, Irwin, 1979) 
Callicles has a similar complaint about Polus; he too has been influenced by his 
sense of shame: 
'And for just this I can't admire Polus myself, for his concession to you that doing 
injustice is more shameful than suffering it; for from this agreement he himself in turn 
was bound up by you in the argument, and was muzzled, after being ashamed to say 
what he thought. ' (482d7 - e2, Irwin, 1979) 
Callicles believes that the values of society are also influenced and misled by a 
sense of shame: 
'For by nature everything is more shameful which is also worse, suffering injustice, 
but by rule doing injustice is more shameful. ' (483a7 - 8, Irwin, 1979) 
'ý The motif occurs, for example, at 461b5,463a5,463d4,472c8,474c7,474d1,482e2,483c7 and 487b1- 5. 
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Shame represents a barrier to effective dialectic. Callicles' total freedom from any 
such sense of shame thus represents the removal of this barrier and so contributes 
towards the creation of the right conditions for dialectic. 
The motif of free speech (arp resia) complements the motif of shame. Socrates 
believes that the right interlocutor will not only be free of any sense of shame but will 
also be willing to express his beliefs freely. He is concerned that both Gorgias and 
Polus fail to meet this criterion: 
'And these foreign visitors, Gorgias and Polus, are wise and friends of mine, but short 
of free speaking, and more prone to shame than they should be. ' (487a7 - b2, Irwin, 
1979) 
Callicles, in contrast, is all too willing to speak freely: 
[Socrates] 'And as for being the type to speak freely without shame, you say it 
yourself and your speech a little earlier agrees with you. ' (487d5 - 7, Irwin, 1979) 
Callicles is not in any way ashamed of his view of justice and it is clear that Socrates 
will not be able to shame Callicles into denying the hedonism upon which Calliclean 
justice is founded. Instead, if he is to defeat Calliclean hedonism, Socrates must 
show that it is incompatible with the type of justice and the type of life Callicles 
believes in. Hedonism is the foundation of Callicles' belief system, and only if its 
position as such is challenged might he be persuaded to abandon it. By taking time 
within the Gorgias to establish the ideal interlocutor and environment for an 
exploration of hedonism, Plato encourages us to take Socrates' subsequent rejection 
of Calliclean hedonism seriously. We recognise that hedonism is being put to the 
test, represented by the best possible advocate - if Callicles cannot defend it, then 
no-one can. 
4.4 Challenging Callicles' model of arete 
Having established that Callicles is the best possible interlocutor to defend a model 
of arete founded upon hedonism, Socrates puts forward two arguments against such 
a model. Both arguments are derived directly from premises Callicles has agreed to 
about the nature of a good (and bad) life. Firstly, Socrates argues that Callicles' 
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hedonistic view of a good life actually requires the compresence of good (pleasant) 
and bad (painful) states. Secondly, he demonstrates that it requires him to value 
human qualities (cowardice and ignorance) which, according to his account of arete, 
are bad. Taken together, the two arguments suggest that Callicles is proposing a 
contradictory account of a good life in which living the kind of life he claims to be 
good depends upon both living and valuing the kind of life he believes to be bad. 
(i) Calliclean arete requires the compresence of good and bad states 
The first part of Socrates' argument against Calliclean hedonism (from 495e - 497d) 
concentrates upon two key features of Calliclean hedonism - its objective of 
maximising pleasure (see 4.2i above) and its account of pleasure as the process of 
desire satisfaction (see 4.2v above). Socrates demonstrates that these two aspects 
of Calliclean hedonism result in a contradictory account of a good life. He presents 
his argument in four main stages: 
Staue 1- Good and bad states cannot be compresent 
(a) Faring well feu rattein and faring badly kak6s rattein are opposite states 
(495e1 - 5). 
(b) Faring well and faring badly are like the opposite states of sickness and 
health, strength and weakness and speed and slowness, in that a person 
cannot have both together or lose both at the same time (495e6 - 496b4). 15 
(c) Faring well is a good state, characterised by a life of happiness feudaimonial 
in which good things16 are present and bad things are excluded. Faring badly 
is a bad state, characterised by a life of wretchedness Fathliotds from which 
good things are excluded. These two states can only be present in turn en 
merei and cannot be present (or cease) at the same time as each other 
(496b5 - c5). 
's Socrates does not explain why faring well and faring badly cannot be compresent or cease at the same time. Nor 
does he explain why this is also the case for sickness and health. Presumably, Socrates Interprets faring well as 
having more good things than bad overall In one's life and faring badly as having more bad things than good. If we 
were to interpret faring well only as having some good things in one's life, then there wouldn't be any reason why it 
couldn't be compresent with (and cease at the same time as) faring badly. Similarly, we can assume that by health, 
Socrates means an overall/predominant state of physical well-being which, therefore, cannot be compresent with an 
overall state of ill-health. 
16 Again, we need to Interpret'good things' to ah- 496b5] as'a predominance of good things' if Socrates' 
argument is to be valid (see preceding footnote). 
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Stage 2- plerösis is pleasure and epithumia is pain 
(d) Every lack Fendeia and appetite e ithumia is painful. Thirst and hunger are 
cited as examples (496c6 - d4). " 
(e) The filling lerösis of a lack/appetite is pleasant. Drinking when thirsty and 
eating when hungry are cited as examples (496d4 - e2). 
Staue 3- Pleasure and pain can be compresent 
(f) We can experience pleasure and pain at the same time and in the same 
place. Drinking when thirsty is cited as an example - Callicles has agreed that 
thirst is a lack endeia and e ithumia and that the process of filling lerösis 
that lack (while our thirst is still present) is pleasant (496e3 - 9). 
(g) Experiencing pleasure and pain cannot be the same as faring well and faring 
badly (which cannot be compresent) and, therefore, the pleasant cannot be 
the same as the good to a athon18 (496e9 - 497a5). 
Stage 4- Pleasure and pain can cease at the same moment 
(h) We can cease from pleasure and pain at the same time. Stopping drinking at 
the point when we stop being thirsty and stopping eating when we cease to 
be hungry are examples (497c5 - 9). 
(i) Pleasures and pains cannot, therefore, be the same as goods and evils 
(497d1 -7). 19 
" In associating desire with a lack Socrates Is probably drawing upon the Ideas of Empedocles. Gosling and Taylor 
(1982, pp. 19 - 23) discuss the evidence that Empedocles described pleasure as the making up IDIOr6sis of a 
deficiency n is which causes a state of pain, with desire as the natural Inclination to fill this deficiency. Socrates, 
however, takes the association between desire and lack one stage further by assuming that the desire which is the 
natural result of a lack has the same characteristic (i. e. painfulness) as the lack itself. He does not argue for this but 
Cailicies accepts it without question. I would suggest that this is a deliberate development on Socrates' part of the 
idea that a lack is painful -a development which enables him to demonstrate a direct contradiction in Callicles' 
account of a good life. Socrates has already demonstrated that, for Callicles, our having pleasure is dependent upon 
our having desire - desire must be there for us to derive pleasure from (the process) of fulfilling it. When Callides 
accepts that this desire Is itself painful, he implicitly accepts the principle that our experiencing pleasure depends 
directly upon our being in pain. By applying this principle in the remaining stages of the argument, Socrates 
demonstrates that Callicles' account of a good life (as pleasant) is contradictory, in that it is actually Identical with his 
account of a bad (i. e. ) painful one. 
'° That Is, it cannot be the same as the good things (tagatha - 496b5) which characterise faring well. Socrates has 
already referred to these collectively as the good at 496c3 and he does so again here. 
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A number of criticisms of this argument have been made. 20 Of these criticisms, 
Irwin's objection (see footnote 20 iv) - that the argument does not show that 
hedonism requires an overall state of pleasure and an overall state of pain to be 
compresent - appears to have the most validity. Taken in isolation from his 
preceding discussion with Callicles, Socrates' argument from 495e - 497d 
demonstrates only that a person must experience some pain (desire) and some 
pleasure (desire satisfaction) together. It does not demonstrate that the person's 
overall/predominant state must, at the same time, be one of both pleasure and of 
pain. Socrates' argument shows, for example, that in drinking when thirsty, a person 
experiences some pain and some pleasure together. He does not, however, 
demonstrate that, because of this, the person's overall state is necessarily one of 
both pleasure and pain. 21 Irwin suggests (1979, p. 202) that Socrates 'does not rely 
heavily on this argument' and that'perhaps it is only a preliminary argument, making 
clear how the hedonist position must be understood. ' 
However, when we interpret Socrates' argument in its full context - namely in the 
light of the key features of Calliclean hedonism which have emerged through his 
discussion with Callicles - the argument does identify a significant difficulty with 
Callicles' model of arete. Irwin does not take into account that Callicles has made 
19 This conclusion draws on 496b5 - c5. Pleasures and pains cannot be the same as the good and bad things which 
are indicative of faring well and faring badly, because the former can be com present (and can cease at the same 
time) whereas the latter cannot. 
20 (i) Adkins (1960, p. 80, n. 10) argues that'Plato Is cheating: it is "drinking when thirsty" that Callicles should have 
admitted to be pleasant - thereby destroying the argument - not drinking Qer sg. Guthrie (1975, p. 291, n. 2) points out 
that it is precisely because drinking when thirsty is pleasant that Socrates can claim that pleasure 'coincides with the 
pain of thirst. 
(ii) Dodds (1959, p. 309) refers to a criticism discussed by Olympiodorus (146.13) that'in drinking when thirsty the 
pleasure and pain are not strictly simultaneous - the pain comes first. ' Olympiodorus pointed out, however, that the 
thirst does persist through the act of drinking and so the two are present together. 
(iii) Irwin (1979, pp. 201- 202) suggests that Socrates' argument is not supported by an account of wherelhow the 
pains of hunger and thirst and the pleasures of eating and drinking occur. He claims that the argument fails to 
demonstrate that pleasure and pain are compresent (i. e. that they occur together in the same place) and does not 
exclude the possibility that where pleasure and pain are experienced together they occur In different parts of a 
person. Socrates could, however, counter this criticism by claiming that by simply being present together In one 
person they are compresent. 
(iv) Irwin also argues (1979, p. 202) that Socrates doesn't demonstrate that an overall state of pleasure (i. e. having 
more pleasure that pain) can be compresent with an overall state of pain (i. e. having more pain than pleasure). He 
claims that the argument only shows that a person can experience pleasure In some respects and, at the same time, 
pain in other respects. 
21 The pleasure of drinking may outweigh the pain of thirst (or vice versa) and so, despite the compresence of 
pleasure and pain, one will predominate. 
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clear that maximising pleasure is the objective of a good life and that this objective is 
achieved by maximising desire (see 4.2 above). When interpreted in the light of this, 
Socrates' argument shows that, according to Callicles, we must maximise pain 
(desire)22 in our life in order to maximise pleasure (the process of fulfilling desire). 
This does require the compresence of a good and bad state overall, 23 something 
which Callicles agrees (495e6 - 496b4) is impossible. 
Since this argument forms an integral part of Socrates' discussion of Calliclean 
hedonism, we are justified in interpreting it in the light of the rest of the discussion. 
When we do so, it becomes apparent why Socrates believes that his argument from 
the compresence of good and bad states raises a valid objection to Calliclean 
hedonism. He has shown that Callicles' account of a good life is one in which we 
maximise pleasure by maximising pain, which is a contradictory account of a good 
life. To fare well Leu rattein by maximising what is good (pleasant) in our life, we 
must also maximise what is bad (painful). To fare well Leg pratteinj we must also fare 
badly kak6s rattein . We must actually embrace the kind of life which Callicles 
despises -a life without all the things he regards as agatha. This will entail 
abandoning the life epitomised by those whom Callicles admires (those with 'a living, 
reputation and many other goods a atha ' 486d1) and accepting instead the life of 
those 'who live in an empty house' (486c7 - 8). 
(ii) Calliclean arete values cowardice and ignorance 
In an argument from 497d, Socrates raises a second criticism of Calliclean 
hedonism. This criticism focuses on: 
" Callicles' belief that all pleasure is good (see 4.2iv above) and that the 
indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure constitutes arete; 
I Socrates' argument relies upon Callicles' acceptance that desire is painful. Without this, Callicles would have to 
admit only that the states of desire and pleasure must be compresent (and there would be no obvious contradiction in 
this). Callicles accepts without question that desire Is painful and Socrates does not appear to justify this part of his 
argument However, if we interpret Socrates' suggestion that'every lack and appetite is painful' [49644] as 
establishing the premises that (i) all desire indicates the perception of a lack and (ii) any lack is painful, Socrates Is 
then justified In concluding from these premises that the desire which is the perception of a lack is a perception of 
pain and will itself be painful. 
23 A state in which the person's life is as pleasant as possible must be compresent with a state in which it is as painful 
as possible. 
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" Callicles' belief that bravery and wisdom underpin the successful pursuit of 
pleasure. 
Callicles has suggested that, in order to live a good life, a man must have the power 
to serve his appetites, when these are as large as possible, 'because of his bravery 
and wisdom' (492a1 - 2). Callicles sees no conflict between a life of bravery and 
wisdom and one devoted to the pursuit of pleasure. In fact, he believes that the 
successful pursuit of pleasure both requires and demonstrates these qualities: 
'First of all I say who the superior men are -I don't say shoemakers or cooks; they're 
whoever are wise in the city's affairs, about how to govern it well, and not only wise, 
but also brave, and capable of fulfilling what they intend - and who don't slacken 
because of softness of soul. ' (491 a7 - b4, Irwin 1979) 
Callicles believes that a life devoted to the pursuit of all types of pleasure carries the 
qualitative guarantee that it will be both brave and wise. Bravery, wisdom and 
hedonism are, for Callicles, integrally connected and, together, they form the basis of 
a model of arete which is sufficient to achieve personal power and thus live according 
to Callicles' model of natural justice. 
From 497d, however, Socrates challenges Callicles' belief that a life devoted to the 
pursuit of pleasure will also be brave and wise. He does so by gaining agreement to 
the following premises which are derived either from Callicles' model of arete [A], 
from his hedonistic philosophy [H] or simply from his observation of life [0]: 
(a) Just as the beautiful are beautiful because of the presence of beauty, so good 
men are good because of the presence to them of good things (497e1 - 3) 
[Ai 24 
24 Irwin (1979, p. 203) questions the validity of this premise. He suggests that Socrates establishes this premise by 
choosing an example of an intrinsic good (being beautiful) and applying this, incorrectly, to an instrumental good 
(having argl6). Irwin's objection involves a comparison between: 
. Beauty (being beautiful) which is an Intrinsic good, i. e. something which Is a good In Itself; and 
40 Ara (according to Irin, argt$ is the power to acquire good) which, by Irwin's definition, is an 
instrumental good i. e. a means of achieving goodness rather than a good in itself. 
Irwin suggests that, whereas it is valid to say that X Is beautiful because it has beauty, it is not valid to say that X has 
the power to obtain pleasure because he has pleasure -X might just have'stumbled on some pleasure' rather than 
acquiring it by any power. Yet, even if we accept Irwin's interpretation of grg as an instrumental good, I would 
suggest that Socrates' premise remains valid. If we experience pleasure, surely it does demonstrate (by the simple 
fact that we do experience It) that we had the power to acquire this pleasure. 'Stumbling on' pleasure cannot be 
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(b) Brave and wise men are good (497e3 - 5,499a1 - 2) [A]. 
(c) Cowards and fools are bad (499a3 - 4) [A]. 
(d) Good and bad men enjoy pleasure about equally; in fact sometimes bad men 
[cowards and fools] have greater pleasure (498e5 - 8) [0]. 
(e) Pleasures are good and pains are evil (498d3 - 4) [H]. 
(f) Those who have pleasure are good and those who are in pain are bad (498e2 
- 3) [H]. 
Socrates concludes: 
`Then doesn't the bad man turn out to be good and bad similarly to the good man, or 
even better? Doesn't this follow, with those previous things, if someone says that the 
same things are pleasant and good? Mustn't this follow, Callicles? ' (499a7 - b3, 
Irwin, 1979) 
The example of going to war, which Socrates used within the final argument of the 
Protagoras from 358a, reappears in the Gorgias (from 498a - c) within the argument 
outlined above. Whether or not this represents a direct reference to the Protagoras, it 
certainly presents a striking contrast to it. In the Protagoras (359e - 360a), Socrates 
argued that courage in going to war is both kalon and pleasant. Here, Socrates 
argues that cowardice in war results in at least as much pleasure as bravery. Irwin 
(1979, pp. 204 - 5) points out that this argument demonstrates a conflict between 
Callicles' 'advocacy of unrestricted desire-satisfaction' and his belief that a good man 
is wise and courageous. If we accept, as Callicles does, that the pursuit of pleasure 
is good, regardless of the type of pleasure, then we must adjust our model of arete 
accordingly. We must either accept that fools and cowards can achieve a good life, 
or accept that what we regard as foolishness and cowardice is, in fact, bravery and 
wisdom. Santas describes the model of aret8 which Socrates suggests we are left 
with if we accept Calliclean hedonism: 
`The Calliclean notion of a good man has been reduced to a man who has no 
consideration for others, and whose wisdom and courage consist entirely in the 
ability to maximise his pleasures and minimize his pains. ' (Santas, 1979, p. 284) 
Callicles cannot accept this. It turns out that even he believes that there is more to a 
good life than the indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure. As a result he has to admit the 
dismissed as an accident rather than a power -'stumbling on' Is the result of an action of some kind (however 
haphazard and unplanned the action may be) and, therefore, the result of our power to acquire pleasure by our 
actions. 
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possibility of a qualitative distinction between pleasures - the existence of good 
kalon) and bad (aischron) pleasures. In fact he pretends that he has always made 
this distinction and that he was only joking before: 
`I've been listening to you for a long time and agreeing, Socrates, thinking that even if 
someone concedes something to you as a joke, you fasten on it gleefully like young 
boys. As though you really suppose that I or any other man don't think some 
pleasures are better and others worse. ' ( 499b4 - 8) 
In doing so, Callicles gives up one of the fundamental principles of his own model of 
arete and, in making him do so, Socrates gives up one of the fundamental principles 
of the Protagoras' metretike techne. 
(iii) A contradictory account of arete 
Together, Socrates' two arguments show that Callicles' model of arete results in a 
contradictory account of a good life. The first argument shows that the objective of 
maximising pleasure in our lives requires us to live in a constant (painful) state of 
desire for more pleasure. The second argument shows that Callicles' assumption that 
all pleasure is good (and that we can distinguish between pleasures only on the basis 
of quantity) means that we must praise any action which enables us to achieve 
pleasure. This means we must praise actions which our instinct tells us are wrong - 
we cannot value anything other than the successful pursuit of pleasure or criticise 
anything other than the failure to achieve pleasure. Each of the two arguments 
complements the other by demonstrating a contradiction in Callicles' model of arete. 
It is easy to assume that the second argument is the more significant25 - because this 
is the one that Callicles actually acknowledges and which makes him concede 
defeat. However, both arguments demonstrate a different contradiction in Calliclean 
arete - the first highlights its direct impact on the quality (pleasantness/painfulness) 
of our lives and the second highlights its impact on our value system. The second 
argument appears to have more effect on Callicles, but both should be given equal 
attention by the reader, since (as I will discuss in the next chapter) Socrates builds 
upon both of these arguments in the second part of the dialogue and both have a key 
role in with the development of a model of arete which begins to address the 
weaknesses of the Protagoras' metretike techne. 
As a number of commentators do (e. g. Irwin, 1979, p. 202). 
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4.5 Conclusion: an alternative model of arete? 
In the Gorgias, Socrates makes clear, through his discussion with Callicles, that the 
model of arete which Socrates proposed in the Protagoras results in a contradictory 
account of a good life -a contradiction which is inherent both in its objective of 
maximising pleasure in our lives and in its assumption that all pleasure is good. In 
demonstrating this, Socrates argues directly against a model of arete which, at the 
end of the Protagoras was, on his own admission, jeering at both himself and 
Protagoras from a position of strength. The Protagoras emphasised the strengths of 
a model of arete founded upon hedonism and, while hinting at its weaknesses, 
challenged Socrates and Protagoras to come up with anything better. I would 
suggest that, in the Gorgias, Socrates begins to rise to this challenge by introducing 
a different model of arete. His confidence in the potential of this model explains his 
willingness to challenge the metretikd techne. 
Immediately after his attack on Calliclean hedonism, Socrates gives an account of 
arete in terms of order kosmos : 
`Then the virtue arete of each thing is something structured ftetaamenonl and 
ordered [kekosmemenonl by a structure taxei ? 
[Callicles] I would say so myself. 
Then it is some order kosmos - the proper order for each of the things that are - 
which makes the thing good by coming to be present in it. 
[Callicles] I myself think so. ' (Irwin, 1979,506e1 - 4) 
He concludes that the arete of the soul also rests in its proper order. 
'Then a soul with its own proper order kosmos is better than a disordered soul? 
[Callicles] It must be. ' (Irwin, 1979,506e4 - 5) 
Here Socrates is suggesting that order kosmos in the soul can be the basis of an 
account of arete. In the next chapter I will argue that he proposes this account in 
response to the difficulties that he has highlighted with the metretiko techne. 
However, I will suggest that, rather than representing the 'tearing up' of his sketch of 
arete as the metretike techne, the introduction of order into his account of arete 
marks the beginning of a process of refining this sketch. Socrates' 'attack' on 
Calliclean hedonism (which clearly identifies the weaknesses of the metretike techne) 
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has provided a clear indication of the difficulties which need to be addressed if this 
model of arete is to survive and Socrates' introduction of kosmos into his account of 
arete represents a response to this. In the Gorgias and beyond, 26 Socrates remains 
committed to a model of arete as the art of measuring pleasure in our lives. 
2° In later chapters I will argue that the sketch which originates in the metrOtikb hn is developed further in the 
Phaedo, Republic and Statesman. 
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Sketching the `Söteria Tou Biou' 
Plato and the Art of Measurement 
Chapter 5- Refining the sketch; arete as measurement of 
order 
(Gorgias 501 a- 507e) 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed how, from Gorgias 495e - 499b, Socrates 
identifies two key weaknesses with the account of a good life advocated by Callicles. 
In doing so, Socrates also challenges the account of arete as the art of measurement 
which he himself proposed in the Protagoras. The weaknesses with Calliclean 
hedonism which Socrates highlights are, firstly, its objective of maximising pleasure 
in our lives and, secondly, its insistence that all pleasure is good. Socrates shows 
that these two aspects of Calliclean hedonism result in a contradictory account of a 
good life according to which, in order to achieve a life which is as good (pleasant) as 
possible we must actively cultivate our desire for pleasure - which is something 
painful and, therefore, bad. 
In this chapter I will explore how, immediately after his attack on Calliclean hedonism, 
Socrates introduces an alternative account of arete as the ability to achieve a state of 
order kosmos in our lives. In section two, I will show how, while this account offers 
an alternative to Calliclean arete (and thus to the metretik6 techne), Socrates still 
presents achieving aretb in our lives as a techne - the technical ability to give a 
rational account Flo os of order in our lives and to put this account into practice. 
However, this techne is practised by the politician on behalf of the individual citizen 
(rather than by the citizen himself) and this represents a key difference both from 
Calliclean arete and from the metretike techne. 
In section three, I use the analogy which Socrates draws between health in the body 
and order in the soul' to explore the nature of the techne which he is now proposing 
as the basis of arete. I conclude that he now presents arete as the ability to maintain 
a proportionate mixture of 'powers' dunameis within our lives. In section four, I 
1 504a3 -5.504b7 - cl . 
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suggest that our achieving this proportionate mixture depends upon the politician 
controlling pleasure in our lives. So, pleasure continues to play a central a role in this 
model of arete - as it did in Calliclean arete (and in the metretike techne). Now, 
however, the techne entails the ability to control rather than to maximise the amount 
of pleasure in our lives. 
So how does this model respond to the difficulties of Calliclean aretd and of the 
metretike techne? In section five I suggest (referring again to the analogy which 
Socrates draws with health) that, because it entails our recognising and achieving the 
right amount of pleasure in our lives, it avoids the difficulties involved in an account of 
arete as the maximisation of pleasure. In section six, I explore how its concern with 
achieving the right amount of pleasure also entails our accepting that not all pleasure 
is good. Thus the model overcomes the difficulties inherent in an account of arete 
that treats all pleasure as good. 
In section seven, I conclude that Socrates' account of arete as the ability to achieve 
kosmos in our lives does not represent his abandonment of his sketch of arete as the 
metretike techne, but rather his refinement of it. It responds to the difficulties of the 
metretike techne while retaining its essential character as a practical art (techne), 
founded upon hedonism, of measuring pleasure in our lives. Socrates' account brings 
difficulties of its own, however, in that its rejection of hedonism means that it is not 
supported by an adequate account of our individual motivation to live a good life in 
the way that the metretike techne was (through its foundation upon hedonism). To 
this extent, Socrates' refined account of arete loses one of the key strengths of the 
metretike techne in an attempt to respond to its weaknesses. Plato highlights this 
through Callicles' withdrawal from the discussion (505c1 - 2) at the point when it 
becomes clear that Socrates' account of a good life rules out unrestricted desire 
satisfaction. 
5.2 Arete as the ability to achieve order in our lives 
Socrates' account of areti as the ability to achieve order kosmos in our lives 
emerges when Socrates asks Callicles (at 500a) who it is that possesses the ability 
to distinguish between good and bad pleasures? Callicles agrees, when prompted by 
2 Socrates' second argument against Calliclean hedonism has forced Callicles to concede that his account of a good 
life must distinguish between good and bad pleasures, in order to accommodate the other qualities he regards as 
part of a good life (particularly courage and wisdom). 
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Socrates, that only a craftsman technikos has the ability. Socrates then recalls his 
previous discussion with Polus about the difference between a techne (medicine is 
used as the example) and a knack em eiria : 
`I said that medicine has considered the nature husis of what it cares for and the 
explanation aitia of what it does [hh6n rattei , and can give a rational account Io os 
of each of these things. ' (501 al - 3, Irwin, 1979)3 
Socrates suggests to Callicles, as he had previously suggested to Polus, that the 
distinguishing characteristic of a techne is a concern for achieving what is best - an 
objective which each techne accomplishes by possessing a genuine understanding 
of its own area of expertise, as described in 501a - 3. He contrasts the characteristics 
of a techne with those of an empeiria, which is concerned only with giving pleasure 
and achieves this without rational understanding alo Ss, 501a6] through their 
recollection mneme, 501a7] of what usually happens fei6thot8s, 501b1]. 
In his discussion with Polus, Socrates had identified the ability of a techne to give a 
rational account Flo os but did not explore the precise nature of this logos. With 
Callicles, however, Socrates explores the nature of the rational account Flo os which 
only a craftsman can provide. He suggests that this is an account of the correct order 
and structure of the product of his work4 -a suggestion which arises as Socrates 
and Callicles argue whether rhetoric is a techn5 and whether some of the earlier 
politicians, whom Callicles has cited as examples of true craftsmen, 5 demonstrated 
true craftsmanship in their rhetoric. In arguing that they did not, Socrates explains 
that a techne involves working to achieve a form eidos, 503e4] consisting of a 
particular structure taxis, 503e7,504a8] and order Fkosmos, 504a8] within which one 
3 Here Socrates refers to 465a where, in his conversation with Polus, he also distinguished between a craft and a 
knack and cited cookery as an example of a knack which impersonates the techn§ of medicine: 'And I say it is not a 
craft, but a knack, because it has no rational account [logos] by which it applies the things it applies, to say what they 
are by nature, so that it cannot say what is the explanation of each thing; and I don't call anything a craft which Is 
unreasoning (alogon). ' (465a2 - 6, Irwin, 1979) 
Socrates claims, at 501a1- 3, only to be recapping on his previous distinction between techn5 and emoeiria. In fact, 
he develops his original distinction by suggesting that each techn6 's understanding of its own area of expertise (hhou 
g2 
ýg 
2eu? I, 501a1, literally 'of what It cares for'], embraces an understanding of its function [MO prattei, 501a2, 
literally'of the things which it does']. 
We can assume, as Socrates does not suggest otherwise, that an account of the order and structure of the product 
of a craft represents an account of both its nature fphusisl and its function iih 6n oratteil. At 501a1 - 3, Socrates 
says that the craftsman must be able to provide a JQM of both. 
6 Callides cites Themistoces, Clmon. Miltiades and Pericles as examples of politicians who could claim to be 
genuine craftsmen because their aim was to achieve the best Interests of the citizens of Athens (503c). 
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thing is fitting re on, 504a1] and suitable [harmottein, 504a1] to another. The 
craftsman must have the ability to achieve this order and structure in the product of 
his work: 
0 trainers and doctors bring order and structure (health and strength) to the body 
(504a3 - 5); 
"a builder brings order and structure to a house (504a8 - 9); 
"a shipwright brings order and structure to a boat (504a11); 
""a good politician brings order and structure to the soul (504d5 - e4). 
Socrates suggests, furthermore, that the aretb of each thing consists in this order and 
structure and that it is, therefore, by achieving the correct order and structure that the 
craftsman can achieve what is best within his field of expertise. Arete is the result of 
a techne -a principle which holds for arete in the soul as much as for arete in the 
body of in the product of any practical craft: 
`[Socrates] But now, the virtue arete of each thing, a tool, a body, and, further, a 
soul and a whole animal, doesn't come to be present in the best way just at random, 
but by some structure and correctness and craft, the one assigned to each of them. 
Is this so? 
-I say so .6 
Then the virtue of each thing is something structured and ordered by a structure? 
-I would say so myself. 
Then it is some order? - the proper order for each of the things that are - which 
makes the thing good by coming to be present in it. 
-I myself think so. 
Then a soul with its own proper order is better than a disordered soul? 
- It must be' (506d5 - e4, Irwin, 1979) 
By this stage Socrates is answering his own questions as Callicles has withdrawn from the discussion. 
1Until this point, Socrates has talked about structure ftgKtW and order fkosmosl as the joint components of the form 
is which the craftsman must create to achieve Lr , 
i$ In his product. At 506e2, however, and thereafter, he refers 
only to kosmos in his account of r $. I would suggest that Socrates believes he has established sufficiently that the 
ordered state expressed by the term kosmos embraces and requires structure xi . He makes this particularly clear 
at 506e1 ax "tetagmenon 1( i kekosm6menonj. Irwin refers to Socrates' 'apparent assumption that these two 
terms are equivalent (1979. p. 214). In fact, Socrates uses xi to explain precisely what he means by kosmos rather 
than as an equivalent term. 
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Socrates' account of arete as an ordered state of soul emerges just at the point in the 
Gorgias where a model of arete founded on hedonism has been shown to be 
untenable. However, while offering an alternative to Calliclean arete (and thus to the 
rnetretike techne), it retains one of its key features, namely its integral relationship 
with techne. Socrates still presents achieving arete in our lives as dependent upon 
and achieved through a technical ability - the ability to give a rational account lo os 
of order in our lives and to put this account into practice. 
There is a key difference, however, between the techne which Socrates is now 
proposing as the basis of arete and the art which formed the basis of Calliclean arete 
(and the metretike techne). The former is practised by the politician (as Socrates 
makes clear at 504d5 - e4) on behalf of the individual citizen whereas the latter was 
practised by the individual himself. Socrates makes clear that an ordered state of 
soul can only be achieved by the intervention of the politician, a point which is 
underlined by the analogy which he draws with the doctor's intervention to restore his 
patient's health (505a). In contrast the maximisation of pleasure in life was achieved 
by the active pursuit of pleasure by the individual himself (as Callicles made clear in 
his conversation with Socrates at 492d - e). 8 Similarly, in the Protagoras, Socrates 
made clear that it is down to the individual to maximise pleasure in his life through 
the choices he makes. 
Socrates' awareness of the dialogue's progression from a model of arete as a techne 
practised by individual citizens to one practised by the state through politicians on 
behalf of the individual is reflected in the language he uses at this stage. His 
language emphasises the need for restraint of the individual's actions and 
intervention in his life. The politician is required to restrain the satisfaction of desire 
(eir ein)9 and thus moderate (kolazein)1° the individual's actions. This requires direct 
intervention in the citizen's life - the politician 'applies' (prosoisei, 504d6) his 
speeches to each soul and 'gives' and 'takes away from the soul (504d7 - 8). In 
section seven I will suggest that underpinning this development is Plato's recognition 
that the model of arete he is now proposing does not offer an adequate account of 
[Socrates] 'And tell me this: Do you say that a man must not restrain his appetites, if he's to be as he should be, but 
should let them grow as great as possible, and find fulfilment for them from anywhere at all, and that virtue is this? 
[Callicles] That's what I say. ' (492d5 - e2, Irwin, 1979) 
9 505b3, b9. 
10 505b9, b11, c4. 
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our individual motivation to achieve a good life. As a result, the techne which is the 
basis of arete in each citizen must be practised on the citizen's behalf. 
5.3 Order as the 'health' of the soul 
As discussed in the previous section, Socrates suggests that the ordered state which 
is the basis of arete requires a structure within which one thing is fitting re on, 
503e8] and suitable harmottein, 503e8] to another. His description of health as the 
order and structure of the human body helps us to interpret what he means by this. 
Initially, Socrates introduces health as an example, amongst several others, of arete 
as an ordered state (he also refers, at 504a - b, to the order in the work of painters, 
builders and shipwrights). From 504b7, however, he uses health more specifically, as 
a direct analogy for the arete/order of the soul: 
'Then what's the name for what comes to be in the body from structure and order? 
[Callicles] I suppose you're talking about health and strength. 
I am. And what's the name for what comes to be in the soul from structure and 
order? Try to find and say the name for this as for the body. 
[Callicles] And why don't you say it yourself, Socrates? 
Well, if it pleases you more, I'll say it myself. But you, if you think I speak well, agree, 
and if you don't, examine me, and don't give in to me. I think that the name for the 
structures of the body is 'healthy' from which health and the rest of bodily excellence 
(arete) come to be in the body. Is that so, or isn't it? 
[Callicles] It is. 
And for the structures and orderings of the soul the name is 'lawful' and 'law' from 
which people become lawful and orderly; and these are justice and temperance. Do 
you say so, or not? 
[Callicles] Let it be so. ' (504b7 - 504d4, Irwin, 1979) 
Here Socrates has moved beyond using health as an example of areto as an ordered 
state to using it directly as an analogy for the arete/order of the soul. He then 
proceeds to build upon and strengthen this analogy by comparing what the doctor 
must do to restore health in the body with what the politician must do to restore areto 
in the soul of each citizen. Just as the doctor must control and restrict his patient's 
diet, similarly the politician must control each citizen's fulfilment of his desire for 
pleasure: 
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'And isn't it the same way, " my excellent man, about the soul? As long as it's 
corrupt, senseless, intemperate, unjust and impious, we should restrain it from its 
appetites, and not allow it do anything else except what will make it better. Do you 
say so, or not? 
[Callicles] I do. ' (505b1 - 6, Irwin, 1979) 
Since Socrates establishes such a clear analogy between health as an ordered 
physical state and arete as an ordered state of soul, it is helpful to refer to the 
treatment of health in pre-Socratic philosophy and in fifth/fourth century Greek 
medicine, to gain a clearer insight into what Socrates could mean by the order which, 
he suggests, is the basis of human arete. The pre-Socratic philosopher and 
physician, Alcmaeon of Croton, 12 conceived health as a structured and ordered state, 
describing it as an equality isonomia of powers dunameis and a proportionate 
fsummetronl mixture krasis of ingredients: 
`Alcmeon taught that what preserves health is equality between the powers - moist 
and dry, cold and hot, bitter and sweet and the rest - and the prevalence of one of 
them produces disease, for the prevalence of either is destructive. The active cause 
of disease is excess of heat or cold, the occasion of it is surfeit or insufficiency of 
nourishment, the seat of it blood, marrow or the brain. Disease may also be 
engendered by external causes such as waters or local environment or exhaustion or 
torture or the like. Health on the other hand is the blending of the qualities in proper 
measure fsummetronl. ' (Aetius v, 30, I- Diels-Kranz 24B4 - trans. Guthrie, 1962, 
vol. 1, p. 346)13 
For Alcmaeon, health is a combination krasis of required ingredients, each with a 
specific power/capacity and each present in the quantity required to promote the 
health of the whole. 14 Maintaining health involves avoiding an excess or deficiency of 
any individual power. The application and development of this concept of health in 
practical Greek medicine is perhaps clearest in the Hippocratic Work The Nature of 
" The same way' [i autos trocosl refers directly to the doctor's actions to maintain his patient's health and 
reinforces the analogy between health In the body and grrgi$ in the soul. 
12 Who probably wrote in the early fifth century (Kirk, Raven & Schofield, 1983, p. 139 n. 1). 
"Guthrie (1962, p. 345) suggests that, while the text Is In indirect speech and Includes language which suggests 
Peripatetic and Stoic Influence, there Is no reason to doubt that the theory it expresses is Alcmaeon's own. 
"For Alcmaeon, equality of powers i is was the key to health and the basis of the proportioned Isummetronl 
mixture which constitutes health. He argued that each of the powers which constituted health needed to be present 
equally within the body. 
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Man. 15 The writer suggests that health is the state in which the constituent humours 
are present in the correct proportion to each other, both in strength and in quantity, 
and are mixed together: 
'The human body contains blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile. These are the 
things that make up its constitution and cause its pains and health. Health is primarily 
that state in which these constituent substances are in the correct proportion to each 
other, both in strength and quantity, and are well mixed. Pain occurs when one of the 
substances presents either a deficiency or an excess, or is separated in the body and 
not mixed with the others. It is inevitable that, when one of these is separated from 
the rest and stands by itself, not only the part from which it has come but also that 
where it collects and is present in excess should become diseased, and because it 
contains too much of the particular substance causes pain and distress. ' (The Nature 
of Man 4, Lloyd ed. 1978, trans. Chadwick & Mann) 
The author of The Nature of Man uses and develops16 the key aspects of Alcmaeon's 
model of health, namely: 
" the portrayal of health as a combination of the right type of ingredients, each 
with a specific function/power; 
" the requirement for each of these ingredients to be present in the right 
quantities, avoiding any deficiency or excess. 
Socrates' depiction of health as the order/structure (which amount to arete) of the 
human body may reflect the influence of this contemporary concept of health as a 
proportioned mixture of powers. Particular evidence of this influence is present in 
Socrates' description of the way in which a doctor maintains health in the body by 
controlling the quantity of food and drink a patient can have: 
`Yes, for what's the benefit, Callicles, of giving lots of the most pleasant food or drink 
or anything else to a sick body in a wretched condition, which won't help it one bit 
15 Which probably dates from around 400BC (see Guthrie, 1962 vol. 1, p. 58). 
A1cmaeon's model of health Is developed by the author of The Nature of Man in three main ways: (I) The elements 
of health are physiological rather than cosmological. I. e. they are not the same elements which constitute the order of 
the cosmos. (ii) He refers to the strength as well as to the quantity of the ingredients. (iii) He adds the requirement for 
the ingredients to be well-mixed. 
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more than the opposite method on the right account, and will help even less? Is that 
so? 
[Callicles] Let it be so. 
Yes; for I suppose it's no profit for a man to live with bodily wretchedness; in that 
condition you must live wretchedly too. Isn't that so? 
[Callicles] Yes. 
And don't the doctors mostly allow a healthy man to fulfil his appetites, for instance to 
eat and drink as much as he wants when he's hungry or thirsty? And don't they 
practically never allow a sick man to fill himself with what he has an appetite for? 
Don't you also agree with this much? 
[Callicles] I do. ' (504e6 - 505a11, Irwin, 1979) 
Alcmaeon regarded the quantity of food and drink which a patient received as one of 
the key factors responsible for maintaining the balanced mixture of powers required 
for health. " This principle was incorporated into practical Greek medicine and is 
often referred to by Hippocratic authors. 18 
While Socrates does not make explicit in the Gorgias the identity of the dunameis 
which form the basis of arete in the soul, I would suggest that their identity does 
become clear in the Republic, when Socrates discusses the balance between three 
specific dunameis within the soul - the rational, appetitive and spirited. The Gorgias 
prepares the ground for this by: 
(i) identifying order in the soul as the basis of human arete: 
(ii) using health to help the reader understand what this order might look like. 
Health as an ordered mixture of required 'ingredients', present in the right proportion 
to each other, would be something with which many readers would be familiar. By 
introducing this concept as an analogy for arete, Socrates prepares the ground for an 
exploration in the Republic of how a similar state of proportion is achieved within the 
soul and thus reflected in living our lives. 
"'the occasion of it (disease] Is surfeit or Insufficiency of nourishment (Diels Kranz 2464). 
1° For example: 
Regimen for Health I: 'The ordinary man should adopt the following regimen. During the winter, he should 
eat as much as possible... When spring comes, he should take more to drink, Increasing the quantity ..... 
(Lloyd ed., 1978, trans. Chadwick & Mann) 
Aphorisms Section 2 (4): 'Neither a surfeit of food nor of fasting is good, nor anything else which exceeds 
the measure of nature. ' (Lloyd ed., 1978, trans. Chadwick & Mann) 
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5.4 Achieving a healthy (ordered) soul 
In the Gorgias, however, Socrates is concerned not so much with identifying the 
individual dunameis that constitute the right order kosmos in the soul as with 
exploring how, in practical terms, an ordered state of soul is created. He is concerned 
with the type of wisdom which the politician must exercise on our behalf, in order for 
us to achieve an ordered state of soul. This reflects Socrates' immediate need to 
respond to Callicles' claim that a good life is characterised by the wisdom (and 
courage) to maximise the amount of pleasure we experience through desire 
satisfaction. It also reflects Socrates' recognition of the need to provide a practical 
alternative to his own account, in the Protagoras, of a good life as one devoted to the 
maximisation of pleasure through the metretike techne. 
In maintaining a focus in the Gorgias upon identifying the type of wisdom which is 
sufficient for a good life, Socrates continues the project which he began in the 
Protagoras - to sketch the type of wisdom which would be sufficient for us to achieve 
arete in our lives. Furthermore, as discussed earlier in this chapter (5.2) he continues 
to present the wisdom which underpins arete as a techne, as he did in the 
Protagoras. In the Gorgias, however, Socrates suggests that arete is the technical 
ability to give a rational account Flo os of order in our lives and to put this account 
into practice. 
In the previous section, I discussed Socrates' use of health as an analogy for the 
ordered state which he is proposing as the basis of arete. From 504e6 he builds 
upon this analogy by using the technd of medicine to explore what, in practical terms, 
the politician must do to create aret6 in the soul of each citizen. He suggests that, 
just as the doctor restricts the freedom of his patients to eat and drink what they 
desire (504e6 - 10), so the politician must restrict desire satisfaction in the disorderly 
soul (505b1 - 5). Similarly, just as the doctor allows a healthy person the freedom to 
eat and drink what he wants (505a6 - 10), so the politician can allow those who have 
already achieved an ordered soul the freedom to satisfy their desires. 19 Thus it is by 
controlling an individual's freedom to satisfy his desires that the politician maintains 
or restores arete. 
19 Socrates does not specifically state this conclusion, but it Is Implicit in the analogy. 
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Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that, although Socrates does not actually 
mention pleasure, he is talking specifically about controlling the satisfaction of our 
desire for pleasure. Throughout their discussion, Callicles has argued that a good life 
depends upon our maximising our desire for pleasure and then indiscriminately 
pursuing the fulfilment of every desire. So, in arguing against Callicles' model of a 
good life and proposing that it is better for us to have a restriction imposed on our 
personal freedom to satisfy our desires, we can assume that it is still desire for 
pleasure that is the subject of discussion. In one sense this creates some unity 
between Calliclean hedonism and the model which Socrates is proposing, since 
Socrates is still presenting arete as concerned with pleasure in our lives. The 
difference is, however, that for Socrates it is concerned with controlling the amount of 
pleasure we experience rather than with the maximisation of pleasure in our lives. 
This is the techne which he describes from 504d5 - e4: 
`Then won't that rhetor, the craftsman, the good one, look to these things20 when he 
applies whatever speeches he makes to souls, and when he applies all his actions to 
them, and when he gives whatever he gives Kai dSron can ti did6 d8sei , and when 
he takes away whatever he takes away kai can ti aphairetai aphairesetail? He'll 
always have his mind on this; to see that the souls of the citizens acquire justice and 
get rid of injustice, and that they acquire temperance and get rid of intemperance and 
that they acquire the rest of virtue and get rid of vice. Do you agree or not? ' (504d5 - 
e4, Irwin, 1979) 
Dodds (1959, p. 330) suggests that, in this passage, Socrates is `contrasting the 
actual with the ideal, politics as it is with what politics might become if politicians were 
philosophers. ' He suggests that, in his reference to the politician 'giving' and taking 
away' from the soul, Socrates 'is presumably thinking on the one hand of payment for 
various forms of public service, on the other of taxation and leitourgai, and is saying 
that fiscal policy should be governed by social policy and should not be treated as a 
vote-catching expedient. ' 
While the reference to a döron at 505c7 does support Dodds' view that the passage 
is talking about payment and reward, I would suggest that 504d5 - e4 should be 
primarily interpreted as a development of the analogy between physical health and 
20 That Is, to the need to achieve a state of structure and order In the soul, which will manifest Itself In justice and 
temperance (504d1 -3). 
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arete in the soul. 21 It establishes the politician as the craftsman who is responsible, 
through the practical actions he undertakes within the state (such as payment for 
public services), for creating order in the soul. This enables Socrates to draw an 
analogy with the doctor (who is the craftsman responsible for health in the body). 22 
My interpretation of this passage as an integral part of an analogy between physical 
health and arete in the soul avoids some difficulties which Dodds' interpretation 
presents. Firstly, it avoids the question of why Socrates should suddenly refer to the 
financial policy of the state when there seems no particular relevance to doing so 
within the context of a discussion about achieving an ordered soul. Secondly, it 
avoids the difficulty of why, if he is only talking about financial policy, Socrates should 
refer, as he does, to the politician giving and taking away specifically from the soul. 
My interpretation enables us to read the passage in the context of an analogy with 
health which immediately precedes and follows it (as Socrates indicates we should 
do by the connective 'ti gar'). It does, however, raise a different question - what is 
Socrates suggesting that the politician 'gives' and 'takes away' from the soul? 
Socrates explains what the politician's role involves from 504e6. He makes clear that 
it is by controlling individual's freedom to satisfy his desires that the politician 
maintains or restores arete. Just as the doctor restricts the freedom of his patients to 
eat and drink what they desire (504e6 - 10), so the politician must restrict desire 
satisfaction in the disorderly soul (505b1 - 5). Similarly, just as the doctor allows a 
healthy person the freedom to eat and drink what he wants (505a6 - 10), so the 
politician can allow those who have already achieved an ordered soul the freedom to 
satisfy their desires. 23 The politician must control desire satisfaction for each citizen 
until the point when he is able to do this for himself. In doing so, he creates the 
ordered state of soul which constitutes arete. Yet why does Socrates introduce the 
concept of 'giving' and 'taking away' to his description of the politician's role? Surely it 
would have been sufficient for him to say that the politician must allow or restrict 
desire satisfaction. It is, in fact, clear from the text that Socrates refers to the actions 
of the politician as 'giving' and 'taking away' from the soul in order to make the point 
that the soul both acquires i ni tai an and gets rid of (apallattetail something as a 
21 Socrates' description of the politician's art at 504d5 -e4 comes Immediately after his Introduction of the analogy 
between physical health and r$ In the soul. 
22 Immediately after his description of the politician's art at 504d5 - 8, Socrates introduces an analogy between the 
doctor and the politician. His Introduction of this analogy with the connective 'g' (504e6) suggests that he believes 
that his previous statement has established his right to draw this analogy. 
23 Socrates does not specifically state this conclusion, but it is Implicit in the analogy. 
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result of these actions - it acquires aretd and gets rid of vice. 24 In controlling desire 
satisfaction, the politician gives aretö to the soul and takes away vice. 
5.5 The right amount of pleasure 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how Calliclean arete and the metretike techne 
are both founded on the premise that all pleasure is good and that arete, therefore, 
consists of the maximisation of pleasure in our lives. I explored how Socrates, 
through his discussion with Callicles (from 495e - 497d), demonstrates that this 
results in a contradictory account of a good life where, in order to maximise the 
pleasure obtained from the satisfaction of our desire, we must also maximise the pain 
of desire. 25 
So, how does Socrates' alternative account of arete as the ability to achieve an 
ordered state of soul respond to this difficulty? At 504e6 - 10 (quoted above), 
Socrates shows how, in the case of health, giving a person large quantities of the 
most pleasant food or drink sitia polls didonai kai to hedista 6 pots e all'hotioun, 
504e7 - 8) is as harmful to the body as starving it (tounantion, 504e9). The clear 
implication of this, although Socrates does not state it directly, is that what is required 
by the body is the right amount of food and drink to maintain the ordered physical 
state that constitutes health. The role of the doctor is, therefore, to ensure that the 
sick patient gets the right amount of food and drink to restore his health. This is 
achieved (as described at 505a6 - 10) by controlling the patient's diet until, when 
healthy, he is able to do this for himself. 
Socrates then draws a direct analogy with the soul and suggests (505b1 - 5, quoted 
above) that, in order to achieve kosmos (arete) in the soul of each citizen, the 
politician must intervene to control desire satisfaction in the same way that the doctor 
intervenes in the patient's diet to make him healthy. Thus the politician must prevent 
each citizen from experiencing an excess of pleasure (the equivalent of too much 
24 A point which Socrates makes three times at 504d5 - e4. 
"Underpinning this argument Is: 
(1) a definition of pleasure as the process (rather than the state) of desire satisfaction. Socrates shows, through his 
conversation with Callicles, that this definition is required by any model of MU such as Callicles', which Is 
concerned with the maximisation of pleasure. 
(ii) an assumption that desire is painful. Socrates makes an association between desire and lack and then takes this 
one stage further by assuming that the desire which Is the natural result of a lack has the same characteristic (i. e. 
painfulness) as the lack itself. He does not argue for this but Callicles accepts it without question. 
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food and drink) or from being deprived of pleasure entirely (the equivalent of starving 
them). Instead, he must ensure that they experience the right amount of pleasure to 
create an ordered state of soul. 
In this way, Socrates responds to one of the key difficulties which he has highlighted 
with Calliclean arete - its objective of maximising pleasure in our lives. He replaces 
this with the objective of achieving the right amount of pleasure. Inherent in this 
objective is the principle that not all pleasure (desire fulfilment) is good and not all 
pain (unfulfilled desire) is bad. We need only cultivate desire (pain) and pursue desire 
fulfilment (pleasure) to the extent that each will result in a good life. In both cases, we 
are actively pursuing what is good. So, we are no longer faced with a contradictory 
account of a good life where we must maximise what is bad (painful) in order to 
achieve what is good (the maximum amount of pleasure). 
So, if Socrates now envisages arete as a techn& which is concerned with achieving 
the right amount of pleasure in our lives, is he still presenting it as an art of 
measurement? It is, after all, still concerned with the quantification of pleasure - albeit 
against a different standard (the right amount, rather than the most). In fact, it is 
noticeable that Socrates does not refer at all to the need for the politician to measure 
or quantify accurately the amount of pleasure in our lives. One reason for this may be 
that Socrates' interlocutor is an aristocrat who is disdainful of manual crafts (as he 
makes clear at 491 a) and would be likely to regard measurement as one of these. In 
presenting an alternative to Callicles' model of arete, Socrates presents it in 
Calliclean terms - as the art of a statesman rather than as a practical craft. 
There may, however, be other reasons why, at this point, Socrates does not present 
arete as an art of measurement. In suggesting that arete is concerned with achieving 
the 'right amount' of pleasure rather than 'the most', Socrates now has the challenge 
of explaining how we actually determine the right amount of pleasure and, 
furthermore, how we can measure accurately against this standard. His reluctance to 
refer to measurement at this stage may well point to his recognition of the practical 
questions he has yet to answer. 
5.6 Good and bad pleasures 
In applying the analogy of health to the role of the politician in bringing order to the 
soul, Socrates emphasises the quantitative aspect of the techne he is proposing as 
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the basis of arete - namely the ability to ensure that the amount of pleasure in the 
lives of citizens is controlled. However, in doing so, he introduces a qualitative 
dimension to the techne in that pleasure is only good to the extent that it is present in 
the right quantity to contribute to order in the soul - excessive pleasure (or too little 
pleasure) is bad. By introducing a distinction between good and bad pleasures, 
Socrates sets apart the model of arete which he is proposing from Calliclean arete 
and from his own metretiki technd (both of which were based on the principle that all 
pleasure is good). Furthermore, in distinguishing between good and bad pleasures, 
Socrates overcomes one of the key difficulties which he highlighted with Calliclean 
arete. From Gorgfas 497d - 499a26 Socrates demonstrates that, in treating all 
pleasure as good, Callicles is forced to value human qualities (cowardice and 
ignorance)27 which, according to his own account of arete, are bad. By 
acknowledging that we should distinguish between good and bad pleasures on the 
basis of whether they are present in the right quantity to bring order to the soul, 
Socrates allows us to maintain courage, wisdom and other qualities within our model 
of a good life. All of these will be qualities of an ordered soul, and pleasure will only 
be good to the extent that it is present in the right quantity to contribute to maintaining 
or restoring this order. Socrates makes clear at 505b1 -5 (quoted above) that 
worthlessness oneria , 
foolishness anoia , 
intemperance akolasia , injustice 
adikia and impiety Fanosiot8s have no place within an ordered soul and that 
pleasure should not be allowed (i. e. is bad) if it (is present in a quantity which) 
contributes to any of these. Thus the pleasures of the coward and the fool are 
eliminated from this model of arete and a key difficulty with Calliclean arete is 
addressed. 
However, the analogy with health makes clear that the qualitative distinction between 
good and bad pleasures is firmly based upon a quantitative standard. Just as food 
and drink is judged good or bad for the body depending upon whether or not it is 
taken in the right quantity to maintain or restore health, so, by analogy, pleasure is 
judged good or bad depending upon whether it is present in the right quantity to 
maintain or restore arete. In this way, Socrates ensures that he retains one of the 
strengths of Calliclean arete and of the metretike techne, namely their potential, 
through their foundation on quantification of pleasure, to bring determinacy and 
practical accuracy to the decisions we make about how we live. 
28 As discussed in chapter 4.4. 
27 Because cowardly and foolish acts can be a source of pleasure. 
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5.7 Abandoning the metretike techne? 
I have attempted to show in this chapter that the alternative Socrates proposes to 
Calliclean arete - his account of arete as the ability to achieve kosmos in our lives - 
does not represent his abandonment of his own sketch of arete as the metretike 
techne (which shared the key features of Calliclean arete) but rather his refinement of 
it. This alternative account continues to present arete as a techne of quantifying 
pleasure in our lives, while refining those aspects which, through his discussion with 
Callicles, have been identified as untenable. It differs from the metretike techne and 
from Calliclean arete in its objective of achieving the right amount of pleasure (rather 
than the most) in our lives and in its underpinning assumption that not all pleasure is 
good. 
Callicles is unable to live with the practical implication of this account - namely the 
requirement to restrict the fulfilment of his desire for pleasure if he is to achieve a 
good life. As a result, Socrates is forced to conclude the argument to establish this 
model of arete on his own - from 506c he has to argue with a hypothetical Callicles 
as the real one refuses to join in. It is hardly surprising that Callicles, as the ultimate 
hedonist, doesn't much like a model of arete that requires him to restrict the amount 
of pleasure he can have. However, it is important to remember that Callilclean 
hedonism and the metretike techne have the same key features. In providing an 
alternative to Calliclean hedonism, Socrates is also offering an alternative to his own 
model of arete. Callicles' resistance to this model may be entirely in character but I 
would suggest that it also reflects the fact that the model Socrates is proposing does 
not, as it stands, present a viable alternative to the metr8tik8 techne. From 506c 
Socrates is arguing with himself in more ways than one. Not only has his interlocutor 
withdrawn from the debate, but Socrates needs to convince himself of the alternative 
account he has proposed. The conversation he conducts with himself is a powerful 
way of showing that he needs to convince himself just as much as Callicles. 
Callicles' reaction to Socrates' account makes clear what the problem is. He 
withdraws his cooperation at the point when Socrates reaches the conclusion that a 
good life requires the restriction (by the politician) of satisfaction of the desires which 
we are naturally motivated to pursue: 
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'Then being tempered is better for the soul than intemperance, which you just now 
thought was better. 
[Callicles] I don't know what you're saying, Socrates. Ask someone else' (505b11 - 
c2, Irwin, 1979) 
Socrates' failure to convince Callicles highlights the difficulty with offering this model 
of arete as an alternative to the metretikö techne. One of the strengths of the 
metretike techne was its practical account (founded upon hedonism) of the many's 
motivation to achieve a good life. In chapter two, I explored how the hedonism on 
which the metretike techne is founded explains why the many will always do what is 
good once they have accurately identified it. Socrates made this clear in the 
Protagoras by establishing that: 
" Pleasure is the only thing that the many pursue as a goal in their actions; 28 
" They actively pursue this goal throughout their lives. 29 
Socrates challenges the many on three successive occasions30 to name another goal 
within their lives, and emphasises that they are unable to do so. The recurring phrase 
'alto ti' Ftelosl is used to drive home the point that there is nothing else which 
motivates the actions of the many. 
However, Socrates is now offering a different model of arete - as the art of achieving 
a state of order within the soul. If this techne is to be sufficient for arete, Socrates 
must demonstrate that it is underpinned by a practical account of our motivation to 
achieve an ordered state of soul. In other words, he must demonstrate that, once we 
recognise what an ordered state of soul entails, we will be consistently motivated to 
pursue this. Callicles' withdrawal from the conversation at the point when Socrates 
spells out the practical implications of the model he is proposing highlights Socrates' 
failure to do this. While Callicles has accepted in principle that not all pleasure is 
2° Socrates emphasises that pleasure is the only goal (telos] the many have and he describes it as the tel of their 
actions three times - at Protagoras 354b7, d2 and d8. 
29 Socrates makes clear in the Protagoras that the many's pursuit of pleasure is consistent in the sense that they are 
always active in pursuit of this goal - there are never occasions where they choose not to act at all and to have a rest 
from pursuing anything. The language Socrates uses demonstrates that the many actively pursue this goal 
throughout their lives. Pleasure is not a goal about which they are half-hearted; they focus all their attention upon it 
taoobleoein2° - 354c1, Q. d8), pursue it (dibkein - 354c4) and flee from (oheuaein - 354c4) any pain which will 
prevent them from achieving it. 
30 354b7 - c2,354d 1- 3,354d7 - e2. 
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good, his underlying motivation continues to be, as it always has been, to pursue as 
much pleasure as he can. Unlike the many in the Protagoras, Callicles is more than 
capable of citing another goal than the one which Socrates is now proposing as the 
basis of a good life. Socrates has not given him a good enough reason to give up this 
goal, and so he withdraws from the conversation and leaves Socrates to argue with 
himself. 
Through Callicles' withdrawal from the conversation, leaving Socrates to have a 
conversation with himself, Plato illustrates that Socrates needs to convince himself, 
just as much as Callicles, that his account of a good life is sufficient for arete. 
Socrates is well aware that Callicles' honest account of his own motivation is one 
which he must address if he is to translate a 'theoretical' account of a good life into 
one which can accommodate the reality of human motivation. At 508a Socrates 
points out to Callicles that he hasn't noticed the importance of geometrical equality 
within a good life: 
'You haven't noticed that geometrical equality has great power among gods and 
men; you think you should practise taking more, because you are heedless of 
geometry. ' (508a4 - 8. Irwin, 1979) 
While, at face value, this appears to be a criticism of Callicles' failure to recognise the 
importance of kosmos within a good life (and of the proportional arrangement of 
dunameis upon which this depends), I would suggest, it may also be a thinly-veiled 
criticism by Socrates of the model of arete which he himself has presented in the 
Gorgias. Socrates may be admitting31 that the model fails to demonstrate to Callicles 
why he should give up the pleasures that he regards as important, just for the sake of 
achieving order and proportion in his soul and in his life (which Callicles sees as 
having no relevance to him). Socrates' model of arete remains, for Callicles, no more 
than an irrelevant theory. In the next chapter, I will argue that, in the Republic, 
Socrates begins to address this difficulty through a distinction between real and 
apparent pleasures. This will enable Socrates to reinstate pleasure as the basis of 
his account of our motivation to live a good life. 
31 By highlighting Callicles' lack of Interest in/awareness of the geometrical principles that underpin order. 
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Sketching the `Söteria Tou Biou' 
Plato and the Art of Measurement 
Chapter 6- Justice in the Republic as the Art of 
Measurement? 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I explored how, in the Gorgias, Socrates introduces a model 
of arete as the ability to achieve a state of order (kosmos) in our soul. I suggested 
that this model responded to the difficulties which Socrates had identified with the 
Protagoras' metretike techne, 1 while retaining its essential character as a practical art 
of measuring pleasure in our lives. 2 I also pointed out, however, that a model of arete 
as the ability to achieve order in the soul brings difficulties of its own. In particular, 
Plato shows, through Socrates' conversation with Callicles, that this model is not 
supported by an adequate account of our motivation to live a good life. Callicles 
makes clear that it is the desire for pleasure that motivates him to act, not the desire 
for an ordered state of soul. In this way, Callicles highlights that Socrates' account of 
arete does not appear to take account of the reality of human motivation. 
In this chapter, I turn to the Republic where, I suggest, Socrates reinforces and builds 
upon his claim in the Gorgias that arete is the ability to achieve an ordered state of 
soul and begins to address some of the practical issues arising from this account of 
arete. In section two, I outline the account of justice which Socrates puts forward in 
Books II - IV, where he presents individual justice as a state of unity in which there is 
harmonia between the different parts of the soul. I explore how this reinforces and 
builds upon the Gorgias' account of arete as the ability to achieve an ordered state of 
soul. 
In section three, I discuss how, in Book V, Socrates begins to look at how, within our 
own lives, we can work towards achieving an ordered state of soul. I focus on a 
suggested in chapter 4 that, through his attack on Callidean hedonism (Gorgias 495e - 499b), Socrates also 
highlights some key weaknesses In the metr6tikO hn . The basis of my argument was that 
Calliclean hedonism 
shares the same essential features as the metrOtikO techne. 
2 It differs from the metr6tikO techni, however, In that It Is concerned with achieving the right amount of pleasure in 
our lives rather than with maximising pleasure. 
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passage in Book V (471 c- 474c) where he justifies the value of the account of 
justice he has developed in Books II - IV and suggests that it provides an illustration 
-a paradeigma - which we can use in living our own lives. Socrates argues that his 
account has value as an illustration of an ideal against which each citizen can 
compare the reality of his life and that of his fellow citizens. I argue that, while Book V 
is often regarded as marking a transition from a practical account of justice to an 
account founded on knowledge of absolute truths (gained through a life devoted to 
philosophy), it actually has a very practical focus. It is in Book V that Socrates begins 
to explain how the account of justice he has already outlined has relevance and 
value in our own lives, and how we can use it in our own attempts to achieve arete. 
We can do so by comparing ourselves in every aspect of our lives against an ideal - 
the ideal being an ordered state of harmonia in our soul - and by acting in the way 
which we judge will bring us closest to this ideal. 
Socrates' introduction of this practical account of justice raises the question of how 
we compare our lives against the aaradeigma he has described. In section four, I 
suggest that Socrates alludes to a process of measurement of our lives against it. 
The language he uses in Book V (471 c- 474c) implies that there is a need for 
objective quantification of our relationship to this paradeigma - in other words, for the 
measurement of our lives against it. It is important to recognise, however, that an 'art 
of measurement' is only alluded to within this passage of the Republic, rather than 
being introduced openly or directly. This is very different from the grand flourish that it 
was awarded in the Protagoras, and in section five I will argue that this is because 
Socrates is well aware of the difficulties involved in proposing measurement as the 
practical activity through which we achieve justice in our lives. While he remains 
convinced, as he has been since the Protagoras, of the need for an art of 
measurement to bring objectivity and determinacy to our pursuit of arete, he is also 
well aware of the difficulties involved in applying this art to the account of justice he 
has proposed in the Republic. Firstly, he must demonstrate that we can quantify 
order in the soul (as a basis for measuring it). At 423b5 - c4 Socrates provides a 
specific example of how one aspect of justice in the state - the right size for the state 
- can be judged using the art of measurement. I suggest that Socrates uses this 
example to illustrate and emphasise the potential role measurement can play in 
achieving justice in our lives. 
In addition, there is a problem for Socrates with making a technical skill such as 
measurement the foundation of the ruler's ability to achieve justice in the state, within 
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an account of justice which emphasises the need to separate the role of the ruler 
from that of the productive/technical class. How can he argue that the ruler's role 
can be founded upon a technical skill, without compromising the principle that justice 
consists in each group of citizens to to hautou raa ttein (433b4)? In section six, I will 
suggest that at 473c -e Socrates begins to address this difficulty when he claims 
that only by giving power to philosophers will the state succeed in putting into 
practice the paradeicma of justice which they have constructed. I explore the 
relationship between Socrates' account of justice as practical wisdom3 and his claim 
that it depends upon philosophical knowledge. In doing so, I refer particularly to Book 
VI (484c -d), a passage in which Socrates uses an analogy with art and the 
metaphor of sight4 to explain the integral relationship which he envisages between 
practical and philosophical wisdom. He suggests that the practical standard of justice 
against which we measure our lives must, if it is to enable us to live a better life, also 
be a standard of absolute truth to alethestaton, 484c7]. It can, therefore, only be 
understood by those who through philosophy have gained an understanding of the 
true nature of justice. By clarifying the dependence of the practical standard of justice 
by which we live our lives upon philosophical understanding of what is truly just, 
Socrates makes the art of measurement against this standard a very different art 
from that which he proposed in the Protagoras. It is no longer a 'tecnica humile'5 
which can do no more than make accurate calculations based upon the best 
standard for a good life that the many could come up with. He makes clear that, 
when we measure our lives against this standard, we are putting into practice an 
understanding of what is truly good. To this extent, in the Republic, Socrates begins 
to strengthen the art of measurement and to raise its status. 
There remains, however, the difficulty of what motivates us to practise this art of 
measurement, when it requires us to restrict the satisfaction of our desires, thus 
controlling the amount of pleasure in our lives. Callicles highlighted this difficulty in 
the Gorgias, by making clear that his motivation was to pursue as much pleasure as 
possible rather than to restrict the amount of pleasure in his life. Glaucon and 
Adeimantus restate this difficulty in Republic II. In section seven I explore how, in the 
Republic, Socrates begins to develop a solution to this problem by the introduction, in 
Book IX, of a distinction between real and unreal pleasures. By making this 
That is, the knowledge of a practical standard Ioaradeiamal for a good he, and of how to measure our lives against 
this standard. 
Both of which he also used at 471- 4. 
6 As it was described by Capra (1997, p. 274 ff. ). 
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distinction, Socrates is able to claim that the just life -a life devoted to the pursuit of 
an ordered soul - is the pleasantest life. Thus he rises to the challenge presented by 
hedonism on its own terms - Callicles (or Glaucon and Adeimantus) should be 
motivated to pursue an ordered state of soul because in doing so they will maximise 
the (real) pleasure in their lives. Equally, in pursuing the maximum amount of (real) 
pleasure in their lives, they will be pursuing a good/just life. So, it finally becomes 
clear in Book IX how Socrates envisages we can objectively measure our lives 
against the paradeigma of a just soul (as he hinted in Book V that we could). We can 
do so by measuring (real) pleasure in our lives - in other words by applying the 
metretike techne. 
6.2 Justice as harmonia of the soul 
The Republic, like the Gorgias, explores the nature of justice. In Book I, after some 
initial attempts at a definition by Cephalus and Polemarchus, Thrasymachus takes 
over as interlocutor and puts forward the thesis that justice is nothing other than the 
interests of the most powerful in society - in other words that it is simply the code of 
behaviour which the powerful enforce to ensure that their own interests are served. 
When Thrasymachus' argument is challenged by Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus 
restate his case for him. In Book II, Glaucon claims that justice is a kind of 
compromise which citizens make (either willingly or through compulsion) because the 
functioning of any society depends upon this. Each citizen's natural instinct, however, 
is to pursue his own interests and this is ultimately what will make him happiest and 
most successful. Adeimantus supports him by giving some examples of the reasons 
why citizens act justly - either in hope of a reward (such as good reputation) of 
through fear of punishment. They leave Socrates with the challenge of showing how 
justice is, in its own right, better for us than injustice. 
To respond to this challenge, Socrates moves (368ff. ) from discussing justice in the 
individual to justice in the state. In doing so, he identifies three different classes of 
citizens (businessmen, auxiliaries and guardians) and suggests that justice in the 
state requires each of these classes to carry out and confine themselves to their own 
function. Their doing so is ultimately in the best interest of the state as a whole: 
'So, meddling and exchange among these three classes is the greatest harm that 
can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst evil one could do to it. ' 
(434b8 - c2, Reeve, 2004) 
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'That, then, is what injustice is. But let's put it in reverse: the opposite of this - when 
the moneymaking, auxiliary, and guardian class each do their own work in the city - 
is justice, isn't it, and makes the city just? (434c7 - 10, Reeve, 2004) 
In Book IV, Socrates draws a parallel between justice in the state and in the 
individual soul. Individual justice is presented as an ordered state (harmonia) 
between three specific dunameis within the soul - the rational, appetitive and 
spirited. Socrates provides a detailed description of how the man who seeks to live a 
just life can achieve a state of harmonia within his soul: 
'And in truth justice is, it seems, something of this sort. However, it isn't concerned 
with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, what is truly 
himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the 
work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each 
other. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in 
order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting 
notes in a musical scale - high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and 
any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes 
entirely one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he act. And when he does 
anything, whether acquiring wealth, taking care of his body, engaging in politics, or in 
private contracts - in all of these, he believes that the action is just and fine that 
preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as 
wisdom the knowledge that oversees such actions. And he believes that the action 
that destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that 
oversees it as ignorance'. (Republic IV, 443c9 - 444a2, Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997) 
Socrates' account of individual justice in the Republic reinforces the Gorgias' account 
of arete as the ability to achieve a state of order Fkosmos within the soul. However, it 
not only reinforces but also builds upon this account by making clear how this order 
manifests itself (as harmonia) and identifies its component parts - the rational, 
appetitive and spirited. In this respect it goes further than the Gorgias which, while 
identifying kosmos as the basis of arete, did not specify the ingredients of this 
ordered state. Nor did it explain how we can recognise kosmos in the soul. While, in 
the Gorgias, Socrates used health as an analogy for an ordered state of soul, he did 
not explore how we recognise a 'healthy' soul. Socrates makes clear in the Republic 
that we can recognise it by a state of unity and harmony between the different 
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dunameis within the soul -a state which he compares to the harmony between notes 
in a musical scale. 
6.3 A Paradeipma of Harmonia 
In Book V (471 c ff. ), Glaucon criticises Socrates because he has not demonstrated 
that his account of a just state (in Books II - IV) can ever be achieved in practice. 
Socrates' defence is that, even if this state can never be achieved in practice, it 
serves as an illustration of what a just individual would be like if he were to exist - an 
illustration against which we can compare our own lives: 6 
`So, it was in order to have a model f aradeigmal that we were inquiring into the 
nature of justice itself and of the completely just man, supposing he could exist, and 
what he would be like if he did; and similarly with injustice and the most unjust man. 
We thought that by seeing how they seemed to us to stand with regard to happiness 
and its opposite, we would also be compelled to agree about ourselves as well: that 
the one who was most like them would have a fate most like theirs. But we were not 
doing this in order to demonstrate that it is possible for these men to exist. ' (Republic 
V, 472c4 - d2, Reeve, 2004) 
Here Socrates describes the account of justice in the state which he has developed 
in Books II - IV as a paradeigma - an illustration of an ideal. He compares his own 
illustration of a just state with an artist's illustration fparadeiamal of the finest and 
most beautiful individual: 
'Do you think, then, that someone would be any less good a painter if he painted a 
model [paradeiama] of what the most beautiful human being would be like, and 
rendered everything in the picture perfectly well hikanös , but could not demonstrate 
that such a man could actually exist? 
(Glaucon] I certainly don't' (472d4 - 8, Reeve, 2004). 
In drawing this comparison, Socrates is making the point that an illustration of an 
ideal can have real value in our lives. In the case of the artist's picture, Socrates does 
Glaucon's criticism is that Socrates' account of a just state is not necessarily achievable In practice. In reply, 
Socrates defends his account of a just individual ('what the completely just man would be like'), rather than his 
account of a just state. Presumably he believes his defence applies to both accounts and he does, from 473b4, 
demonstrate its application to the state. 
not state explicitly what its value would be. Instead, he points to the evidence that we 
do, in reality, value an illustration of the ideal -a fact which is reflected in our praise 
and admiration of artists. Socrates does, however, explain how his own paradeigma 
has value. In making clear what the life of a completely just (happy) individual is like, 
it enables us to compare ourselves against this picture and to determine how close 
we are to a perfectly just (happy) life and how just we are in comparison to our fellow 
citizens. Thus Socrates presents the account of justice he has given as having 
practical value in helping us to achieve arete in our lives. So, is he justified in making 
this claim? I would suggest that the account of a just individual which he has 
developed in Books II - IV has practical relevance to our lives in three main ways: 
(i) It illustrates how the individual must act in order to be just; he must follow the 
guidance of reason in all his actions and subject all other motivation to reason. 7 
(ii) It provides this illustration in terms which are relevant and real to the individual - 
in terms of experiences he recognises, namely the experiences of desire and 
thumos. 
(iii) It, therefore, gives the individual a meaningful8 picture to which he can relate and 
against which he can compare the reality of his life. 
In fact, Glaucon has asked Socrates to justify that his account of a just state - not of 
a just individual - is of any value. Socrates' claim, however, that his account provides 
a practical illustration of excellence would apply just as well to his account of a just 
state, which also meets the three criteria outlined above: 
(i) It describes what the state must do to be just; it must ensure that each group of 
citizens fulfils its own proper role within the state. 9 
(ii) It describes this in terms which are relevant and real to the state - in terms of the 
roles of and relationship between familiar and recognisable groups of citizens 
(namely those who provide for, defend and rule the state). 
(iii) It, therefore, offers a practical illustration of justice to which the state can aspire 
and against which it can compare reality. 
7 At 443e, for example, Socrates states that '.... in all of these, he [the just man] believes that the action is just and 
fine that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge 
that oversees such actions... ' (443e4 - 444a1, Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997) 
It is meaningful because it is expressed in terms which are relevant to the individual's own life and experiences. 
For example, at 433e: 'Therefore, from this point of view, also, the having and doing of one's own would be 
accepted as justice: (433e10 - 434a1. Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997). 
The term paradeigma is used by Socrates later in the Republic10 to refer to a 
standard for what is absolutely true -a standard which can only be grasped by those 
who have philosophical understanding of the truth. It becomes clear, furthermore, 
that, in order to gain this understanding, philosophers must turn their attention away 
from the sensible world. In 471 - 4, however, Socrates uses paradeigma to describe 
an illustration of the ideal which is practical and relevant to the world we live in and 
which we can use in living our lives. By comparing the reality of an individual life 
against this practical ideal, we can evaluate the extent to which this life is just or 
unjust. Arete requires the ability to compare ourselves against an ideal picture of 
harmonia, in every aspect of our lives, and to act in the way which we judge will bring 
us closest to this ideal. 
Many commentators have noted the extent to which the language Socrates uses in 
Book V alludes to a model of justice founded on knowledge of separated Forms. " 
For this reason, 471 -4 is often regarded as marking a transition from a practical 
account of justice to an account founded on knowledge of absolute truths, gained 
through a life devoted to philosophy. 12 Few commentators have acknowledged, 
however, that the passage actually puts forward a very practical model of arete, 
based on the comparison of our lives against an ideal. Later in this chapter, I will 
explore the relationship between Socrates' account of justice as the ability to 
compare our lives against a paradeiama and his claim that justice depends upon 
philosophical understanding. 
6.4 Measuring Harmonia? 
If, as I have suggested in section three, Socrates is proposing an account of arete as 
the comparison of our own lives against an ideal picture fparadeiqmal_ of harmonia 
within the soul, this raises the question of how we compare ourselves against this 
ideal. In this section, I suggest that Socrates alludes to a process of measurement of 
10 For example, Book VI 484c6. 
" For example, Lee (1987, p. 210, n. 2) suggests that: 'Plato here uses, whether deliberately or not, language that 
recalls his Theory of Forms. Particular things 'share in' or'partake of (metechein) the forms which they exemplify; 
and the form is a pattern (caradeiama) to which particulars approximate. ' 
12 Halliwell (1993, p. 194) suggests that'This section marks perhaps the most important transition in the entire 
Republic. It is a juncture which harks back to the outset of bk. 5 (for it Is a final attempt to answer the question of 
'possibility' which has hung over the discussion since 450c8). yet simultaneously begins a progression into what will 
turn out to be the great centrepiece of the dialogue, occupying the whole of books. 6-7: an account of the'true 
philosopher' in terms which involve an extensive and ambitious scheme of metaphysical ideas! 
our lives against this paradeigma. In particular, the vocabulary he uses at 472b -c 
hints at the need for objective quantification of our relationship to this standard of 
excellence - in other words, for the measurement of our lives against it. Socrates 
suggests that we must determine who is just by considering who is closest to 
e utata, 472c1] and has the greatest share in leista metechei, 472c1 - 2] the 
paradeiama. The person who most closely resembles the paradeicima of the just man 
will have a portion moiran, 472d1] of happiness most like his. 
The adjective eggus can describe either qualitative similarity or quantitative 
closeness (in time or distance). Although metechein is used elsewhere by Plato to 
describe the relationship of our lives to a metaphysical paradeigma, the same word 
can also mean simply to 'have a share' of something. I would suggest that, here, 
Plato carefully chooses a word which (i) describes our conformance to (share in) a 
practical ideal; (ii) implies, with support from the quantitative adjective leista , that 
the extent of our conformance (our share) can be quantified and measured; (iii) 
predicts the role of philosophical knowledge in achieving practical arete. 'Moira' 
traditionally describes a person's fortune in life; their allotted portion of life (see 
Halliwell, 1993, p. 197). The same word, however, also describes a (quantifiable) 
physical portion of something. By his careful juxtaposition of a series of terms that 
can be interpreted quantitatively, Socrates implies that the extent to which our lives 
are just can be quantified and measured against a aaradeiima. We can objectively 
measure the value of (472b8) an individual life by quantifying its'closeness to' 
(472c1), its 'share in' (472c1 - 2) and its 'portion of (472d1) the ideal. 
The majority of translations of this passage overlook the possibility that the passage 
alludes to quantification and measurement. If, however, we do read the passage as 
referring to quantitative evaluation of our lives against a DaradeiQma, it offers a very 
practical account of arete. Interpreted in this way, Book V does not, as most 
commentators suggest, represent a transition away from a practical account of arete, 
but, in fact, offers measurement against an ideal as a practical means of achieving 
arete in our own lives. 
It is possible, of course, that the language of measurement is no more than an 
analogy for living our lives with constant reference to a practical ideal for justice, 
without any necessary implication that we will actually be quantifying or measuring 
our lives against this ideal. Perhaps all Socrates intends is that we should compare 
our likeness to the ideally just man/state, as the basis for living a better life. He 
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describes the process of comparison by using the language of measurement, 
because it is natural to use this kind of language (in a loose sense) to describe how 
one thing compares against another. I might say, for example, that the meal I have 
just eaten was 'close to' being perfect, but I don't mean that I have measured it. 
Similarly, I might suggest, when recruiting a person to a job, that someone 'shares' 
many of the characteristics of the ideal person for the job, but I don't mean that they 
have a quantifiable share of these characteristics. Socrates may just be using the 
language of measurement in a loose, non-technical sense to describe how we 
evaluate our lives, without any intention that we should quantify and measure our 
lives. 
This would, in one sense, be an easier interpretation of Socrates' use of the 
language of quantity in this passage - an interpretation which avoids the 
considerable difficulties involved in attempting to quantify how just our lives are. If we 
accept, however, that Socrates is using the language of measurement only as an 
analogy for the comparison of our lives against an ideal (rather than as the actual 
means of comparison) we undermine his claim that the paradeigma he has put 
forward in Books II - IV has real value within our lives. If Socrates' paradeigma is to 
have the value which he claims for it, then he must demonstrate how we can use it 
as a basis for living our lives. Only by adopting an objective process of comparison 
can we use the standard in the way Socrates envisages - to determine how I actually 
compare to the ideal. Without this, I may believe myself to be very like the 'ideal' 
person in the artist's illustration but this will only reflect my subjective opinion on (a) 
which criteria are relevant to judging likeness in this particular case and (b) the extent 
to which I meet these criteria. If Socrates' paradeigma is to fulfil the role he affords it 
in achieving a better life, then we must have a means of using it objectively within our 
lives. Otherwise, in referring to the paradeigma in living our lives, we will be 
vulnerable to the 'power of appearancesi13 just as the many were, in the Protagoras, 
in their attempts to pursue what was most pleasant (until they acquired the art of 
measurement). Furthermore, Socrates will be entirely vulnerable to Glaucon's 
criticism that his account of justice has no practical use. Within this passage, by 
consistently choosing the language of quantification to describe the process of 
comparison against a paradeigma, Socrates implies that measurement can provide 
the objectivity we need. In doing so, I would suggest, he keeps the door open for a 
model of arete founded upon measurement and for the possibility (as he originally 
13 Cf. Protagoras 356d4. 
suggested in the Protagoras) that such a model may still be the 'salvation of our 
lives'. 
6.5 An Art of Measurement? 
Yet if, as I have suggested above, measurement continues to have a role in the 
model of arete Socrates is proposing in the Republic, why does he only allude to it? I 
would suggest that this is because Socrates remains aware of the practical issues he 
must address before he is in a position to present measurement as the 'salvation of 
our lives'. In part, his failure to refer directly to an art of measurement points to his 
recognition of how hard it is to explain how we can, in practice, quantify or measure 
how far we have achieved harmonia in our lives. For this to be possible, harmonia in 
the soul would itself need to be expressible in quantitative terms. However, by 
comparing harmonia in the soul directly to the harmony of the notes in a musical 
scale [443c9 - 444a2, quoted above], Socrates draws a direct parallel with a type of 
harmonia that the reader would be likely associate with quantification - the harmony 
of notes within a musical scale. 14 By referring specifically to the 'three limiting notes 
in a musical scale', Socrates reminds the reader of the Pythagorean15 theory of the 
tetractys. 16 This theory would be likely to be familiar - Philolaus, the key Pythagorean 
philosopher in the second half of the fifth century had discussed in detail how musical 
harmony was quantifiable. '? In Socrates' reference to the 'limiting' notes in the scale, 
he also recalls (whether intentionally or not) Philolaus' advocacy of the limited and 
"'Certainly by the time of Plato and Aristotle, the application of number theory to music was a central preoccupation 
of the Pythagoreans... ' (Kirk, Raven & Schofield, 1984 p. 234). 
15 That Is, the theory of the Pythagorean school rather than of Pythagoras himself. Kirk, Raven & Schofield (1984, p. 
234) point out that 'explicit testimony that Pythagoras discovered that the fundamental musical relations in the octave 
can be represented by simple numerical ratios is found only in late and untrustworthy authors who may depend 
ultimately (but not therefore credibly) on Xenocrates (fr. 9 Heinze, Porphry in Ptol. 30,2ff. )'. 
10 'The tetractys is a certain number which, being composed of the first four numbers, produces the most perfect 
number, ten. For one and two and three and four come to be ten. This number Is the first tetractys, and Is called the 
source of ever flowing nature since according to them the entire cosmos is ordered according to harmonia, and 
harm ni is a system of three concords - the fourth, the fifth and the octave - and the proportions of these three 
concords are found In the aforementioned four numbers (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7.94 - 95, 
as translated by Curd & McKirahan, p. 22). 
"The magnitude of the scale harmonic is the fourth and the fifth. The fifth is greater than the fourth by a tone. For 
from the highest [string; the lowest in pitch] to the middle (string] to the third Is a fourth; from the third to the highest 
[string] Is a fifth. That which is In the midst of the middle [string] and the third is a tone. The fourth is the ratio 3: 4, the 
fifth is 3.2, and the octave is 2: 1. Thus the scale harm nia Is five tones and two semitones, the fifth Is three tones 
and a semitone and the fourth is two tones and a semitone: (Stobaeus, Selection 1.21.7d =44B6a, as translated by 
Curd & McKirahan, p. 23). 
unlimited as the basis of a harmonia achieved through number -a harmonia which, 
for Philolaus, was the basis not only of music but of everything in the universe. 18 
While there is no direct evidence that Socrates is referring specifically to Philolaus (or 
to any other of the Pythagoreans), I would suggest that it is significant that: 
(i) he has chosen, as an example of harmonia in the soul, a type of harmonia (the 
musical scale) which contemporary readers would associate with quantification; 
(ii) he makes reference to limit and, in doing so, introduces a term which, in 
contemporary philosophy, applies both to the principles of musical harmony and to 
the 'ordering' of the universe as a whole. 
In doing so, he alludes to the possibility that harmonia in the soul may be quantifiable 
and, therefore, something against which we can measure/quantify our own lives. Just 
as the art of measurement assumes a low profile at the end of the Protagoras, and 
throughout the Gorgias, so it continues to do so in the Republic. Nevertheless, it 
remains present in the background and, I would suggest, remains for Socrates, 
potentially at least, 'the salvation of our lives'. 
Socrates does, in fact, provide one clear example of how harmonia in the state is 
measurable. He suggests that a fundamental part of the ruler's role is to ensure that 
they do not let the city increase to a size that will endanger the unity which is 
essential to its harmonia. Once a city gets too big, its citizens will no longer constitute 
a unified whole but will, instead, disintegrate into separate factions, which are 
effectively different states. To prevent this happening, Socrates suggests, the rulers 
must quantify correctly the size to which the city can grow without losing its unity, and 
ensure that it does not grow beyond this size: 
'Then this would also be the best limit for our guardians to put on the size of the city. 
And they should mark off enough land for a city that size and let the rest go. 
[Adeimantus] What limit is that? 
I suppose the following one. As long as it is willing to remain one city it may continue 
to grow, but it cannot grow beyond that point. 
[Adeimantus] That is a good limit. 
18 Nature in the cosmos was fitted together out of unlimiteds and limiters; both the cosmos as a whole and everything 
in it' (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 8.85 = Philolaus 44B1, as translated by Curd & McKirahan, p. 23) 
Then, we'll give our guardians this further order, namely, to guard in every way 
against the city's being either small or great in reputation instead of being sufficient in 
size and one in number. ' (423b5 - c4, Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997) 
Here Socrates offers a practical example of the model of justice which he has 
outlined at 471 - 4, namely of the process of measurement against a practical 
standard fr)aradeigma] of justice as harmonia in the state. He makes clear that 
putting this model into practice involves: 
9 expressing the standard we aspire to in quantitative terms and establishing 
this as a quantitative standard for our lives (423b3 - 9). In this example, the 
harmonia of the state (the standard it aspires to) is expressed in terms of its 
maximum size, which thus provides a limit to its expansion. 
" referring to this quantitative standard in determining how we act (423b9 - 
c1 l). In this example, the ruler will refer to the maximum size for the state in 
every decision he makes about acquiring land and territory. He will allow the 
state to acquire territory up to its maximum size, but not beyond. 
0 being constantly aware of this standard in order to ensure that the state does 
not exceed or fall short of it (423c2 - 4). 
The potential contribution of the art of measurement to achieving justice in our lives is 
made very clear in this example. Measurement brings clarity and objectivity to the 
process of comparison of our lives against a practical standard for justice. 
0 It brings precision and accuracy to our attempt to achieve justice in our lives. 
If we define the standard we live by in quantitative terms, we clarify exactly 
what justice entails and how close we are to achieving it. The ruler will be 
clear as to the precise size to which the state can grow if it is to maintain the 
harmonia that constitutes its justice. 
" It brings objectivity to our attempt to achieve justice. Justice is expressed and 
evaluated in objective, quantitative terms which offer no scope for subjective 
opinion. When the amount of land the state can occupy has been 'marked 
off, and a clear limit established, there is no further scope for debate on the 
state's expansion but only for reference to this limit. 
" As a result, measurement overcomes our vulnerability to the influence of 
popular opinion by providing us with a clear standard of what is actually right 
for us to do. In this example, the ruler will no longer be swayed by the need 
to maintain the reputation of the state in the eyes of other cities. Instead, he 
will concentrate on maintaining the right size, regardless of how others will 
view this. 
Socrates' discussion of the right size for a just state comes about in response to a 
question from Adeimantus. Socrates has emphasised (421c ff. ) that extremes of 
poverty and wealth will damage the harmonia of a state. Adeimantus asks whether, 
in some cases, the state may be put at disadvantage in war through its lack of 
wealth. It may be particularly vulnerable, he suggests, if it is fighting against a very 
wealthy state or against states which have combined their resources. Socrates' reply 
is that wealthy men represent no match for trained fighters19 and that combined 
wealth is achieved at the cost of disunity which weakens a state. 20 Up to this point, 
Socrates' reply represents a direct response to Adeimantus' question, but at this 
stage Socrates moves from a discussion of wealth in a state (the subject of 
Adeimantus' question), to a discussion of the size of territory a state occupies: 
'And as long as your own city is moderately governed in the way that we've just 
arranged, it will, even if it has only a thousand men to fight for it, be the greatest. Not 
in reputation; I don't mean that, but the greatest in fact. Indeed, you won't find a city 
as great as this one among either Greeks or barbarians, although many that are 
many times its size may seem to be as great. ' (423a5 - b3, Grube, rev, Reeve, 1997) 
Socrates goes on to explain that it is the role of the ruler to avoid the state becoming 
too large in size (423b4 - c4, see above), and it is clear that, at this stage, he is 
talking specifically about the amount of land a state possesses. If this is to make 
sense as a response to Adeimantus' original question about the wealth of a state, we 
must assume that Socrates is making a link between the size of a state's territory and 
the extent of its wealth. His argument is that by limiting the size of a state's territory 
we limit its wealth, and thus avoid the weaknesses that excessive wealth brings. Yet 
the link Socrates assumes between the size of a state and its wealth is just as 
19 Well then, It would appear that our trained soldiers should easily be a match for two or three times their number. ' 
(422c8 - 5, Lee, 1987) 
20 We'll have to find a greater title for the others because each of them is a great many cities, not a city, as they say 
In the game. At any rate, each of them consists of two cities at war with one another, that of the poor and that of the 
rich, and each of these contains a great many. If you approach them as one city, you'll be making a big mistake. But 
if you approach them as many and offer to give to the one city the money, power and indeed the Inhabitants of the 
other, you'll always find many allies and few enemies. ' (422e4 - 423a5, Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997) 
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tenuous as the link which Adeimantus proposed between the wealth of a state and its 
strength in war, a link which Socrates challenged vigorously (422b -d). A state may 
have a limited amount of land but a large amount of wealth, and so still be vulnerable 
to the disunity which, Socrates has suggested, is the result of excessive wealth. We 
need to question, therefore, not only why Socrates introduces the size of a state's 
territory into his response to Adeimantus' question, but also why he goes on to 
emphasise that controlling the size of a state's territory is a central part of the 
guardian's role. This doesn't really make sense as a response to Adeimantus, so 
Socrates is either unaware of its irrelevance or he must have another reason for 
emphasising this aspect of the ruler's role. I would suggest that he recognises that, 
by introducing a discussion of a state's territory, he gains an opportunity to illustrate 
how objective measure against a paradeigma which is expressed in quantitative 
terms provides a basis for practical arete. By describing how the ruler should manage 
the size of a state's territory, Socrates offers a clear example of the art of 
measurement in practice, and of the contribution that this makes to achieving or 
maintaining harmonia. The way he describes the ruler's role makes it clear that he is 
describing an art of measurement -a practical activity which involves accurately 
quantifying a sufficient size for the state hosen dei to megethos ten polin poieisthai. 
423b6], marking off faphorisamenous, 423b7] the appropriate amount of land as a 
boundary horos, 423b5] for the state's expansion, and referring to this boundary in 
every decision he makes. 
By describing the role of measurement within this particular decision (which can be 
expressed in terms of quantity), Socrates is able to illustrate how, potentially, 
measurement could bring objectivity to decisions the ruler makes and thus be the 
basis of justice in our lives. In illustrating how we can express the right size of state in 
terms of a specific numerical quantity, Socrates shows how the quantification which 
is the basis of musical harmonia can also be the basis of harmonia in our lives. If we 
could quantify other aspects of a harmonia in the state and individual, then all our 
decisions could be determined objectively by quantification. Unfortunately, Socrates 
is not yet in a position to show us how other aspects of our lives are quantifiable in 
the same way, and so he can only allude to a model of arete founded upon 
measurement. 
At 426d - e, immediately after his discussion of the size of a just state, Socrates 
compares an unjust ruler (who has not, through the proper education, gained an 
understanding of what is truly just) to a man lacking in the art of measurement: 
'What do you mean? Have you no sympathy for such men? Or do you think it's 
possible for someone who is ignorant of measurement not to believe it himself when 
many others who are similarly ignorant tell him that he is six foot tall? (426d7 - e1, 
Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997) 
The unjust ruler is described as like a man who lacks a valid standard of 
measurement, and has, therefore, no other option than to believe the judgements of 
others. He is thus susceptible to their opinions and their flattery, and will use these 
(rather than true justice) as the basis for ruling the state. Here, Socrates is not just 
talking about one aspect of the ruler's role, but about ruling justly in general. By using 
measurement as an analogy for justice as a whole, Socrates builds upon his 
description of how the ruler'measures' the size of the state, and prepares the ground 
for giving measurement a more fundamental role in justice. At the same time, his use 
of this analogy underlines his awareness that in applying measurement to other 
aspects of justice, he is confined to using it as an analogy because he cannot 
demonstrate how, in practice, other aspects of justice are measurable. 426d7 - e1 
contrasts sharply with Protagoras 356d3 - e2 (see p. 1 2). In both passages, Socrates 
describes how measurement brings clarity and rules out the misleading influence of 
opinion, 21 but in the Protagoras he is claiming that this art has a direct application to 
arete, whereas in the Republic he avoids openly making this claim. He is aware that 
the account of justice he has proposed in the Republic - as harmonia in the soul - 
does not lend itself easily to quantitative measurement, and yet he is also aware that, 
without the art of quantitative measurement, we may be deluded into believing that 
our lives are just. 
6.6 to to hautou rp attein? 
Socrates' reluctance to describe the ruler as openly using an art of measurement 
may also reflect his awareness that this would be incongruous within an account of 
justice which advocates each class fulfilling only their own role (to to hautou prattein, 
433b4). Socrates has already made clear that technai should be the concern of the 
21 The ability of measurement to rule out the misleading Influence of opinion is also emphasised In Socrates' 
discussion of the appropriate size for a just state. Socrates contrasts [423a6 - 7] a state which is great by reputation 
Meudoklme in with one which Is truly the greatest [hh6s alethbs meaistel because, by limiting its size, it has achieved 
true justice. The ruler who has determined the right size for a state and uses this as a measure for its expansion is 
no longer concerned with the state's reputation fdokousa, 423c4] but with maintaining its appropriate ikan , 423c4] 
SIZE. 
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productive class and not of the ruling class. 22 To advocate now that the ruler should 
practise a techne would cut across this account of justice. 
I would suggest that Socrates begins to address this difficulty at 473d -e when he 
claims, much to Glaucon's horror, that the ideal state which they have described will 
never come into being to the fullest extent possible huei to eis to dunaton, 473e1] 
or see the light of the sun ['kai phös heliou idei', 473e2] until philosophers rule the 
state: 
'Unless philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading 
men genuinely and adequately philosophise, that is, until political power and 
philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either 
one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from 
evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the 
constitution we've been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest extent 
possible or see the light of the sun. ' (473c11 - e1, Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997) 
In this section, I will explore the relationship between Socrates' account of justice as 
the ability to measure our lives against a practical standard of excellence and his 
claim that justice depends upon philosophical understanding. I will suggest that he 
uses the metaphor of sight to establish an integral relationship between these two 
aspects of justice. The foundation of this metaphor is laid at 472d4 - 10, where 
Socrates compares the practical standard of justice which they have developed to an 
artist's representation of an ideally beautiful man, which illustrates what an ideal man 
would look like if he were to exist. The artist's picture is an illustration 1 aradeigmal of 
the ideal. By analogy, Socrates suggests that they have developed an illustration in 
words of an ideally just state fparadeigma epoioumen loQöi a ag thes oa IeSs, 472d10 
- el]. Thus he describes his account of justice not only as a practical standard but 
also as a visual standard - an illustration or model, which we can 'look to' for 
guidance in living our lives. This is reflected in the language he uses to describe the 
comparison of our lives against this standard. He suggests, for example, that we 
should look to fapoblepein, 472c7] the paradeigma of a just and unjust man in order 
22 This is clear, for example, in his discussion in Book III of the primary education which is appropriate for the ruling 
class: 'Should they Imitate metal workers or other craftsmen, or those who row In triremes, or their time-keepers, or 
anything else connected with ships? How could they, since they aren't to concern themselves with any of these 
occupations.: (396a8 - b3, Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997) 
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to establish who bears the closest resemblance to each of them hos an ekeinois hoti 
homoiotatos ei, 472c9 -d1]. 
At 473d - e, Socrates suggests that this ideal state will not be 'born to the fullest 
extent possible' huei ... eis to dunaton. 473d7] or'see the light of the sun' kai phös 
heliou idei, 473d7 - e1] until the state is ruled by philosophers. Socrates is 
apparently using these two expressions to describe a situation where the ideal state 
has been achieved (or at least where we have come as close to it as we can get) in 
the real world; the perfect state is thus 'born' and emerges into the 'light of the sun'. 
Yet Socrates' concern throughout the passage (471 - 4) has been primarily to 
establish the use of an ideal in our lives. He makes clear within the passage that his 
whole account of justice represents an ideal for us to live by (paradeigmatos ara 
heneka, 472c4] and aim towards. An alternative interpretation, therefore, is that he is 
not talking about how a state achieves the ideal of justice, but about the more 
fundamental question of how it incorporates this ideal as a standard within its life. On 
this interpretation, huei refers to the standard's progress/growth towards becoming 
real/possible eis to dunaton as a standard within our lives. This progress happens 
only when the ideal 'sees the light of the sun' - that is, when it is illuminated by the 
sun for its citizens, who now understand that it represents the kind of state they 
should be aiming to achieve. By referring to the illumination of the standard by which 
the state should live, Socrates builds on his earlier description of the ideal state as an 
illustration to which we can refer in living our lives; this illustration is now described 
as becoming visible by illumination in the light of the sun. Socrates claims, however, 
that this will only happen when the state is ruled by philosophers and thus suggests 
that only philosophers are capable of recognising this ideal and of establishing it 
within the state. This interpretation is supported by a later passage, 484c - d, where 
he repeats his claim that only philosophers can recognise the standards the state 
should live by: 
'And isn't it clear that the guardian who is to keep watch over everything should be 
keen-sighted rather than blind? 
Of course it's clear. 
So do you think then, that there's any difference between the blind and those who 
are really deprived of the knowledge of each thing that is? The latter have no clear 
model in their souls, and so they cannot - in the manner of painters - look to what is 
most true, make constant reference to it, and study it as exactly as possible. Hence 
they cannot establish here on earth conventions about what is fine or just or good, 
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when they need to be established, or guard and preserve them, once they have been 
established. 
No, by god, there isn't much difference between them. 
Should we, then, make these blind people our guardians or rather those who know 
each thing that is and who are not inferior to the others, either in experience or in any 
other part of virtue? ' (484c - d, Grube, rev. Reeve, 1997) 
In this passage it is very clear that Socrates is talking about how we establish 
tithesthai, 484d1 & 2] and safeguard Fs6zein, 484d2] the ideal the state should live 
by, rather than about how we achieve this standard. He restates his earlier claim that 
only philosophers can do this for the state, and suggests that the non-philosopher is 
'blind' to the standards the state should live by, whereas the philosopher is 'keen- 
sighted'. In presenting the practical standards we live by as a visible illustration of 
how we should live, the passage recalls 471 - 4. In describing philosophers as keen- 
sighted, however, Socrates shifts the emphasis of the metaphor from the visibility of 
the paradeicma itself - its illumination in the light of day - to the philosopher's ability 
to see it. This indicates that, having begun to explore the nature of philosophical 
knowledge, Socrates is ready to explore how such knowledge enables the 
philosopher to 'see' the practical standards we should live our lives by and to make 
these standards visible to/in the state. 
Socrates suggests that the non-philosopher is blind to what is just in the state 
because he does not have a standard [paradeigmal of absolute truth to alethestaton, 
484c7] about justice. So here, as at 471 - 4, Socrates refers again to the use of a 
standard [aradeiama1 in achieving justice in our lives -a standard which enables us 
to make practical decisions about what is right and wrong. It provides a basis for 
identifying those aspects of the state's life which are already just and, therefore, need 
to be preserved and those aspects which need to be changed by establishing new 
laws. But at 484c - d, Socrates makes clear that the practical standard against which 
we compare our lives must, if it is to be of any real value, reflect'what is most true' 
(alethestaton]. For this reason, it can only be 'seen' by those who, through 
philosophy, have grasped the true nature of reality auto ara hekaston to on, 480a11]. 
In this way, Socrates provides a basis for his earlier claim (473c - e) that the ideal we 
must live our lives by will be invisible in a state that is not ruled by philosophers. 
Despite its practical application, this ideal is founded upon a standard of absolute 
truth which can only be understood ('seen') by philosophers. In a state where 
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philosophers do not have power, therefore, it will not be recognised as an ideal and 
so will not see the light of day. 
Socrates uses the analogy of art to emphasise the integral relationship between the 
practical standard of excellence which we use in living our lives and the standard of 
absolute truth from which this is derived. At 471 -4 he compares the practical 
standard of excellence which has been developed in Books II - IV to an artist's 
picture of an ideal individual. At 484 he compares a standard of absolute truth to the 
model which an artist uses when painting a picture. These two analogies remind us 
that both standards serve as an illustration or visual model, which we can 'look to' for 
guidance in living our lives, and highlight an integral relationship between them. The 
artist's picture of the ideal man is clearly derived from and dependent upon the model 
which the artist uses. The picture wouldn't be created, or certainly wouldn't be an 
accurate image, if the artist didn't use and pay close attention to a model. In this way, 
Socrates emphasises that the practical standard we live by (the standard which he 
established in Books II - IV) must be derived from a standard of 'what is most true'. 
So, by identifying the direct relationship between the practical standard we live our 
lives by and a standard of absolute truth, this passage clarifies the relationship 
between practical justice and philosophical understanding. It reinforces the model of 
practical justice which Socrates proposed at 471 -4 as the evaluation of our life 
against a practical ideal. At the same time, it clarifies that this practical ideal is 
derived from and dependent upon a standard for what is absolutely true about 
justice. In doing so, it makes the measurement of our lives against this standard a 
very different art from the one which Socrates proposed in the Protagoras. Socrates 
makes clear that, when we measure our lives against a practical ideal, we are 
demonstrating our understanding of a standard of absolute truth about justice - that 
is, an understanding of what is truly good. In contrast, when we exercise the 
Protagoras' art of measurement, we are doing no more than making accurate 
calculations based upon the best standard which the many can come up with. 
Pleasure is established as the principle by which a good life is measured purely on 
the basis that the many cannot cite any other way of judging whether a life is good. 
Socrates emphasises numerous times that they are unable to give any other account 
of a good life: 
'Or can you point to any result by reference to which you call them good, other than 
pleasures and pains? They would say no, I think. 
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I think so too, said Protagoras. 
So you pursue pleasure as good, and avoid pain as evil? 
He agreed. 
So it's pain which you regard as evil, and pleasure as good since you even call 
enjoyment itself bad when it deprives you of greater pleasures than it has in itself, or 
leads to pains which are greater than its own pleasures. For if you call enjoyment 
itself bad for any other reason and by reference to any other result, you would be 
able to tell us what it is. But you can't. 
I don't think so either, said Protagoras. 
And again, surely it's the same about suffering pain itself. Don't you call suffering 
pain itself good when it gets rid of greater pains than it has in itself, or when it leads 
to pleasures which are greater than the pains? For if you refer to any other result 
when you call suffering pain itself good than the one I say, you will be able to tell us. 
But you can't. ' (Protagoras 354c - e, Taylor 1991, my italics) 
'But even now you are at liberty to withdraw if you can give any other account of the 
good than pleasure, or of evil than pain. Or are you content to say that it is a pleasant 
life without pains? ' (354e - 355a, Taylor, 1991, my italics) 
Socrates emphasises, by making the point many times, that the many cannot offer an 
alternative account of a good life. The language he uses stresses their inability to 
describe a good life in terms that are not ultimately reducible to pleasure or pain and 
their lack of any other account. Having firmly established this principle, Socrates 
constructs upon it an argument against akrasia - an argument which results in the 
conclusion that areto is the art of measurement of pleasure in our lives. 23 We are 
aware, however, that this model of arete is constructed upon an account of/standard 
for a good life which amounts only to the best the many can come up with. Socrates 
has actually admitted this, and drawn attention to it; at Protagoras 354e he explains 
that he has gone on at length about the hedonism of the many because 'the whole 
argument depends on this'. Furthermore, we have our doubts as to whether this 
really is the best account of a good life the many could come up with. They have 
Socrates and Protagoras speaking for them - both of whom have a vested interest in 
arguing against akrasia and in demonstrating the role of knowledge in a good life. We 
are left wondering whether the metretike techne, despite the clarity it brings to our 
23 Protagoras 355a if.. 
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pursuit of a good life, is founded on an account of a good life which has not really 
been put to the test. 
In the Republic, in contrast, Socrates makes clear that his account of practical justice 
is founded on a standard for a good life which is 'ale thestaton'. Whereas the 
Protagoras' art of measurement has been established by exploring and clarifying 
popular opinion, 24 the Republic's art of measurement uses a standard which is 
established by turning away from popular opinion about a good life (and the sense 
experiences from which such opinions are derived). 25 Socrates' detailed questioning 
of the many in the Protagoras about their experiences and opinions is in sharp 
contrast with his claim in the Republic that the true philosopher will ignore such 
experiences and opinions. 26 The Republic's art of measurement is strengthened 
because it is founded on an objective understanding of what a good life entails, 
achieved by setting aside the misleading influence of the sensible world. 
It becomes clear that measurement of justice in our lives is fundamentally different 
from any other techne because it is founded upon an understanding which cannot be 
gained through practical experience and which can, in fact, only be acquired by 
ceasing to be concerned with practical experience. The art of measurement which 
Socrates alludes to in the Republic offers the accuracy and determinacy of any other 
techne, but is founded on philosophical understanding rather than on practical 
experience. Thus Socrates need no longer be concerned about making this techne 
the responsibility of the ruling class, since it is fundamentally different from the 
technai which are the concern of the productive class. 
24 Socrates explores what motivates the many in all their actions, and clarifies the basis upon which they describe an 
experience as good or bad. In doing this, however, he Is not clarifying the true nature of a good life, but only the truth 
about the many's opinion on what a good life entails. 
I From 474 - 484, Socrates has begun to explore the nature of philosophical knowledge, and has concluded that the 
philosopher is concerned with the 'true being of each thing' [auto gar k st Y4 . Qn, 
480a11]. This entails 
understanding each thing (beauty, justice etc) in itself ku, 476b9 -10] and recognising Its true nature tn 
hui , 
476b7j. In order to achieve this understanding, the philosopher must turn his attention away from the 
unstable world of sense experience, which can only be the object of opinion. At 484c - d, he makes clear that the 
philosopher's understanding of the truth provides him with a standard Ibaradeiamaj of absolute truth 't al@thestaton' 
against which he can correctly determine the way the state should live. 
26'And they [philosophers] set their hearts on the field of knowledge, while the other type set theirs on the field of 
opinion for, as you will remember, we said that their eyes and hearts were fixed on the beautiful sounds and colours 
and so on, and that they could not bear even the suggestion that there was such a thing as beauty itself. ' (479e9 - 
480a4, Lee, 1987) 
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6.7 Real and Unreal Pleasures 
I have suggested in the rest of this chapter that, in the Republic, Socrates still 
presents arete as the ability to achieve an ordered state of soul - an ability which 
entails the measurement of our lives against a model (paradeigma) of arete. In doing 
so, he builds upon and reinforces the account of arete which he gave in the Gorgias. 
He does this by clarifying what an ordered state of soul consists in (by identifying its 
component parts - the rational, appetitive and spirited) and by establishing a state of 
harmonia between these parts as a paradeigma against which we can measure our 
own soul/lives. In addition, he raises the status of the art of measurement by 
presenting this paradeiama as a representation of the truth about arete. 
The problem of human motivation 
However, in presenting this model of arete, Socrates is still faced with the question, 
which Callicles raised in the Gorgias, of why we should be motivated to pursue an 
ordered state of soul when this requires us to restrain the appetitive part of the soul 
and thus, apparently, restrict the amount of pleasure in our lives. Callicles argues that 
his life is happiest when he achieves as much pleasure as possible, and Socrates is 
unable to convince him otherwise. The strength of Callicles' argument is that it is 
based upon and refers to his own direct life experience of what, in practice, motivates 
him and makes him happy. This presents Socrates with the challenge of 'explaining 
away' Callicles' actual experience of what makes him happy and he faces a similar 
challenge in his discussion of arete in the Republic. When Socrates suggests that 
achieving order (harmonia) in the soul is the basis of a good and happy life, he must 
also explain why we would not be happier spending our lives in pursuit of our own 
self-interests. As Russell (2005, p107) puts it '.. the problem remains that a life's 
being 'orderly' is not necessarily the first thing that even reasonable, mature persons 
would cite as making the happy life happy'. Yet unless Socrates' account of arete is 
underpinned by an adequate account of our motivation to achieve it in our own lives, 
then it will never be the 'salvation of our lives'. 
From the very beginning of the Republic, Socrates is faced once again with the 
challenge of providing an adequate account of our motivation to achieve justice 
(arete) in our lives. Thrasymachus claims (Book I) that justice is no more than the 
advantage of the stronger and that happiness is obtained by acting unjustly in one's 
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own best interests. At 343d, he gives three specific examples of where, in practice, 
acting justly can result in unhappiness for the agent: 
`You must consider it as follows, Socrates, or you will be the most naive of all: a just 
man must always get less than does an unjust one. First, in their contracts with one 
another, when a just man is partner to an unjust, you will never find, when the 
partnership ends, that the just one gets more than the unjust, but less. Second, in 
matters relating to the city, when taxes are to be paid, a just man pays more on an 
equal amount of property, an unjust one less: but when the city is giving out refunds, 
a just man gets nothing while an unjust one makes a large profit. Finally, when each 
of them holds political office, a just person - even if he is not penalized in other ways 
- finds that his private affairs deteriorate more because he has to neglect them, that 
he gains no advantage from the public purse because of his justice, and that he is 
hated by his relatives and acquaintances because he is unwilling to do them an 
unjust favour. ' (343d2 - e7, Reeve, 2004) 
In Book II, Glaucon and Adeimantus support Thrasymachus' argument by suggesting 
that, given immunity from the social consequences of our actions, our natural 
motivation is to act in pursuit of our own interests because this makes us happier. 
They present Socrates with the challenge of showing why we should be motivated to 
pursue justice in itself, rather than for its consequences: 
`On the basis of what further argument, then, should we choose justice over the 
greatest injustice? For if we possess such injustice with a false facade, we will do as 
we have a mind to among gods and humans, both while we are living and when we 
are dead, as both the masses and the eminent claim. So given all that has been said, 
Socrates, what device could get someone with any power - whether of mind, wealth, 
body, or family - to be willing to honor justice, and not laugh aloud when he hears it 
praised? ' (366b4 - c3, Reeve, 2004) 
In Socrates' subsequent development in the Republic of his own account of a just 
and happy life (as dependent upon a state of harmonia in the soul and in the state) 
he does not appear to respond directly to the challenge which Glaucon and 
Adeimantus have raised. In Book IX, however, he finally responds to it through his 
exploration of the type of city and ruler which have the most just and happiest life. As 
part of this exploration, he discusses the role of pleasure within a just and happy life 
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through two arguments (580c - 583a, 583b - 588a) which lead to the conclusion that 
the philosopher's life is the happiest. 
In the first argument (580c ff. ), Socrates suggests that each part of the soul gains 
pleasure from a different source. The appetitive part of the soul gains its pleasure 
from money and profit, the spirited part from victory and good reputation, and the 
rational part from learning and truth. Our judgement of which of these pleasures is 
the greatest is influenced by which part of our soul is 'in charge'. However, only the 
philosopher (who is ruled by the rational part of the soul) is in a position to judge 
which type of life is the most pleasant. This is because the philosopher has 
experience of all three types of pleasure and, in addition, can apply the power of 
reasoned argument to this experience. 
'So, of the three pleasures, then, the most pleasant would be that of the part of the 
soul with which we learn, and the one of us in whom it rules has the most pleasant 
life. 
[Glaucon] How could it be otherwise? The knowledgeable person at least praises 
with authority when he praises his own life. 
What life and pleasure does the judge say are in second place? 
[Glaucon] Clearly, those of the warrior and honor-lover, since they are closer to his 
own than those of the moneymaker. 
Then those of the profit-lover come last, apparently. 
[Glaucon] Of course. 
Well, then, that makes two in a row. And twice the just person has defeated the 
unjust one. (583a1 - b2, Reeve, 2004) 
This conclusion, however, presents Socrates with the difficulty of arguing against 
Glaucon and Adeimantus' own direct life experience of what makes them happy. This 
is a difficulty which Socrates addresses within his second argument about the role of 
pleasure within a good life, from 583b. In this argument, Socrates suggests that our 
judgements about the pleasantness of our lives cannot be taken at face value and 
draws a distinction between real and unreal pleasures. He bases his argument on the 
premise that real pleasure is not just the avoidance or relief of pain (583c - 585a), as 
many people think, and makes a distinction between the pleasures that satisfy the 
body and those that satisfy the mind (585b). Socrates argues that, since intelligible 
things are more real, the pleasures they experience are, therefore, more real. While 
there has been much controversy about the precise nature and the validity of the 
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distinction which Socrates is making, I intend to concentrate on his conclusion that it 
is the ordered state of soul which can maximise the true pleasure we experience: 
`So, when the entire soul follows the philosophic element and does not engage in 
faction, the result is that each element does its own work and is just; and, in 
particular, each enjoys its own pleasures, the best pleasures and - to the degree 
possible - the truest. 
[Glaucon] Absolutely. 
So, when one of the other parts gains mastery, the result is that it cannot discover its 
own pleasure and compels the other parts to pursue an alien, and not a true 
pleasure. (586e4 - 587a6, Reeve, 2004) 
Here Socrates refers again to the state of harmonia between the three different 
dunameis within the soul, which he presented as the basis of a just life in Republic IV 
(443c9 - 444a2). In this case, however, he suggests that, by acting in pursuit of an 
ordered state of soul, we will achieve true pleasure in our lives. Since the pleasures 
of the rational part of the soul are more real, the ordered soul within which reason is 
'in charge' is in a position to maximise true pleasure. In making this claim, he 
responds to the challenge which Callicles presented in the Gorgias - to explain why 
we should be motivated to act against our own self-interests in order to live a just life. 
Socrates makes clear that, in doing so, we will maximise the real pleasure in our 
lives. While this will involve restricting the satisfaction of some of our desires, the 
fulfilment of these desires would only result in the illusion of pleasure and so would 
not, in the long run, make us happier. 
Does Socrates also respond to Glaucon and Adeimantus' challenge of showing why 
we should be motivated to pursue justice in itself, rather than for its consequences? It 
could be argued that, if we are motivated to pursue an ordered state of soul because 
it is pleasantest, we are not pursuing it for its own sake. Russell (2005, p. 106) refers 
to the additive conception of happiness, according to which the happiness of a 
virtuous life depends upon 'some dimension of that life, or other, instead of on its 
rational structure as a whole. ' The advantage of this conception of happiness is, as 
Russell points out, 'that it does well at showing that a certain mode of living is 
attractive and thus a reasonable candidate for happiness. ' In other words it offers an 
account of our motivation for living such a life and responds to the type of challenge 
which Callicles raised. However, Russell also points out that'it does so at the cost of 
making happiness 'dimensional' rather than holistic: a happy life is so because of that 
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dimension of it that is its pleasantness, say. ' It could be argued that the model of a 
good life which Socrates puts forward in Book IX depends upon such an additive 
conception of happiness, according to which the rational pursuit of an ordered state 
of soul results in a happy life because pleasure is one dimension of this life. Russell 
argues against this, and suggests that, in Book IX, Socrates presents the pursuit of 
pleasure as an important part of rational activity, rather than as 'tacked on' to 
wisdom. 7 He still accepts, however, that pleasure is a conditional good (albeit an 
'especially important' one - p. 137) with the order of the soul as the unconditional 
good upon which a good and happy life ultimately depends. 
I would go further than this, and suggest that in Book IX, Socrates presents the 
maximisation of pleasure within our lives as identical with the pursuit of an ordered 
state of soul. From the outset of the two arguments about pleasure, Socrates 
demonstrates a willingness to accept that pleasantness is the basis upon which 
Glaucon judges the goodness/happiness of a life. Socrates' conversation with 
Glaucon from 580c - 583a is underpinned by the acceptance that pleasantness is 
the value against which they are judging the goodness/happiness of a life. This is 
stated explicitly by Socrates at 581 e: 
'Since the pleasures of each kind and the lives themselves dispute with one another - 
not about which life is finer or more shameful or better or worse - but about which is 
more pleasant and less painful, how are we to know which of them is speaking the 
absolute truth? ' (581 e5 - 582a1, Reeve, 2004) 
In this statement Socrates acknowledges that within their discussion about the 
best/happiest life, the debate will focus upon the relative pleasantness of different 
types of pleasure (he expresses this in terms of the pleasures 'disputing' with one 
another) because the quantity of pleasure within a life is the way in which Glaucon 
judges its goodness. Furthermore, when at Republic 583a -b (quoted above) 
Socrates asks: 'What life and pleasure does the judge say are in second place? ' he 
Z''For Plato, virtue and vice are different constitutions of soul, and we can evaluate them by determining which of 
them is identical to a psychologically healthy, integrated, and thriving soul, and which to an unhealthy and twisted 
one. Pleasure Is relevant to this comparison, for one thing, because the ways in which the different aspects of the 
soul find enjoyment In the world around them are a key factor in the health or sickness of the soul. For another, to 
take pleasure in one's life as a whole is to judge one's life to be genuinely rewarding and satisfying, to be a truly 
happy life; and that judgement can be correct or mistaken, and made from within a better or worse perspective. ' 
(Russell, 2005, p. 136) 
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appears to accept that the judgement about (a) how good a life is and (b) how [truly] 
pleasant it is, are one and the same. 
Socrates' apparent willingness to accept that, for his interlocutor, the maximisation of 
pleasure is the basis of a good life strongly recalls his discussion of the nature of 
arete within the Protagoras. From Protagoras 351 b he established that the many 
regarded the maximisation of pleasure as the basis of a good life, and constructed 
his account of arete (as the metretiko techne) upon this. However, as discussed in 
chapter 3, this required both himself and Protagoras to accept that the 'fineness' of a 
courageous man rests in nothing more than the correct use of a technique of 
calculating the greatest amount of pleasure and thus to give up a great deal from 
their natural conception of arete. By clarifying in Republic IX that real pleasure 
consists in the pursuit of an ordered state of soul, Socrates is able to argue once 
again that a good life consists in the maximisation of pleasure - without in any way 
challenging his conception of what the 'fineness' of a just life consists in. The claim is 
entirely compatible with the model of aretd which he has put forward in the rest of the 
Republic, and so it is no longer jeering at him as it was in the Protagoras. 
The direct consequence of Socrates' presenting arete as the maximisation of (real) 
pleasure within our lives is that aretb depends once again, as it did in the Protagoras, 
upon the ability to judge accurately the amount of pleasure that is to be derived from 
our actions and to rule out misleading appearances about pleasure in order to reach 
the truth: 
'How can it be right, then, to think that the absence of pain is pleasant or the absence 
of enjoyment painful? 
There's no way it can be. 
So, it is not right. But when the quiet state is next to what is painful, it appears 
pleasant; and when it is next to what is pleasant, it appears painful. And there is 
nothing sound in these illusions fphantasmatal as far as the truth about pleasure is 
concerned. On the contrary, they are a sort of sorcery. ' (584a4 - 10, Reeve, 2004) 
'So isn't it necessary, then, for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with 
pains, mere phantoms Feid6la and illusionist paintings feskiagraphemenaisl of true 
pleasures? And aren't they so colored by their juxtaposition with one another that 
they appear intense, beget mad passions for themselves in the foolish, and are 
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fought over - as Stesichorus tells us the phantom eidblon of Helen was fought over 
at Troy - through ignorance of the truth. ' (586b7 - c5, Reeve, 2004) 
The language of illusion and deception is present throughout the discussion of 
pleasure in Book IX and this strongly recalls the discussion of the metretike techn6 in 
the Protagoras. 28 However, there are some key difference between the Protagoras' 
metretike techne and the model of aret6 which Socrates presents in the Republic. 
Firstly, pain has no relevance to the calculation of pleasure in our lives, whereas in 
the Protagoras, it was a key part of the calculation 2' In Republic IX, Socrates makes 
clear that the absence of pain does not constitute pleasure30 - instead, pleasure is 
maximised only 'when the entire soul follows the philosophic element and does not 
engage in faction'. Secondly, as discussed in section 6, pleasure is measured 
against a paradeigma of a good/pleasant life which is a reflection of the absolute 
truth. For this reason, it can only be 'seen' and used by those who, through 
philosophy, have grasped the true nature of reality auto ara hekaston to on, 480a11]. 
As a result, the art of measurement is now the art of the philosopher, rather than an 
art which can be practised by'the many'. 
Despite its strengths, the Protagoras' metretike techne reduced arete to a parody of 
what Socrates believed it should be. In Republic IX, by establishing a new account of 
pleasure, which is identical with the account of a good life as an ordered state of soul 
which he has developed in the Gorgias and the Republic, Socrates is able to 
reinstate the metretikl techne. It makes a quiet reappearance in Republic IX, but in 
an enhanced form which addresses its original weaknesses (while retaining its 
strengths). It still offers the maximisation of pleasure as an objective and determinate 
basis for judging the nature of a good life, and as an account of our motivation for 
pursuing such a life - but it is now underpinned by an account of pleasure which is 
identical with Socrates' conviction that arete consists in the pursuit of an ordered 
state of soul. In the next chapter I will discuss how, in the Statesman, Socrates 
"'So if our well-being had depended on taking steps to get large quantities and avoid small ones, what should we 
have judged to be the thing that saves our lives? The art of measurement or the power of appearances [! a jai 
nhainomenou dunamisl? The latter, as we saw, confuses us and makes us often change our minds about the same 
things and vacillate back and forth In our actions and choices or large and small things; but measurement would have 
made these appearances (IQ phantasmal powerless, and given us peace of mind by showing us the truth and letting 
us get a firm grasp of It and so would have changed our lives. ' 
29 But even now you are at liberty to withdraw if you can give any other account of the good than pleasure, or of evil 
than pain. Or are you content to say that it is a pleasant life without pains? ' (354e8 - 355a3, Taylor, 1991) 
30 584a4 - 10 (quoted above). 
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explores in detail how the philosopher can apply this art of measurement within the 
state. 
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Sketching the `Soteria Tou Biou' 
Plato and the Art of Measurement 
Chapter 7- Knowledge and Due Measure in the Statesman 
7.1 Introduction 
The Statesman is formally presented (257a1 - 5) by Plato as a continuation of the 
Sophist. The Statesman continues the search which began in the Sophist for a 
definition of the sophist, the statesman and the philosopher (although the definition of 
the philosopher is apparently never reached). However, it is not clear whether the 
Statesman also continues the Theaetetus' and Sophist's investigation of knowledge' 
or whether Plato has by now moved on to other areas of concern. In this chapter I will 
suggest that in the Statesman Plato is still concerned with knowledge, but takes a 
different approach from that taken in the Sophist and the Theaetetus. Rather than 
trying to define knowledge (as in the Theaetetus) or to defend its existence (as in the 
Sophist), the Statesman is concerned with providing a model of knowledge, based 
upon the world we live in and understand, which is sufficient for arete. In this respect, 
it continues the project which, I have suggested, began in the Protagoras (and 
progressed through the Gorgias and Republic) - to sketch the `salvation of our lives'. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that, in Republic IX, Socrates 'reinstated' (since its 
original introduction in the Protagoras) his account of arete as the art of measuring 
pleasure in our lives. I suggested, however, that the Republic's art of measurement 
was founded upon a very specific definition of real pleasure as the pursuit of a state 
of order within the soul. In this chapter I will explore how, in the Statesman, the 
principle of due measure (to metrion) is presented as the basis for achieving the 
ordered state of soul which is the basis of aret&. Due measure is introduced as an 
objective and quantifiable standard of excellence, which can accommodate2 the 
The Theaetetus has asked 'what is knowledge? ' and in doing so raised Issues about the nature and possibility of 
false belief. The Sophist builds upon this by exploring how falsehood can occur. 
2 By Incorporating measurement of'the right moment' Usairos . 
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constantly-changing context of the world in which we live. It is presented as the basis 
of excellence in all technal and this is demonstrated in relation to the art of dialectic 
and to the art of the statesman. 
In clarifying how the statesman measures the order that is the basis of arete, the 
Statesman completes the sketch of arete as the art of measurement which Socrates 
began in the Protagoras. In chapter one I suggested that Socrates made clear that 
this sketch would need to make clear, firstly, whether areto was a techne and, 
secondly, upon what standard of a good life it is founded. The Statesman makes 
clear that it is a techne of measurement of order in our lives - an order which is 
expressed in the standard of due measure. In the final section of this chapter I will 
discuss how, in doing so, the Statesman develops the Protagoras' original sketch of 
arete - the metretike techne - while retaining its essential strengths. 
7.2 Introducing Due Measure 
In the first part of the dialogue, the Stranger attempts to define the statesman using 
the method described at 262a -c: 
`Let's not take off one small part on its own, leaving many large ones behind, and 
without reference to classes; let the part bring a class along with it. It's a really fine 
thing to separate off immediately what one is searching for from the rest, if one gets it 
right - as you thought you had the right division, just before, and hurried the 
argument on, seeing it leading to human beings; but in fact, my friend, it's not safe to 
make thin cuts; it's safer to go along cutting through the middle of things, and that 
way one will be more likely to encounter classes. ' (262a8 - cl, Rowe 1995) 
At 266e, the Stranger introduces a different, 'shorter method which (although it is 
never actually defined) appears to involve moving more directly to the significant 
similarities and differences rather than working systematically through the divisions. 
Soon after this, the use of models is introduced to help identify the significant 
similarities and differences within this shorter approach to division. Weaving is the 
central model which continues throughout the second part of the dialogue, but others 
are also introduced, including medicine, training, helmsmanship and refining gold. 
Due measure is introduced at 283c, in relation to this second approach to division, as 
a tool to assess the relevance of the model which is being used. The Stranger 
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introduces it as a tool to assess whether their long description of weaving has been 
relevant to their enquiry: 
'First then, let's look at excess and deficiency in general, so that we may distribute 
praise and censure proportionately on each occasion when things are said at greater 
length than necessary and when the opposite occurs in relation to such discussions. 
[Younger Socrates] That's what we must do, then. 
If we talked about these very things, I think we'd be proceeding correctly. 
[Younger Socrates] What things? 
About length and brevity and excess and deficiency in general. I suppose the art of 
measurement [h. metretik6 relates to all these things. 
[Younger Socrates] Yes. 
Then let's divide it into two parts; that's what we need towards our present objective. 
[Younger Socrates] Please tell me how we should divide it. 
This way: one part will correspond to the sharing by things in greatness and 
smallness in relation to each other, the other to what producing things necessarily is. 
[Younger Socrates] What do you mean? 
Does it not seem to you that by its nature the greater has to be said to be greater 
than nothing other than the less, and the less in its turn less than the greater, and 
nothing else? 
[Younger Socrates] It does. 
What about this: shan't we also say that there really is such a thing as what exceeds 
the class of what is in due measure to metrion in what we say or indeed in what we 
do, which is just that respect in which those of us who are bad and those who are 
good most differ? ' (283c3 - e6, Rowe, 1995a) 
He explains that measurement against the standard of due measure is different to 
comparative measurement of what is greater against/in comparison to what is less: 
, if someone will admit the existence of the class of the greater in relation to nothing 
other than the less, it will never be in relation to what is in due measure - you agree? 
[Younger Socrates] That's so. ' (284a1 - 4, Rowe, 1995a) 
The Stranger suggests that measurement against due measure is, in fact, an 
essential basis for all technai, including statesmanship - the object of their enquiry - 
and its model, weaving: 
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'Well, with this account of things3 we shall destroy - shan't we? - both the various 
kinds of expertise themselves and their products, and in particular we shall make the 
one we're looking for now, statesmanship, disappear, and the one we said was 
weaving. For I imagine all such kinds of expertise guard against the more and less 
than what is in due measure not as something which is not but as something which is 
and is troublesome in relation to what they do, and it is by preserving measure in this 
way that they produce all good and fine things. 
[Young Socrates] Of course. ' (284a5 - b1, Rowe, 1995a) 
As a result, if they do not acknowledge the existence of the due measure, they will 
never achieve a definition of the statesman's art: 
'Is it the case then that just as with the sophist we compelled what is not into being as 
well as what is, when our argument escaped us down this route, so now it is that we 
must compel the more and less, in their turn, to become measurable not only in 
relation to each other but also in relation to the coming-into-being of what is in due 
measure? For if this has not been agreed, it is certainly not possible for either the 
statesman or anyone else who possesses knowledge of subjects relating to things 
done to have come into being in an undisputed way. ' (284b6 - c3, Rowe 1995a) 
7.3 The origin of due measure 
Due measure appears to make a rather sudden appearance within the Statesman 
and quickly to become the accepted foundation for the discussion. Young Socrates 
seems to accept readily the Stranger's claim that it is the foundation of all technai 
and is willing to let him use it both to judge the relevance of their discussion and to 
define the art of the statesman (as I will discuss in the next two sections of this 
chapter). 
I would suggest, however, that the ground for introducing due measure into a 
discussion about aretö, has already been laid in an earlier dialogue, the Phaedo, in a 
passage (69a6 - c3) which is often regarded as criticising the Protagoras' art of 
measurement and, in particular, its foundation upon hedonism: 
3 That Is, the account of measurement as the greater measured against the lesser (as described at 283e3 - 6). 
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'Yes, Simmias, my good friend; since this may not be the right way to achieve virtue, 
[using] the exchange of pleasures for pleasures, of pains for pains, and of fear for 
fear, greater for lesser ones, [as if these exchanges were] like coins; it may be, 
rather, that this alone is the right coin, which one should use instead of all these false 
coins - wisdom; and the buying and selling of all things for this and with this, may be 
real bravery, temperance, justice, and, in short, true goodness in company with 
wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and all else of that sort be added or taken 
away; but as for their being parted from wisdom and exchanged for one another, 
goodness of that sort may be a kind of illusory facade, and fit for slaves indeed, and 
may have nothing healthy or true about it; whereas, truth to tell, temperance, justice, 
and bravery may in fact be a kind of purification of all such things, and wisdom itself a 
kind of purifying rite. ' (Phaedo, 69a6 - c3, Gallop, 1975 amended) 
Kahn (1996, pp. 234 - 253) suggests that this passage criticises the hedonistic 
calculus of the Protagoras. He argues (p. 251) that, in the Protagoras, Socrates uses 
the hedonistic calculus because it enables him to present a model for knowledge of 
the good which foreshadows and lays a basis for'the stronger, metaphysically 
grounded notion of phronesis we find in the Phaedo'. Kahn believes that Socrates' 
argument in the Protagoras is tongue in cheek and that he is no more committed to 
the hedonistic calculus as the basis of wisdom than he is to 'the virtuoso 
misinterpretation of Simonides' poem' (p. 242). Thus, on Kahn's interpretation, 
Phaedo 69a6 - c3 represents the introduction of a more sophisticated, metaphysical 
model of phronesis which is not founded on hedonism. 
Others see the passage as attacking a particular type of hedonism. Gosling and 
Taylor (1982, pgs. 87 - 95) suggest that if Phaedo 69a6 - c3 is read in the context of 
the discussion of which it forms part - namely Socrates' distinction between the 
philosopher and the lover of the body - the passage does not represent an attack on 
the Protagoras' hedonistic calculus per se or on hedonism as a whole. Instead, it 
challenges those who regard bodily pleasures as relevant items of value. Some 
pleasures, however, are valuable. So, hedonism remains intact and so, implicitly, 
does the hedonistic calculus which the Protagoras presents. 
In fact, I would suggest that 69a -c is not an attack on hedonism in any form. In this 
passage Socrates treats pleasures, pains and fears are facts of life; they have to be 
dealt with and choices made about them. The passage does not seem to provide 
evidence either way as to whether pleasure should be identified with arete. I would 
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argue that, instead, it represents a criticism of those who exchange greater and 
lesser quantities of pleasure (and pain and fear) as the basis for achieving arete 4 At 
the start of the passage, the final object of exchange to which Socrates refers - 
greater for lesser (69a8 -9) - clearly applies to the three objects previously mentioned 
(pleasure, pain and fear) and its position at the end of the list of objects suggests that 
it is the exchange of greater and lesser quantities which Socrates is really criticising. 
The exchange of greater and lesser quantities is being wrongly used like a coin, to 
achieve (buy) aret8.5 
4I Interpret the whole passage as being about how, In practical terms, we achieve are% and would suggest that this 
is made clear by Socrates' Initial claim that the philosbmatos does not make 'h$ Oros areton la laff (69a6 - 7). 
Several commentators suggest that Socrates Is describing Argo as part of an exchange, I. e. as something which is 
received in exchange for something else. This Includes Hackforth (1955) who translates 'r areti n' as'the right 
way to exchange things for virtue' and Luce (1944) who renders It'the right way to purchase virtue'. Yet these 
translations refer to the analogy of trading with coins (an analogy which has not been developed at this stage) and, 
therefore, seem rather premature. Burnet (1911) suggests that Socrates sees a[elt as the standard against which 
any exchange should be judged, and thus translates'2ros aret6n' as 'judged by the standard of goodness'. Archer- 
Hind (1973) translates It more vaguely as 'in respect to virtue'. These translations, however, fail to reflect the 
discussion which Immediately precedes 69a6 - c3. In this discussion Socrates has described the false Argem of the 
majority, which consists In enduring lesser evils to avoid greater ones (68d) and giving up lesser pleasures for the 
sake of greater ones (68e). This Is an exchange (of pleasures for pleasures and pains for pains) - an exchange 
which the majority of people believe achieves ar210. It, therefore, seems likely that, when Socrates says at 69a6 -7 
that it Is'not the right exchange', his point is that It Is not the right way of achieving r $. The translation of 69a6 -7 
as 'this Is not the right exchange with a view to (achieving] Kg& would make this clearer and would establish that the 
passage is concerned with the practical question of how we achieve ; r$ and with offering a positive account of how 
it can be achieved. This translation not only makes a clear link with the preceding discussion, but also reflects that 
the discussion Is now moving forward from a criticism of the life of the philosÖmatos Into a practical and positive 
account of what he must do to put this right. 
5 On my Interpretation, Socrates is suggesting that the exchange of greater and lesser quantities (of pleasures, pains 
and fears) - rather than the quantities themselves - Is being used like a coin to 'buy' a good life. Most commentators, 
however, assume that hbsoer nomismata applies to the pleasures, pains and fears themselves. If we accept this 
Interpretation, the implication Is that quantities of pleasure etc. are exchanged for each other like coins are 
exchanged for each other. Since coins are not usually exchanged for one another, this presents a difficulty which 
commentators have addressed In several ways. Rowe (1993, p. 149), for example, suggests that Socrates actually 
means that pleasures etc. are exchanged for each other like coins are exchanged for goods. Hackforth (1955, p. 192) 
suggests that hbsoer nomismata must be taken to refer not to the actual exchange of coins, but to the fact that we 
value some coins more highly than others, just as we value some pleasures more highly than others. On my 
Interpretation, however, the analogy of coinage can be taken at face value; we no longer have to find a way round the 
problems of coins being exchanged for each other like pleasures, because Socrates Is not suggesting that coins are 
like quantities of pleasure etc.. It Is the various exchanges of the nhilosbmatos which are used like coins to try and 
buy a better life. Although anLc& (69a7) Is singular, and nomismata (69a9) Is plural, Socrates does give three 
examples of the ohiiosbmatos' exchange (pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains and fears for fears). So, we can 
take nomismata as applying to all three exchanges. 
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Later in the passage, Socrates confirms that the exchange of greater and lesser 
quantities has no relevance to achieving a good life: 
`... and the buying and selling of all things for this and with this [i. e. hronesis , may 
be real bravery, temperance, justice, and, in short, true goodness in company with 
wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and all else of that sort be added or taken 
away; (69b1 - 5, Gallop, 1975, amended) 
This part of the passage could be taken as meaning that all pleasures and fears are 
ultimately irrelevant to aretO6 Alternatively, it can be taken as reinforcing Socrates' 
claim that greater and lesser quantities (of pleasure, pain, fear etc. ) have no 
relevance to virtue (while leaving open the possibility that pleasure, pain and fear in 
themselves may still have relevance). On this interpretation, the 'adding' and `taking 
away' of pleasures etc. describes the result of the exchange of greater and lesser 
quantities of pleasure etc. which Socrates discussed earlier in the passage. 
My interpretation of 69a -c as a criticism of the exchange of greater and lesser 
quantities of pleasure, pain and fear as the basis for achieving arete is supported by 
the fact that this is also the object of Socrates' criticism in the dialogue leading up to 
this passage. The mistake of the philosömatos in regarding the quantity of physical 
emotions as significant in his choices and actions is described by Socrates from 68d 
- 69a. The philos6matos only achieves an image of virtue because he is temperate 
only for the sake of greater pleasure in the longer term and courageous only to avoid 
greater evil in the longer-term. In criticising this exchange of greater and lesser 
quantities as the basis for achieving aretb, the Phaedo foreshadows the Statesman, 
which suggests that this cannot be the basis of excellence in any techne. 7 
° Gosling and Taylor (1982, pgs. 92 - 3) interpret It more specifically as a statement that the presence or absence of 
bodily pleasures Is irrelevant to virtue, whereas intellectual pleasures do have value In this respect. 
7 Well, with this account of things (see footnote 3 above) we shall destroy - shan't we? - both the various kinds of 
expertise themselves and their products, and in particular we shall make the one we're looking for now, 
statesmanship, disappear, and the one we said was weaving. For I Imagine all such kinds of expertise guard against 
the more and less than what Is In due measure not as something which is not but as something which is and is 
troublesome In relation to what they do, and it Is by preserving measure in this way that they produce all good and 
fine things. 
[Young Socrates] Of course. ' (Statesman 284a5 - b1, Rowe, 1995a) 
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However, at 69a - c, Socrates not only highlights the wrong way of achieving arete 
but also makes the positive proposal that ohronesis is the 'right coin' with which to 
purchase areto: 
'it may be, rather, that this alone is the right coin, which one should use instead of all 
these false coins - wisdom rr)hron8sis ; (69a9 - 10, Gallop, 1975, amended) 
All other coins (the other things we use in trying to achieve a good life) can be 
'exchanged' for this one, 8 because only by using phroni sis will we be successful in 
this. The phrase panta tauta (69a10), therefore, refers to the worthless coins9 (those 
exchanges of greater and lesser pleasures, pains and fears), 1° used by the 
philosömatos, which, Socrates suggests, should all be 'exchanged' for phronesis (i. e. 
phronesis should be used instead of them). Panta tauta is, therefore, 'all these [false] 
coins' rather than 'all these things' (with the neuter plural case of panta tauta (69a10) 
applying to the false nomismata [69a9 - 10]). Phronesis is the 'coin' which we must 
use to achieve a good life and its role in achieving areto is explored through an 
analogy with trading: " 
'and the buying and selling of all things ants for this toutou , or rather with this 
meta toutou '(69a - b2, Gallop, 1975, amended) 
'kkatallattesthai' [69a10) appears to present the difficulty that coins are not usually exchanged for one another. I 
would suggest, however, that since Socrates is discussing which coin Is the right one to use, we can interpret his 
exhortation to exchange all coins for chronesis, as an exhortation to use Dhron6sls Instead of other coins, in order to 
achieve a good life. By 'exchange for' he, therefore, means 'use Instead of rather than 'swap for' or'trade for". This 
avoids the need to explain why one coin should be swapped/traded for another, since Socrates does not suggest that 
it should be. My interpretation does entail that katallattesthal is used In a different sense here than at 69a8, where it 
does refer to the exchange (i. e. swapping/trading) of pleasures etc. for each other. There is no reason, however, why 
the word must be used in the same sense both times, when it refers to different subjects (namely to pleasures, pains 
and fears at 69a8 and to coins -'all these [false] coins' - at 69a10). 
0 Grammatically'panta' could equally well apply collectively to'hbdonas', '[4Pas' and 'ehobon' (69a7 - 8) as 
most commentators have suggested it does. So, for example, Gallop (1975) translates it 'all these things' (with things 
being the pleasures, pains and fears which the ohilosbmatos exchanges), as does Hackforth (1955) and Weiss 
(1987). I have argued, however, that pleasures, pains and fears are not themselves described as coins within the 
analogy which Socrates draws (see note 43) and so there Is no reason why he should advocate using a different coin 
(hr n i) Instead of them. 
10 The exchanges, rather than the pleasures, pains and fears themselves, are the false coins. 
¶1 A number of commentators fail to distinguish between the simile of coinage at 69a6 -9 and the subsequent 
metaphor of trading (buying and selling) Into which It develops. The two are taken together and described, for 
example, as an'economic metaphor' (Gooch, 1974). This fails to bring out the distinction between the identification of 
hr i as the right currency (through the simile of coinage) and the practical use of this currency In living our lives 
(through the analogy of trading with coins). 
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Here, Socrates explains how phronesis must be used. Firstly, we must sell 
everything for this coin toutou . 
12 Secondly, we must buy everything13 with this coin 
[meta toutoul. Most commentators avoid translating 69a10 - b2 so that it refers 
directly to selling for and buying with phronesis, because of the implication that our 
stock of ahronesis will increase or diminish as a result. 14 However, if Socrates still 
has in mind (as I believe he does)15 that phroni sis is a techne (of measurement), 
then this will not be the case -a techne is something which, once we have acquired 
it, we can use as much as we want without diminishing it. Buying and selling with 
phronesis will (cashing out the analogy) entail using this techn6 as the practical tool 
for making decisions and choices in our lives (about pleasures, pains, fears etc) 
rather than simply exchanging these for each other on the basis of quantityt6 - just as 
we would use a coin as the practical tool for making purchases and sales. It is, thus, 
the use of coinage as a practical tool in living our lives (rather than as the basis of a 
stock of wealth which we can increase or diminish) which is the focus in this analogy. 
The difficulty of how the analogy of trading with coins can apply to phronesis is 
overcome if we consider what Socrates may envisage that phronesis will turn out to 
be and how we will use it in achieving a good life. Without phronesis, he suggests, 
we will be subject to deception in our attempts to achieve a good life: 
12 Taking 'toutou' as genitive of value. 
13 1 interpret'panta' (69b1) as referring to all the choices that are open to us during our life and including, therefore, 
the pleasures, pains and fears to which Socrates has referred at 69a7 - 8. There is nothing in the structure of the 
sentence to suggest that it refers to the aretai which Socrates lists at 69b2 -3 (as, for example, Archer-Hind [1894, 
p. 25] and Dorter [1982, p. 29] claim it does). Nor do I accept Bluck's argument that an refers back to oanta tauta 
at 69a10. I have suggested that pants 1i1 are the false coins that the ohilosbmatos uses and there is thus no 
reason why these should be bought with or sold for Dhronesis. 
"'iqutou men pants &W meta toutou bnoumena IQ l pioraskomena' (69b1- 2) 
The majority of translations of'toutou' attempt to avoid the difficulty of having to explain how we can sell 'for wisdom' 
without affecting our stock of wisdom. Rowe (1993, p. 151) does translate it as '[and everything bought and sold] for 
this' but suggests that Socrates subsequently corrects this by his translation of 'M meta toutou' as 'or rather In the 
company of this'. Luce (1943/44, pp. 61 - 2) believes Socrates is suggesting not that we sell for hr ni, but that we 
exchange our false currencies for Dhron6sis (with toutou referring to our exchange for the correct currency). Yet this 
requires the Interpolation of allattommena after toutou for which there appears no clear evidence. 
Similarly, the majority of translations of 'meta toutou' reflect a concern on the part of commentators that, if it is 
translated as referring directly to buying with hr ni, this creates the difficulty of explaining how we can 'spend' 
wisdom without It diminishing. So, for example, Rowe (1993, p. 151) translates it instead as 'in the company of this 
fghronOsis '. Gooch (1974, p158) renders It'with wisdom's help'. Weiss (1987, p. 59) does translate it as with 
hr nM i' but qualifies her translation by adding [as one's value, aim, or concern]. 
15 A belief which (as I have argued In previous chapters) Is supported by the re-emergence of a model of r as a 
e hn of measurement in the Republic and Statesman. 
16 1 would suggest that this Is the point that Socrates makes at 69b5 - 7. 
172 
`but as for their being parted from wisdom and exchanged for one another, goodness 
of that sort may be a kind of illusory facade Fskiacraphial, and fit for slaves indeed, 
and may have nothing healthy or true about it;... ' (69b5 - 8, Gallop, 1975, amended) 
The language of illusion and deception here reflects the discussion of pleasure in 
Republic Book IX" which, in turn, strongly recalls the discussion of the metretike 
techne in the Protagoras. 18 
In its concern with identifying the wisdom which forms the basis of arete (and ruling 
out the misleading power of appearances) Phaedo 69a -c continues the project 
which Socrates began in the Protagoras. At the end of the passage, Socrates 
returns to his description of a good life as a life devoted to purification of the soul -a 
description which he introduced earlier in the Phaedo in his comparison of the 
philosopher and the Dhilos6matos: 
'whereas, truth to tell, temperance, justice, and bravery may in fact be a kind of 
purification of all such things, and wisdom itself a kind of purifying rite. ' (69b8 - c3, 
Gallop, 1975) 
The use of phronesis has emerged as the practical means (the purifying rite) through 
which he can achieve this. Phronesis enables us to make objective choices, free 
from the concern with maximising pleasure and minimising pain. As a result, 
Qhronesis is now described as a purifying rite (i. e. as the means by which we can 
purify the soul) and arete as the act of purification. So, in returning to the theme of 
purity, Socrates introduces a distinction between arete as the act of purification 
FkatharsisI19 and ahronesis as the rite katharmos 20 through which this act is 
"'So Isn't It necessary, then, for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, mere phantoms 
iI and Illusionist paintings feskiaaraDh2menais of true pleasures? And aren't they so colored by their 
juxtaposition with one another that they appear Intense, beget mad passions for themselves In the foolish, and are 
fought over - as Stesichorus tells us the phantom iIn of Helen was fought over at Troy - through Ignorance of 
the truth. ' (586b7 - c5, Reeve, 2004) 
Is 'So if our well-being had depended on taking steps to get large quantities and avoid small ones, what should we 
have judged to be thing that saves our lives? The art of measurement or the power of appearances [ham IQy 
p gjnomenou dunamis ? The latter, as we saw, confuses us and makes us often change our minds about the same 
things and vacillate back and forth In our actions and choices or large and small things; but measurement would have 
made these appearances (tQ phantasmal powerless, and given us peace of mind by showing us the truth and letting 
us get a firm grasp of It and so would have changed our lives. ' 
'° Luce (1943/44, p. 63) translates katharsis as 'consummated purification' - that is, as the end result of the 
purificatory rite. He cites the scholium of Olympiodorus on this passage (where katharsis is predicated of completed 
are t6) as evidence for his translation. While I accept Luce's distinction between katharsis as the end and katharmos 
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accomplished. In introducing this distinction, Socrates summarises the achievement 
of 69a6 - c3 - namely to identify the use of ahronesis as the practical means by 
which we can purify the soul. In the Statesman, it will emerge that using phronesis 
involves referring to due measure in all the decisions we make in life. The Phaedo 
lays the foundation for this by making clear that the wisdom which forms the basis of 
arete cannot be founded upon the measurement of greater and lesser quantities and, 
thus (by implication), that if a good life is to be measurable in the way that the 
Protagoras has suggested, a different type of measurement will be required. 
7.4 Key Features of Due Measure 
At Statesman 284e, the Stranger explains in more detail what he means by due 
measure and how it is distinguished from measurement as we normally envisage it: 
'It's clear we would divide the art of measurement, cutting it in two in just the way we 
said, positing as one part of it all those kinds of expertise that measure the number, 
lengths, depths, breadths and speeds of things in relation to the opposite, and as the 
other, all those that measure in relation to what is in due measure, what is fitting, the 
right moment, what is as it ought to be - everything that removes itself from the 
extremes to the middle. ' (284e2 - 8, Rowe, 1995a) 
From this we are able to identify four key features of measurement against due 
measure: 
(i) Measurement against due measure entails evaluation against a standard 
The stranger makes a distinction between 
- comparative measurement of one quantity against another; 
- measurement against a standard (due measure) of what is appropriate. 
In this way, he makes clear that measurement in relation to due measure involves an 
evaluative judgement about what is appropriate. This is in contrast to measurement 
as the means of purification, I would suggest that katharsis can be translated simply as 'act of purification'. Socrates' 
point is that if we are to devote our life to the activity of purification kh i) of our soul, then we must use the right 
means of conducting this activity. If we do not use the right katharmos then we will not accomplish the act of 
purification. 
20 Burnet (1911, p. 69) explains that katharmos Is a specifically religious term for the Initiatory ceremony of 
purification. I translate it'purifying rite'. 
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which merely establishes the factual size/quantity of something as a basis for 
comparing it against something else. The first example which Socrates gives of this 
evaluative judgement is in relation to their own enquiry into the art of the statesman: 
`Well, I say that you and I must be careful to remember what we have now said and 
distribute censure and praise of both shortness and length, whatever subjects we 
happen to be talking about on each occasion, judging lengths not in relation to each 
other but, in accordance with the part of the art of measurement we previously said 
we must remember, in relation to what is fitting. ' (286c5 - d2, Rowe, 1995) 
In this particular example the Stranger suggests that their evaluative judgement 
about the appropriate length for their discussion will be made on the basis of what 
will best achieve an improvement in their skills as dialecticians (286d4 - 287a6, 
Rowe, 1995). 
(ii) Measurement against due measure entails quantitative measurement 
Many commentators interpret due measure as a non-quantitative form of 
measurement. For example, Rosen (1995) talks about arithmetical and non- 
arithmetical measurement. Lafrance (1995) makes a distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative measurement. Skemp (1952) suggests that, through due measure, 
Plato'clears himself of adherence to mere mathematical measurement'. Lane (1998, 
p. 127) sees the introduction of due measure as 'a considerable polemic' against the 
measurement of number which 'is distanced from its close customary links with order 
and understanding, portrayed instead as a purely comparative task'. 
However, as discussed above, the distinction made at 284e2 -8 is not between 
quantitative and non-quantitative measurement, but between comparative 
measurement and measurement against a standard. In the text, the grammatical 
object of both these forms of measurement is: 'the number, lengths, depths, breadths 
and speeds of things. ' Both are still concerned with mathematical measurement of 
features which can be expressed in mathematical terms, but the dialogue suggests 
that they can be measured relatively or against a specific standard. So, we can say 
that the dialogue is longer or shorter (than another dialogue) or that it is the right 
length. In either case, there will still be a quantitative and mathematical judgement 
involved. Due measure still requires quantitative measurement. The Stranger makes 
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clear that this is the case for dialectic where due measure is primarily concerned with 
measuring the appropriate length of their discussion: 
'About length and brevity and excess and deficiency in general. I suppose the art of 
measurement [h6 metretik8 relates to all these things. 
[Younger Socrates] Yes. 
Then let's divide it into two parts; that's what we need towards our present objective. ' 
(283c11 - d5, Rowe, 1995a) 
Here again, the Stranger indicates that both parts of measurement are concerned 
with measuring length and brevity. Furthermore, the language used to evaluate the 
progress of their search for the statesman reflects the quantitative basis of due 
measure. For example, at 274e5, the Younger Socrates asks 'how great' fr)osoni 
their mistake has been and the Stranger replies that in one sense it was 'lesser' 
(brachuteronl but in another sense much 'greater' oIISi meizon and 'more 
extensive' leon . At 277, when the Stranger is analysing the errors they have made 
so far, he suggests they have used 'large-scale illustrations' [me gala paradeigmata, 
277b3 - 4], a 'mass o kon, 277b4] of material' and a 'greater part' meizon meros, 
277b5] of the myth than was necessary. Like sculptors, they have gone wrong 'by 
making additions and increasing the size of the various parts of their work beyond 
what is necessary' (277a7 - b1, Rowe, 1995a). The language used reflects 
quantitative standards as well as evaluative judgement. 
While it could be argued that the Stranger is using the language of quantity 
metaphorically (rather than genuinely intending that these features should be 
expressed in numerical terms), the grammatical structure of 284c2 -8 counts against 
this, as does the fact that, in applying due measure to dialectic, it is still the length of 
their conversation that the Stranger is concerned with measuring. 
(iii) Due measure is an independent2' and obiective standard of goodness 
Rosen (1995) suggests that a key feature of due measure is that it is dependent 
upon human intentionality. He argues that 'in non-arithmetical measurement, 
everything measured is excessive, deficient or suitable with respect to a human 
purpose. Nothing is excessive, deficient or suitable in itself (p. 121). This could mean 
21 Independent of human Intention. 
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that due measure is simply what is required or appropriate to achieve our purpose - 
the purpose itself may be good or bad. So, when the Stranger remarks at 283e5 -6 
that due measure is 'just that respect in which those of us who are bad and those 
who are good most differ, ' he may, on Rosen's interpretation, mean good only in the 
sense of 'able to achieve our purpose'. According to Rosen, due measure is a 
subjective form of measurement based upon what we want to achieve. 
When, however, at 284a, the Stranger clarifies the role of due measure in techne, his 
explanation seems to be at odds with Rosen's interpretation: 
'For I imagine all such kinds of expertise guard against fparaphulatteiný the more and 
less than what is in due measure not as something which is not but as something 
which is and is troublesome chafe on in relation to what they do, and it is by 
preserving measure in this way that they produce all good a atha and fine kala 
things. ' (284a8 - b1, Rowe, 1995a) 
The Stranger presents due measure as an objective standard of goodness - to which 
we must refer in undertaking any techne. The language he uses makes clear that 
due measure is not an integral part of our own intentions, but a challenging external 
standard which we must 'guard against' and which is 'troublesome' for us to achieve. 
He describes something which is external to us and which we must take account of in 
our actions. Furthermore, he suggests that the product resulting from a techne which 
has made reference to due measure is not only good but fine kalon . It is unlikely 
that the Stranger would use kalon to describe something which does no more than 
reflect/achieve the craftsman's purpose - instead it describes something which has 
achieved an objective standard of goodness/praiseworthiness. The Stranger 
illustrates how this standard is applied in the case of the techne which is their 
immediate concern - dialectic: 
'Well, I say that you and I must be careful to remember what we have now said and 
distribute censure and praise of both shortness and length, whatever subjects we 
happen to be talking about on each occasion, judging lengths not in relation to each 
other but in accordance with kata the part of the art of measurement we previously 
said we must remember, in relation to what is fitting [pros to pre on . '(286c5 - d2, 
Rowe, 1995a) 
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Due measure is established as the objective standard of goodness which is the basis 
for each techne achieving what, in its own sphere, is good and fine. The Stranger 
also hints that this standard of goodness has a wider significance in relation to an 
absolute standard of truth: 'That at some time we shall need what has now been said 
toward the demonstration in relation to the precise truth auto takribes itself. ' (284d1 
-2, Rowe, 1995a). 
22 Even without this significance, however, due measure has 
provided an objective standard (a standard which the Stranger summarises as 
'everything that removes itself from the extremes to the middle') for excellence in 
techne. 
(iv) Due measure incorporates measurement of kairos 
At 284e2-8, the Stranger describes due measure as measurement of 'what is fitting, 
the right moment kairos , what is as it ought to be - everything that removes itself 
from the extremes to the middle. ' 
He makes clear that measurement of kairos (the right moment) forms part of due 
measure. Wilson (1980) argues that kairos is 'part of a litany of traditional value 
words which lend emotional support' to the Stranger's introduction due measure (by 
this he appears to mean that it is part and parcel of due measure and adds nothing to 
its meaning) in the Statesman and is thus 'at least by association, elevated to a 
principle of great importance' (p. 200). In support of his argument, Wilson discusses 
the meaning of kairos in Greek literature, and argues that, in classical literature, it is 
generally used in the sense of due measure, or the mean, whereas in later literature 
it is used in a temporal context to mean the right time. 
Lane (1998), however, suggests that the something can only be appropriate or in due 
measure relative to its time or context Fkairos . This is precisely the point which the 
Stranger raises at 294, with regard to laws: 
'That law could never accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the 
same time, and so prescribe what is best; for the dissimilarities between human 
beings and their actions, and the fact that practically nothing in human affairs ever 
remains stable, prevent any kind of expertise whatsoever from making any simple 
22 Rowe (1 995a, p. 208) points out that the precise truth Itself could simply refer to the precise account of the 
statesman but acknowledges that'At the same time, we should not miss the unmistakeable signals E. S. has given us 
about the Importance, In a wider context, about the notion of measure... ' 
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decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time. ' (294a10 - b6, 
Rowe, 1995a) 
At 305, the Stranger gives an example of how the statesman applies his knowledge 
of kairos: 
'If then one looks at all the kinds of expert knowledge that have been discussed, it 
must be observed that none of them has been declared to be statesmanship. For 
what is really kingship must not itself perform practical tasks, but control those with 
the capacity to perform them, because it knows when it is the right time e kairias to 
begin and set in motion the most important things in cities and when it is the wrong 
time akairias ; and the others must do what has been prescribed for them. ' (305c9 - 
d4, Rowe, 1995a) 
By making kairos part of due measure, Plato ensures that (unlike written laws) due 
measure is a standard which has practical value within the changing context of the 
world in which we live. While kairos is an integral part of due measure, it plays (as 
Lane argues) a particular role within it, and its meaning cannot (as Wilson suggests) 
be subsumed into the overall definition of due measure as 'everything that removes 
itself from the extremes to the middle. ' 
7.5 Due Measure and Dialectic 
Due Measure is first introduced within the Statesman at 283c if. as a principle for 
judging whether what has been said so far is of an appropriate length in relation to 
their enquiry (in response to the Young Socrates' claim that their definition of 
weaving has been too lengthy). Santa Cruz (1995, p. 192) argues that due measure is 
presented primarily as the basis of dialectic, and that the dialogue's principal aim is to 
illustrate due measure in dialectic - the subject of enquiry, statesmanship, is 
secondary to the enquiry itself. She suggests that the dialogue as a whole is an 
illustration of due measure through dichotomy, myth and paradigm. Her view is 
supported by the Stranger's claim at 285d: 
'What then about our inquiry now about the statesman? Has it been set before us 
more for the sake of that very thing, or for the sake of our becoming more able 
dialecticians in relation to all subjects? 
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[Young Socrates] That's clear too - for the sake of our being more able in relation to 
all. ' (285d4 - 8, Rowe, 1995a). 
If we take this at face value, the whole process of finding the statesman is primarily 
an exercise in due measure in dialectic. However, Lane (1998) argues against this 
and concludes (p. 202) that, in the Statesman, 'method and politics become one'. She 
claims that Plato presents due measure as the basis both for doing philosophy and 
for political decision-making. In the next section, I will explore how Plato applies due 
measure to the art of the statesman and will argue in support of Lane's view. In the 
meantime, it is worth pointing out that Lane's argument is supported by drawing a 
parallel with the Protagoras where a discussion which is apparently concerned with 
dialectical method has a significant relevance to the dialogue's final conclusion about 
arete. 23 A standard of measurement is presented as a dialectical tool to help move 
the discussion forward (by resolving a disagreement about how long Protagoras' 
answers should be). However, it emerges that a standard of measurement is also the 
basis of arete so here too, measurement is the basis for doing philosophy and for 
living our lives. 
In the Protagoras, the type of measurement which is proposed as the basis of 
dialectic is rather different from that which is proposed as the basis of arete. Dialectic 
is about finding a middle length in their discussions, whereas arete is about 
maximisation of pleasure. However, in the Statesman, this middle length becomes 
the basis for living our lives too. To this extent, the 'digression' in the Protagoras 
looks forward and gives us of a preview of the sketch of arete which will finally 
emerge in the Statesman. 
7.6 Due Measure and the Art of the Statesman 
Later in the dialogue, due measure is taken out of its dialectical context into the realm 
of politics and the statesman. Although the specific term 'to metrion' is not mentioned 
directly in relation to the statesman, it becomes evident that it is also the basis of 
statesmanship - the statesman, like the dialectician, needs to judge 'what is fitting, 
the right moment, what is as it ought to be' and 'everything that removes itself from 
the extremes to the middle' (284e6 - 8). 
23 As discussed In Chapter 1 
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The Stranger explains that one aspect of the statesman's role involves controlling all 
other technai, by determining when it is appropriate for each craft to be practised 
(and when not): 24 
'For what is really kingship must not itself perform practical tasks, but control those 
with the capacity to perform them, because it knows when it is the right time 
e kairias to begin and set in motion the most important things in cities and when it 
is the wrong time Fakairlas ; and the others must do what has been presented for 
them. ' (305d1 -4, Rowe, 1995a) 
However, not only does the statesman 'weave together' the different technai within 
the state, 25 but he also 'weaves together' different types of people - the courageous 
and the moderate - into an integrated and ordered whole: 26 
'For this is the single and complete task of kingly weaving-together, never to allow 
moderate dispositions to stand away from the courageous, but why working them 
closely into each other as if with a shuttle, though sharing of opinions, through 
honours, dishonour, esteem, and the giving of pledges to one another, drawing 
together a smooth and 'fine-woven' fabric out of them, as the expression is, always to 
entrust offices in cities to these in common. ' (310e7 - 311a2, Rowe, 1995a) 
In order to do this successfully, he must ensure that the state admits as citizens only 
those with the right disposition to be 'mixed' by the statesman. 7 This entails: 
" making sure that anyone involved in education within the state works towards 
developing a disposition in their pupils which is fitting re on, 308e7] to 
contribute to the 'fine-woven' fabric which will is the final outcome; 
9 those who are unable to develop such a disposition because they are 
inherently evil are removed from the state; 
24 Thus applying his knowledge of Lai M, which is an Integral part of due measure. 
26 In the sense of co-ordinating when each of them is practised. 
26 Thus the Stranger demonstrates the statesman's concern with 'everything that removes itself from the extremes to 
the middle'. Courage and moderation are both presented as extremes of character, with the statesman creating a 
balance between them in the state. 
21 Here the Stranger demonstrates the statesman's concern with what Is 'fitting' rn In relation to the state. 
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" those who are unable to develop such a disposition because they are 
ignorant or base [ta einotes are subjected to slavery: 
`In just this very way, it seems to me that the art of kingship, since it is this that itself 
possesses the capacity belonging to the directing art, will not permit the educators 
and tutors, who function according to law, to do anything in the exercise of their role 
the working out of which will not result in some disposition which is fitting re on in 
relation to the mixing that belongs to the directing art, and calls on them to teach 
these things alone; and those that are unable to share in a disposition that is 
courageous and moderate, and the other things that belong to the sphere of virtue, 
but are thrust forcibly away by an evil nature into godlessness, excess and injustice, 
it throws out by killing them, sending them into exile, and punishing them with the 
most extreme forms of dishonour. 
[Young Socrates] At least it is put something like this. 
And again those who wallow in great ignorance and baseness it brings under the 
yoke of the class of slaves. ' (308e4 - 309a6, Rowe, 1995a) 
At 311, the Stranger describes the final product of the statesman's art: 
'Then let us say that this marks the completion of the fabric which is the product of 
the art of statesmanship, the weaving together, with regular intertwining, of the 
disposition of brave and moderate people, when the expertise belonging to the king, 
bringing their life together in agreement and friendship and making it common 
between them, completing the most magnificent and best of all fabrics and covering 
all the other inhabitants of cities, both slave and free, holds them together with this 
twining and, so far as it belongs to a city to be happy, not falling short of this in any 
respect, rules and directs. ' (311 b7 - c6, Rowe, 1995a) 
Due measure which, earlier in the dialogue, has been established as the basis of 
dialectic, turns out to be the basis of statesmanship too - and the Stranger illustrates 
in detail how the statesman applies due measure to create excellence in the state. To 
this extent, as Lane argued, dialectic and statesmanship have become one. 
However, there may be another, more fundamental, way in which the two are the 
same art. In chapter six, I suggested that, in Republic Book VI (484c -d), Socrates 
uses an analogy with art and the metaphor of sight to explain the integral relationship 
which he envisages between practical and philosophical wisdom. He suggests that 
the practical standard of arete (justice) against which we measure our lives must, if it 
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is to enable us to live a better life, also be a standard of absolute truth to 
alethestaton, 484c7]. It can, therefore, only be understood by those who, through 
philosophy, have gained an understanding of the true nature of justice. He thus 
emphasises the dependence of the practical standard of justice by which we live our 
lives upon philosophical understanding of what is truly just. If, in the Statesman, Plato 
is presenting due measure - the practical standard by which the statesman achieves 
arete in the state - as a reflection of the absolute truth, 28 then the art of 
statesmanship can only be practised by those who have grasped the absolute truth 
through philosophy. If this is the case, then dialectic (the art of the philosopher) will 
be an integral part of the art of the statesman. This would also make more sense of 
the Stranger's claim at 285d that their enquiry into the art of the statesman is 'for the 
sake of our becoming more able dialecticians in relation to all subjects' - in 
discovering the art of the statesman we will also discover the art of pursuing the truth 
on all subjects. 29 
28 As the stranger hints at 284d 1 -2. 
29 Furthermore, to this extent, the Statesman does achieve a definition of both the statesman and the philosopher. 
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Sketching the `Söteria Tou Biou' 
Plato and the Art of Measurement 
Conclusion - Completing the Sketch 
I suggested in chapter six that, in the Republic, Socrates reintroduces an account of 
arete as the measurement of pleasure in our lives - with pleasure consisting of the 
pursuit of an ordered state of soul. In doing so, Socrates reinforces and builds upon 
the claim he made in the Gorgias - that arete is the ability to achieve an ordered 
state of soul. He also reinstates the Protagoras' metretike techne, but in an enhanced 
form which takes account of its original weaknesses (while retaining its strengths). It 
still offers the maximisation of pleasure as an objective and determinate basis for 
judging the nature of a good life, and as an account of our motivation for pursuing 
such a life - but it is now underpinned by an account of pleasure which is line with 
Socrates' argument in the Gorgias and Republic that a good and kalon life consists in 
the pursuit of an ordered state of soul. 
However, the Republic leaves unanswered the question of how, in practical terms, 
we actually measure an ordered state of soul. As I discussed in chapter seven, the 
Statesman addresses this by exploring how order between the different technai and 
different types of character within the state can be judged and measured so as to 
achieve excellence within the state. It reaches the conclusion that it can be measured 
against the standard of to metrion - due measure. Due measure provides a way of 
articulating a qualitative state of order ('what is fitting, the right moment, what is as it 
ought to be') in quantitative terms - and thus of expressing it objectively and 
determinately. It provides a basis for the statesman to judge accurately and 
objectively how he should act on each occasion so as to achieve order in the state. 
Furthermore, it does so in terms which can take account of specific and changing 
circumstances and contexts, ' and so can cope with the reality of the world within in 
which the statesman lives. 
1Through the Incorporation of kairos within the standard of due measure as discussed In chapter seven. 
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In the Republic arete was presented as the pursuit of order within the individual soul 
as well as within the state. In the Statesman, however, the focus is upon achieving 
order in the state, by creating balance and harmony between the different types of 
citizens and technai within the state. I would suggest that this points to a growing 
conviction on Plato's part that the order which is the basis of arete is achieved by an 
individual citizen through the part he or she plays within the state (i. e. the extent to 
which they contribute to the order of the state) and that their contribution is achieved 
through the intervention of the statesman. On this account, individual arete is 
achieved when the individual contributes to the order (arete) of the state to the best 
of their ability. Gould (1955) suggests that the ethical philosophy of the early Socratic 
dialogues presents an individual model of aret8 which gradually develops through 
dialogues including the Meno, Republic, Timaeus, Politicus and Philebus to the 
collective model of arete which emerges in the Laws, where the state is the source of 
aret8 through the laws and through the way in which it educates and rules its 
citizens. 2 It could be argued that the development of a collective model of arete can 
be seen in the way that Socrates' account of aret8 as the art of measurement 
develops from the measurement of individual goodness in the Protagoras, through 
the Gorgias, 3 to the measurement of goodness within the state in the Statesman. 
However, I do not accept Gould's view that by the later dialogues, Plato has 
accepted that aret8 is 'beyond the reach of the majority' and can only exist in the 
state as a whole, rather than in the individual. Instead, I support Christopher 
Bobonich's argument (2002, Chapter 10) that the Statesman represents a 
progression towards a model where the intervention of the state is the basis for 
individual aret8 and happiness. The Statesman's application of due measure has a 
key role in achieving arete for each individual by enabling them to contribute, to the 
best of their ability, to order in the state. 
In the Protagoras, Socrates set out to sketch the type of wisdom which is sufficient 
for arete and can thus be the salvation of our lives. The Statesman, in depicting the 
basilike techne (311 c5) as the art of measurement against the standard of due 
measure, completes the sketch of arete as the art of measurement which Socrates 
began in the Protagoras. It develops the Protagoras' original sketch of arete as the 
2A key aspect of this development, according to Gould, is the emergence of a 'reality principle' as Plato comes to 
recognise that knowledge cannot apply to the sensible world of particulars. This puts it beyond the reach of the 
majority who are, of course, immersed in the sensible world. ' (p. 193) 
3 Where, as I discussed in chapter five, Socrates suggests that individual rtU requires the intervention of the 
politician. 
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metretike techne, by underpinning it with an account of arete as order within the 
state, the while retaining its essential strengths by offering: 
"a determinate basis for the statesman to make decisions about how citizens 
should live, through its foundation upon an objective and quantifiable 
standard for a good state to metrion ; 
" an account of each citizen's motivation to act consistently upon the 
statesman's judgement of what it is right to do. The Stranger claims that 
basilikd techne will result in a state where the lives of its citizens are as happy 
as possible. I would suggest that underpinning this claim is an account of 
real pleasure (such as Socrates put forward in Republic IX) as the pursuit of 
order within in the soul. It is by acting upon the judgements of the statesman 
that each citizen will, as far as possible, achieve order in their own soul and 
thus maximise their own pleasure. 
In achieving this, the basilike techne represents the culmination of a process of 
developing and refining the metretike techne through the Gorgias, Phaedo and 
Republic. Socrates returns5 at the end of the Statesman to confirm that they have 
indeed completed a otelein, 31 1c7] their search for the statesman. However, in 
doing so he also marks the completion another much longer search6 for the `söteria 
tou biou'. Rowe's translation brings out well the fact that a portrait has been 
completed: 
[Old Socrates] Another most excellent portrait, Stranger, this one that you have 
completed for us, of the man who possesses the art of kingship: the statesman. 
(311 c7 - 8, Rowe, 1995a) 
I would suggest, however, that the picture which has been completed is not only a 
portrait of the statesman but also a sketch of the type of wisdom which would be 
sufficient for arete and which thus represents the 'sSteria tou biou'. 
`Then let us say that this marks the completion of the fabric which Is the product of the art of statesmanship: the 
weaving together, with regular intertwining, of the dispositions of brave and moderate people - when the expertise 
belonging to the king brings their life together in agreement and friendship and makes It common between them, 
completing the most magnificent and best of all fabrics and covering with all the other Inhabitants of cities, both slave 
and free; and holds them together with this twining and rules and directs without, so far as It belongs to a city to be 
happy, falling short of that in any respect. (311 b-c, Rowe, 1995a). 
6 See Rowe (1995a, p. 245) for the arguments for attributing the final statement of the dialogue to Socrates himself. 
And I would speculate that this may be another reason for his return. 
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It remains as a sketch, however, because there is still more work to do. In particular, 
the Statesman leaves unexplored the key question of how, in practice, the standard 
of due measure, by which the statesman rules the state, relates to the absolute truth 
about what is good - this connection is only hinted at. I would suggest that this 
question is left for the Philebus and the Timaeus. Both dialogues move away from 
the political world of the Statesman, yet both are concerned with the principle of due 
measure. In the Philebus, this is in relation to the balance of elements within 
goodness and in the Timaeus it is in relation to the mathematical principles which 
underpin cosmic order. In these dialogues, the sketch of söteria tou biou' will develop 
into a fuller illustration which will place the kosmos, which is the basis of due 
measure, in the context of the broader truth upon which due measure is founded. 
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